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ABSTRACT
Negotiating New ICTs in the Education Sector in Afghanistan -
Participation, Adoption and Appropriation
Melanie Stilz
The importance of a participatory component has become broadly accepted in today’s
international development programs. Accordingly, most organisations dealing with
technology-use strategies in the education sector in Afghanistan highlight concepts like
‘empowerment’, ‘Afghan ownership’ and ‘partnership’ in their project descriptions. Yet
the definition of participation ranges from the idea that all stakeholders should actively
take part to a more narrow concept of extracting local knowledge to design programs
externally. This limited participation is in the case of ICTs often further reinforced by
technology being seen as a black box1 (a stable ‘input-output device’) with a predefined
optimal application that needs to be taught by the technology experienced West to those
in need of development. This is often even motivated by particular ideas about how
the technology should support certain educational practice and organisational structures.
In my PhD thesis I explore the evolution and consequences of ICT project design
and implementation from the perspectives of different actors involved in, or affected by,
the intervention. The empirical aspects are centred on three examples all located in
the Afghanistan setting: a school-laptop project, a university network infrastructure
project and the broader question concerning what role ICT capacity building plays. As
a consultant in the field I was able to follow the projects’ development over the course of
several of years and gained profound insight. The research is informed by a broad-based
review of the research literature in fields of communication and development, Science
and Technology Studies and related areas. Approaches from each field contributed
substantially but also each showed their individual limitations with regard to this study.
The ‘Technology-in-Use’ perspective by Carroll (2004) is suggested as a suitable starting
point for an interdisciplinary approach.
keywords: ICT4D, Development Communication, Participation, Technology
Appropriation
1 Other than in science studies, the term “black box” is mostly used with a positive connotation by
computer scientists, meaning a system needs little or no maintenance
xi
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 (Re-?)Constructing Afghanistan
In Afghanistan, it seems easy to justify why technology projects fail – who can be blamed?
Electricity is unreliable, internet access not everywhere easily available, expensive and
often slow and local staff mostly inexperienced with new technologies. Afghanistan’s
physical communication infrastructure – be it roads, electricity, postal service or phone
lines – was in 2001, after 30 years of war and conflict, next to non-existent. Since the
civil war in the early 1990s most universities had been unable to offer regular service
and non of them had any computer lab.
But infrastructure development, increasing internet access and ICT capacity building
efforts of the past years slowly start to reveal that there is more to making a technology
‘work’ than just uninterrupted service. When I first came to Herat in 2005, as a lecturer
for computer science, the university, like most higher education institutions, was in a
state of reorganisation. A campus was in the planning, the faculties were distributed all
over the town, with a different donor supporting each. Most of the students had just
returned from neighbouring Iran or Pakistan, others had lived in Afghanistan for the
past two decades: under the communists, the warlords, the Taliban and most recently a
democratically elected government. It was difficult to fit the hardware and concepts we
had brought with us into this setting, and most of the time we only succeeded with the
help of our students.
The first time I really started thinking about technology and context, however, was
not about information technology, but when the topic of cars came up. Most of our
students loved shiny fast sports cars, pictures posing in front of a Porsche or a Ferrari
in a shopping mall in Delhi or Dubai where popular screen savers (this was before
Facebook) – but these cars belonged somewhere else and were not seen as something
1
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desirable for Afghanistan. The roads are too bumpy to drive really fast and there is
hardly any car on the road whose doors are not full of scratches and dents. A good car
needs durable shock absorbers and it’s more the inside that shines: carpets, pillows,
curtains and, for those who can afford it, a small screen on top of the dashboard to
entertain the driver with music videos during heavy traffic.
I started to recognize such differing preferences, adaptations and workarounds with
regard to ICT as well. There were these imported systems and settings that we were
struggling to keep running; and there were local internet cafés whose owners probably
did not have a professional technical education and also did not have the same resources
and equipment. Yet they, too, managed to keep their systems running and earn a living
somehow.
Rebuilding Afghanistan’s physical infrastructure became one of the top-priorities of
the international community, and the Ministry of Communication’s ambitious plans
regarding the role of digital technologies found general approval. With the rise of the
Internet in the mid 1990s, especially since the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in
2000 and the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in 2003, Information and
Communication Technologies (ICT) have received increasing attention in development
initiatives. The demand by the international-development community for novel solutions
to persistent socioeconomic challenges, the expansion of the ICT industry into emerging
markets as well as corporate philanthropy of big IT companies have resulted in a wave
of digital initiatives. With so many different stakeholders involved, expenditure on ICTs
in development is hard to estimate, and said to be ranging from hundreds of millions to
tens of billions of U.S. dollars per year (Toyama: 2010).
Surprisingly, when regarding these numbers, there is little beyond anecdotal evidence
as to what role ICT plays, and has played, in achieving the MDGs such as poverty reduc-
tion, primary education, or gender equality, and despite being seen by the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as a crucial factor in achieving
them (Gevaert (2011), OECD (2005)). Due to the large sums (still) being spent here by
the aid industry, many technology projects in developing countries have become pilot
laboratories ranging from bottom-up community-based mobile-empowerment programs1
to top-down market-led private-public-partnership (PPP) approaches2.
Considering this attention towards ICT as one central aspect to development interven-
1 A good example of what some also call “pilotitis” is given in this article: Hagen (2013)
2 Increased attention by PPPs in recent years was given to tech incubators, like the one in Herat,
Afghanistan, funded by Google, IBM and the DoD (fastcompany.com: 2011)
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tions – in particular since Smart-phones and Social Media have reached all corners of
the globe – it is also astonishing that few programs actually focus on ICT as a means in
itself ("how does a mobile-phone work and what does it depend on?"), instead of utilising
ICT as a tool to serve a specific developmental goal ("how can a mobile-phone be used
to distribute information to remote areas").
In Afghanistan, in the last 10 years, various international stakeholders started to build
what began as “ICT islands” in the education sector: VSAT internet connections, PC
labs for schools or IT centres for universities to name just a few. Partnering these ICT
initiatives in most cases are representatives of three groups: funding agencies, practi-
tioners and various local interest groups – which of course are not mutually exclusive
– uniting different age, gender, social and cultural backgrounds. In this study I will
examine the complex interplay between these groups that are involved in ICT projects in
the education sector in Afghanistan. As in most “development cooperation” or “global
aid architecture”1 programs, donors, implementing organisations, contractors and local
partners and interest groups come from very different backgrounds but depend on each
others’ cooperation and support to implement a project.
I also want to pay particular attention to the local situation in Afghanistan with its
conflicting interests on the ground – which is certainly unique in its specifics, if not
regarding the phenomenon in general – and their effect on cooperation and decision
making regarding the education sector and new digital technologies. Different political
and ethnic groups within the country have been in conflict for the past 30 years, with
sometimes more, sometimes less interference from the outside, raising the questions of
how these past front-lines are dealt with in Afghanistan today, and how they influence
power-relations in the education sector? I want to observe how different goals and
perceptions on the one hand, and the level of involvement of these different actors on the
other, influence the project framework, the choice of technologies, their use concepts and
content. I want to look at the different intentions within each of these groups, how they
interact with each other and negotiate their strategies and how decisions are formed,
despite often conflicting preferences.
1 The notion of “development” and its implications for the so-called “developing world” has increasingly
been contested in recent years by “post-development” scholars (for an overview see Ziai (2007))
and will also be discussed briefly in chapter 2.1. In the following I will use the terms development,
developing countries and developed countries as well as the West and Western countries as part of a
language that was, and is, predominantly used both in the field and most of my literature.
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1.2 Deconstructing ICT projects in Afghanistan
The key research issue is to gain a better understanding as to why some ICT projects
in developing countries are seen as successful, while others – in fact most – do not
accomplish their intended goals, being shut down shortly after the project was handed
over to the local partners or get absorbed or transformed to serve an entirely different
purpose. A prominent example from previous international ICT initiatives are tele-
centres, intended to enhance the empowerment of the poor and marginalized through
education and information supply and which often shut down for economic reasons after
the funding ended or were only sustainable in urban areas, serving those who can afford
the charge (Proenza: 2001). This raises questions regarding how decisions about ICT
initiatives are formed in an early stage, how cooperation among the involved actors is
organised, how these decisions are modified during the implementation process and how
these ICTs, intended or unintended, are adopted, rejected and interpreted by the users?
Context, participation and a concentration on the actor comprise core tenets in
the cross-disciplinary sets of literature that inform my research: Communication for
Development (C4D), Science and Technology Studies (STS) as well as Information and
Communication Technologies for Development (ICT4D). C4D has a long tradition in
addressing programs that use communication for the purposes of social change, the goals
themselves vary with the underlying approach taken to development (Wilkins: 2008).
From the dominant paradigm’s top-down, one-way and linear-growth perspective during
the 1950s and 60s, C4D research moved towards a stronger consideration of the social
and economic structures with an emphasis on dialogical communication, participation
and empowerment.
Though New ICTs have in recent years increasingly complemented or replaced older
media and communication technologies such as television, radio and newspapers and
also gained more significance in C4D initiatives (Wilkins: 2008), digital technologies like
mobile phones or laptops are barely addressed beyond their being a tool for communica-
tion.
The field of Information and Communication Technologies for Development (ICT4D)
emerged during the mid 1990s, when the Internet and new digital technologies became
diffused and supplied a new means for development linked with many hopes and visions
(Kozma: 2005). Solutions are often seen within hardware-innovations and local partici-
pation is seen as desirable but difficult (Heeks: 2009). Similarly the focus on technology
projects in Afghanistan is mostly on making a technology work despite the unstable
environment. Considerations on content and use of a technology and local participation,
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first of all depend on establishing a ‘stable technology’.
Questioning the common sense views positioning technology as a determinant of
practice, the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) has led to the development
of perspectives in which technology is treated as the consequence of practice (Oliver:
2011). In their perspective on the Social Construction Of Technology (SCOT), Pinch
and Bijker (1987) argued that the success of a technology depends on the impact and
scope of the group that take it up and promote it. Technological objects such as New
ICTs are often perceived by users as ‘black boxes’ (a stable ‘input-output device’) with
ordinary users paying little attention to the objects’ inner workings (Proulx: 2008). STS
aims to deconstruct the black-boxing process and look at the social context influencing
its creation, acceptance, adaptation or rejection.
Another perspective on the relationship between technology and humans that de-
veloped within STS and influenced my research approach is Actor-Network Theory
(ANT). A distinctive feature of ANT is the idea that apart from humans, actor-networks
include diverse non-human actants1 such as materials, equipment, configurations and
institutions. Indeed ANT theorists argue that all such actors cannot only be seen
to shape and influence but also help stabilise the network. Considering the generally
‘unstable’ environment in Afghanistan, ANT offers an interesting approach to identify
which elements help stabilise a technology actor-network and which elements fail or
might be missing.
As this brief introduction has demonstrated, the relationship between technology and
humans has been studied from various perspectives, from the above mentioned early
technological determinism at one extreme, where ICTs are seen as having the potential
to directly affect peoples’ behaviour, through relativist positions of mutual influence,
to social constructivist views like SCOT or ANT at the other extreme (though Latour
(2005) refers to ANT as “anti-social constructivism” ).
In analysing why so few projects in developing countries that involve New ICTs are
deemed successful and where the reasons for these “failures” lie, an STS perspective
on these networks of human and non-human actors is justified in my view. It can
help disclose the relations between decision makers, users, administrators, guidelines,
technologies, infrastructure and others, that shape and influence these ICT projects and
1 Akrich & Latour (1992) define “an actor is an actant endowed with a character”
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it can help to gain a better understanding of the context and participation of its actors.
This research project seeks to interrogate how, despite statements on ‘participation’
and ‘contextualization’, the dominant paradigm and the diffusion model are still inherent
in many ICT related projects which often rather follow ‘best practice’ than pursuing
genuine partnerships (McLaughlin: 2005). Technologies are still often treated in a
deterministic manner, as a tool that corresponds to its predefined function and that, if
introduced properly, will lead to predefined goals. There is no clear conceptual approach
to what participation is, who is supposed to participate and how successful participation
is measured (Tufte & Mefalopulos (2009), Sparks (2007), Heeks (1999)). The same
applies to context and the question where it starts and where it ends with regard to a
global actor-network that ICT and international development form. This thesis explores
these concepts within the setting of concrete ICT projects in the Afghan education
sector.
ICT island and networks
The research was conducted around a university connectivity project, building up cam-
pus networks at universities all over the country; a school-laptop project that provided
educational technology to schools in several provinces; and ICT capacity building efforts
that were a central aspect or byproduct of many ICT projects. The projects and
interview partners chosen for this research were by no means ignorant or unaware of
concepts like context or participation. And despite knowing that I was critically looking
at stakeholder interaction, most admitted openly unresolved issues and project dilemmas
and demonstrated an interest in addressing these.
The technology company implementing the laptop project made considerable efforts to
get me also to those schools where problems had already been reported – despite the ‘bad
news’ that was to be expected – and readily included me in the preparations for some
of their future projects. The project coordinator of the university connectivity project
was exceptionally committed to visiting all universities and meeting all local partners
in person, which was far beyond his obligations. And most ministry, university and
school employees I interviewed took their involvement very seriously, had suggestions to
improve cooperation and worked hard for what they saw as urgently needed changes. So,
despite none of the projects describing itself as explicitly “participatory” or community-
based, the commitment to context and participation was certainly above average. Early
ICT4D projects often made it easy to criticise the obvious: a lack of cultural and
language localization, a lack of institutional support, problems with power supply, and
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costs for hard- and software that no local NGO could afford to maintain. The more
challenging questions arise when these ‘more context-aware’ approaches to ICT projects
in international development are no closer to achieving the intended goals.
1.3 Research Questions
1. How are decisions about ICT initiatives formed in the early stages?
1.1. Who and also what has agency in the designing and planning of projects
around New ICTs in the Afghan education sector?
a) What intentions can be attributed to the different actors towards
using New ICTs?
b) What underlying concepts of “development” and “technology” influ-
ence perceptions of New ICTs?
c) Where do their perceptions and expectations derive from?
1.2. How is cooperation among the involved actors organised?
1.3. What strategies are suggested and what reasons are given for previous ‘fail-
ures’?
1.4. How are “participation” and “context” construed and taken into consideration?
2. What technologies are prioritised?
2.1. Who influences the decisions about technologies?
2.2. What reasons are given for using certain technologies?
2.3. What limitations do those technologies contain for the Afghan context and
(how) are they adapted?
2.4. How and by whom are New ICTs shaped in the different stages of their imple-
mentation process and how do they in turn reflect the environment they are used in?
3. How are earlier concepts about New ICTs modified during the implementation
process?
3.1. Why are the changes made?
3.2. Who decides these changes?
3.3 What factors or experiences led to such changes?
4. How are these New ICTs, intended or unintended, adopted, rejected and inter-
preted by their users?
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4.1. How do the users adapt the technology to their lives, and are practices adapted
to the technology in return?
4.2. How flexible is the technology to adaptations and different configurations?
4.3. Are adaptations and reconfigurations of the technology supported and encour-
aged?
1.4 Outline
In the following chapter I will introduce two of the central concepts of this study:
development and technology. In chapter 2.1 I will follow the path of how the idea of a
developed world versus a developing world derived from the assumption that economic
growth equals development, attributing to Europe and North America a modernity
which was yet to be achieved by the rest of the world. During the 1970s, the failure of the
top-down approach and increasingly critical reflections on colonialism and exploitation,
indicated the need for alternative development approaches. As they play a central role
in my research, I then look at different concepts of participation and their recent critique
by post-development scholars in more detail. Today there is no universally accepted
concept of ‘development’ and the diversity of approaches resulting from this discordance
can also be found in the current study.
Chapter 3 looks within the framework of development at how media and technology
have been utilised in the service of development from the 1930s until today. The early
communication scholars followed the dominant paradigm of development, believing in
a linear stages model, leading from a traditional society towards modernization and
that behavioural change could be triggered by exposure to new ideas and information.
Here, mass media took an important role to inform and persuade potential adopters
about innovations. In the 1970s a growing critique, led by Latin American scholars,
marked a turn in development communication. The dominant paradigm’s hierarchical,
bureaucratic, and sender-oriented communication model was increasingly replaced by a
more horizontal, participative and receiver oriented approach.
Another radical critique of how the West continued to dominate non-Western cultures
was postcolonial theory, attempting to break up the relation of Third and First World
in binary opposition. It received surprisingly little attention by C4D scholars at the
time, though both fields deal with similar questions about agency and context, regarding
developing countries. Chapter 3.1.4 looks at the empowerment concept, initially pro-
posed as a radical form of participation, aiming to hand back decisions to development
beneficiaries. But like ‘participation’ it remained widely a rhetorical concept. As in
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development practice in general, development communication today has no singular
definition or approach. A call for participation remains strong, but its limitations within
the broader development industry structure and policies persist. With New ICTs taking
the place of mass media, there even seems to be a revival of the dominant paradigm
and the renewed promise of modernization through the power of the internet, as early
research in the field of ICT4D shows. Chapter 3.2 introduces the field of ICT4D and
how the diffusion of the internet and digital communication technologies brought new
approaches to international development. Not unlike mass media during the dominant
paradigm, the sheer availability of digital technologies and access to internet seemed to
promise education and economic growth, with little attention to the broader context.
This changed with what is called “ICT4D 2.0” to more context aware approaches. As
in other areas of international development, however, academia and practice did not
always follow the same path and many ICT projects in the aid sector continue to be
accused of a technology-deterministic perspective.
In the fourth chapter I take a closer look at different perceptions of technology, start-
ing with technological determinism. I look at where this deterministic view shows in
technology projects and how technology continues to be seen as a driver for development.
The limits of this deterministic view and the impact of the social on the technical
are described in chapter 4.2. Science and Technology Studies look at how scientific
‘facts’ and technological artefacts are constructed and how a number of social, historical,
cultural and other factors influence these developments. This approach draws attention
to the mostly unknown work of researchers and developers, by “opening the black box”.
The context inscribed into these devices and how that influences usage in a context
other than the one anticipated by the designers, is something that is also relevant
for the present study. On the other hand STS looks at the user and consumer side
of technology, how it is open to different interpretations during its development, in-
troduction and use, which actors are involved, and how it reaches some degree of stability.
The literature review is concluded by the research agenda, summarising how the
different concepts and models are combined and applied for the present research. It is
followed by Chapter 5, summarising key developments in Afghan history of the past 100
years and offering a closer view on the history and state of communication infrastructures
and the role of education in Afghan society in the past century.
In Chapter 6 I give an overview over the mainly qualitative research methods used
for the study, with a focus on reflexivity and how the fact that I simultaneously worked
and researched in the field represented advantages as well as risks. The chapter also
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introduces the setting and my access to the field and how the approach to this thesis
developed during the early stages of the research. It finally leads to the research findings,
by first briefly discussing the broader context of ICT in international development,
followed by brief personal impressions of expatriate life in Afghanistan.
Chapters 7 to 9 concentrate on the description of the research findings. In Chapter 7
I describe a school laptop project, initiated by a local IT company and implemented
in cooperation with the Ministry of Education, the laptop producer and a United
States-funded contractor. In phase one of the project the parents, teachers and pupils
at the schools, as the research reveals, are only included at later stages of the project
and not involved in planning and configurations. When the project was renewed at
a different school (phase two) there was a stronger involvement, though the project’s
general framework was also mostly set.
Chapter 8 looks at a university infrastructure project, initiated and funded by a
military alliance and implemented in cooperation with the Computer Directorate of
the Ministry of Higher Education. The project mostly struggles with finding adequate
staff for the provincial universities to administrate the new campus networks that are
installed with funds by the project donor. Interviews with employees of the ministry
and lecturers at one of the universities demonstrate a number of challenges the new
infrastructure poses to the universities, regarding its maintenance, use and future funding.
The last empirical Chapter 9 explores the main types of capacity building within
or linked to ICT projects in Afghanistan: basic computer literacy, institutional ICT
capacity building and professional ICT trainings. It points out which goals are linked
with these different types and how these trainings enable the use of and interaction with
digital technologies. Finally it looks at conflicts linked with capacities and local power
structures and their effects on cooperation in ICT projects in the education sector.
I provide the analysis of my research findings in chapters 10 and 11, in the context of
the the theoretical framework, the methodology and the Afghan history. The first of
the two looks at the power relations among the involved actors and how the rhetoric of
the technological sublime intensifies Western domination in project design and ruling.
It demonstrates how not the technology but the users get adapted within most ICT4D
projects and are expected to continue to “function correctly” to maintain projects
locally. Finally, I suggest derived from the literature, certain types of actors that play
a crucial role within ICT4D projects and how a stronger involvement of these actors
can strengthen local empowerment and ownership. Chapter 11 takes a closer look at
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different types of participation within ICT4D project and at what participation means
for different actors. It shows how different types of participation depend on the project
design and goals, but are also influenced by the broader development sector architecture.
It concludes with a scenario that extends the stages and levels of participation, but also
the range of involved actors.
In the final Chapter 12 I look back at five years of research and writing, reflect on my
findings and suggest how a stronger exchange between scholars and practitioners as well
as extended research in related disciplines could contribute to explore additional aspects
of technology and international development.
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CHAPTER 2
Approaching development and technology
The initial debate as to whether ICTs are relevant for developing countries has already
been clearly resolved in favour of “yes”. The challenge now is to find how ICTs can
be beneficial (Walsham & Sahay (2006), Sein & Harindranath (2004)). For many
researchers in the area of ICT and human development, the main motivation is the
belief that ICTs potentially have the capacity to contribute towards the improvement of
many different aspects of life, from alleviating poverty to strengthening the democratic
polity (Avgerou: 2009). But technical projects do not exist separately from the general
problems within a country as well as the aid sector and are thus deeply intertwined with
issues of power, politics, donor dependencies, institutional arrangements, and inequities
of all sorts (Walsham & Sahay (2006), Sparks (2007)). The diffusion of information and
communication technologies is seen as inevitable, and to be more than ever holding the
potential to create new opportunities for development (UNESCO: 2005). This makes
the planning, justification, implementation and evaluation of ICT within the contested
discourse of development a pressing concern for millions of people (Thompson: 2004).
Perceptions of the increasing importance of New ICTs as components or even drivers
of development led to discourses surrounding digital technologies becoming part of
the developmental discourse itself. The topic area of New ICTs and development has
now become a regular feature in global policy meetings, with events such as the WSIS
(World Summit for Information Society), the IGF (Internet Governance Forum) and
the WITFOR (World Information Technology Forum) attracting large audiences and
attention. With ICT becoming a priority in development, not only good scholarship is
needed, but scholarship that offers relevant and useful implications for policy makers
(Bada & Madon: 2006).
Having studied various case studies concerning ICT and development, the next phase
of my research involved a review of literature on three specific areas that combined to
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contextualise my core research interest. As indicated in the introduction, I have built my
thesis on three domains of existing research: Communication for Development (C4D),
Information and Communication Technologies for Development (ICT4D), as well as
Science and Technology Studies (STS). For a better understanding of the influences
that surrounded their formation, and the evolution of “development”, within which my
research is placed, I start with a short introduction to the most dominant development
discourses from the 1950s until today.
2.1 Concepts of ‘technology’ and ‘development’
“After fifty years of development, including a number of years of critical
development scholarship, we still have no better grasp of how to theorise or
understand the reality of Asia, Africa, or Latin America in a way that leads
to significant or lasting improvement.”
(Escobar: 2000:165)
Which aspects of life are and which ones are not seen as an important part of global
development goals is not a settled debate in the development community, and the area
of new media and communication-technologies for social development has to deal with
this same uncertainty. The term “development” suggests that there was a specific
direction, towards which the poorer countries should aim to move. Furthermore by
defining “Millenium Development Goals” the United Nations (UN) even seemed to give
a clear end point of what needs to be achieved (UNDP: 2000). On the other hand, the
UN simultaneously pushes for universal education, improvements in child and maternal
health, and a number of other goals which also shows its increasing multi-dimensionality
(Toyama & Burrell: 2009). Ideas and theories about development have changed over
time and strongly influenced development goals and practices.
In the 1950s the field of development communication emerged as a foreign aid strategy
by western institutions. One of the main tools to support development practices was
seen in mass communication. Today, ICTs also play a growing role in the economy,
education and interaction of people from poorer countries. Due to rapidly reducing costs
per function, New ICTs are seen to offer new opportunities for development (UNESCO:
2005:18), and, especially in recent years, the increasingly intertwined relationship be-
tween ICT and developmental discourse is frequently highlighted (Thompson: 2004).
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2.2 Development theories - by whom and how is development defined?
The reconstruction of the post-World War II world and decolonization of most of Asia and
Africa was an international project centred around the assumption that ‘development’
meant widespread adoption of the Western experience as a role model.
The Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 led to the creation of three key international
institutions aimed at stable economic growth within a capitalist system; the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) to regulate the global monetary exchange, the World Bank, to
provide credit and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to regulate
trade (Willis: 2005:36). The USA, where these institutions were headquartered and
which were by far their largest paymaster, took a leading role in promoting development
from the beginning.
In the following decades, various competing movements and theories were proposed
and tested in development practice, all promising to improve the socio-economic situation
of developing countries. Although these theories and paradigms of development are
by no means linearly displacing one another, Pieterse sees the long-term trends in
development theory parallel general shifts in social science (Pieterse: 2001:11). In a
similar manner Escobar perceives: “the three major paradigms for thinking about
development, corresponding with three general social science paradigms” (Escobar:
2000:166): market-based liberal theories, production-based Marxist theories and language
and meaning-based post-structuralist theories. These parallels will become evident
through some of the major development theories.
2.2.1 Modernization Theories
Modernization and development as concepts and a new vocabulary, quickly replaced the
discredited former concepts of colonialism, westernisation or Christianisation. Rostow
(1960) proposed to move colonization and modernization even closer by suggesting that
the establishment of colonies was “initially not to execute a major objective of national
policy, nor even to exclude a rival economic power, but to fill a vacuum: that is to
organise a traditional society incapable of self-organisation (or unwilling to organise
itself) for modern export activity including production for export”(Rostow: 1960:109).
Or as Kothari defines it: “where colonialism left off, development took over” (Kothari:
1988:143).
After the end of the Second World War, the independence of a growing number
of colonies coincided with President Truman’s ambition to capitalise growing world
markets and promote democracy to counter the communist threat. This accompanied
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the USA’s role as a major, if not dominant, international economic and political force
((Melkote & Steeves: 2001:51), (Willis: 2005:37), (Sparks: 2007:9)). Modernization
was seen as promoting and supporting capitalist economic development in developing
countries and the new programmes of international aid from North to South were part
of the policy responses of modernization theory (Willis: 2005:45). The belief that social
and economic progress can be universally replicated mainly by the sharing of technical
know-how from developed to developing countries had been encouraged by the success
of the Marshall Plan in rebuilding Europe. ‘Modernization’ became the operational arte-
fact of the concept of ‘development’, based on liberal political theory (Melkote: 2003:130).
The main idea behind the concept of development had been the assumption that
growth, more precisely economic growth, is the main indicator of development (Alhassan:
2004:36) and its progress could be measured in ‘objective’, quantitative indicators such
as the Gross National Product, Gross Domestic Product and per capita incomes. The
concept of ‘modernization’ emerged from economic theory (see Rostow (1960)) as well
as from social evolutionary theory (see chapter 3.1.1) and was characterised by various
bipolar attributions like traditional vs modern societies, local vs global, religious vs
secular and so on. The roots of poverty were seen in traditional ways of living, rather
than in economic deficits, inspired by certain models or assumptions about the expe-
riences of North America and Western Europe since the late 19th century. This view
of development equates the definition of a modern nation with Western industrialised
nations in all areas of society, including political and economic behaviour and insti-
tutions, attitudes towards technology and science and cultural mores (Melkote: 2003:131).
Economic development was not seen as compatible with the maintenance of ‘traditional’
ways of life that were presumed to prevail in developing countries. A break with
the latter in the form of a revolution in the totality of social, cultural and religious
institutions and habits, and, thus, in their psychological attitude, was seen a prerequisite
to economic progress (Sadie: 1960:302). Probably the best example of what has been
termed ‘modernization theory’ was Walter Rostow’s take-off or stages of growth model
(Chitnis: 2005:37). Rostow mentions in his book that “it is possible to identify all
societies in their economic dimensions as lying within one of five categories” (Rostow:
1960:4). And though he did not talk about ‘development’ explicitly and concentrated
mainly on economic factors, he made a distinction between “more developed” and “less
developed”. He defined a linear path to development going from “traditional society”,
the “precondition for taking off”, the “take off”, the “drive to maturity” and finally to
the “Age of High Mass Consumption”, with tradition seen as an obstacle to “take-off”.
He goes on to say that a predominantly agricultural society (one with 75% or more
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of its working force in agriculture), must shift to one where industry, communication,
trade and services predominate (Rostow: 1960:18f).
For most governments of developing countries as well as multilateral agencies such as
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, ‘development’ was to be achieved
through variations on Keynesian approaches, based on national government intervention
and foreign assistance on an international scale. It was generally assumed that increased
production and consumption of goods and services constituted the essence of development
and that fair distribution of income and opportunities would ‘trickle-down’ necessarily
in due time (Beltrán: 1976:19). But despite systematic efforts, large areas of the world
did not appear to be reaching the take-off phase, the result of adopting development
models copied from a foreign model was that only the income concentration of the elites
was growing while the poorest became even poorer (Diaz-Bordenave: 1994:40).
2.2.2 Dependency Theories
After the obvious failure of the modernization concept, Marxist and other leftist scholars
started in the 1970s to emphasise the history-specific setting of present-day moderniza-
tion, arguing that the situation in the new developing states was shaped by imperialism,
colonialism, exploitation and dependency rather than any presumed ‘tradition’. Marxian
and other Leftist understandings of power were an essential element of the dependency
theories, as were the relations of domination and subjection between nations, addressed
by classic theories of imperialism: as the colonies became independent the inequalities
did not disappear (Islam: 2009).
Marx’s theory of development, on the other hand, also included similarities to Ros-
tow’s model of linear stages, as he writes in his introduction “the country that is more
developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future”
(Marx: 1909:xvii). The core meaning of development in dependency theory likewise was
economic growth (Pieterse: 2001:6), the end point however differed significantly in social
and political terms from that in modernization theories.
Dependency theories criticised modernization theorists for creating external structures
that both made and make it difficult for developing countries to grow, emphasising
also that only the elites in the developing nations had benefited from modernization
measures.
“Underdevelopment is not due to the survival of archaic institutions and the
existence of capital shortage ... [but] generated by the very same historical
process which also [generates] economic development: the development of
capitalism itself”
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(Frank 1969:9, in (Kapoor: 2002))
The economic and cultural expansionism and imperialism of modernization was
criticised and instead they argued for political and economic restructuring to produce a
more even distribution of rewards in society. Kothari (1984) claimed that a connection
had to be made to the availability of resources to which the poor had always had
access and of which they were now continually being deprived in the conflict over
access to and control over natural resources (p. 18). Consequently it was not the
culture of the underdeveloped that had to be blamed for economic failure in dependency
theories, instead the responsibility rested with the More Developed Countries (MDC).
The dependency approach formed part of a general structuralist reorientation in social
sciences. Development and underdevelopment were understood in the context of the
world system (Servaes: 1996:31). The biggest failure of development thinking was to see
problems and their solutions in unidimensional terms.
The criticism put forth by the dependency theorists did not, however, result in specific
solutions or recommendations to be adopted by development practitioners, the crux
being that power is not easily redistributed. It did lead though to new ideas and the
reconsideration of the existing definition of development.
2.2.3 Alternative development
The top-down approaches had shown little improvement for the poorest and during the
1970s the so called grassroots development gained increasing attention. The concept
of ‘basic needs’ was promoted by certain Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs)
and community organisations and taken up by multilateral organisations such as the
World Bank with the focus on developing policies to be directed at the poorest people
in society. Robert McNamara, President of the World Bank during the 1970s, is a key
figure associated with this approach. McNamara suggested that development programs
should, at the least, provide access to food, health, education, and safety and should be
directly focused at the poorest, rather than at macro-level policies which were aimed to
help the poor indirectly (World Bank: 2003). This approach, known as the Basic Needs
Approach (BNA) marked a major progression in how development became envisioned
as a basic human right, and not merely economic progress. BNA called for a greater
focus on small-scale activities and poorer sectors of society combined with continued
investment in large-scale infrastructure. Its small-scale agricultural production and
informal sector activities were criticised, however, by many as a barrier to achieving
the rapid economic growth of the developed countries (Willis: 2005:95) and was soon
discarded by the major development organisations.
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Another move away from the top-down, neo-liberal, market-led approaches was repre-
sented mainly by the growing number of NGOs. Most of them work with populations
at the grassroot level to provide appropriate services effectively, through the direct
involvement of local people who are in many cases able to react much quicker to local
demands than large multilateral organisations. Since the 1990s a growing share of Official
Development Assistance (ODA) – between 2% - 10% depending on the origin country –
went directly to NGOs rather than to the governments of developing countries (Willis:
2005:99). Important aspects of NGO work have been the concepts of ‘empowerment’
and ‘participation’, referring to setting up conditions for, and the provisions of, facilities
to support a strong involvement of local people in development activities.
With this human centred approach, also referred to as human development came
the understanding of development as capacitating, following Amartya Sen’s work on
capacities and entitlement, concentrating on the potential of development to promote
enabling (Pieterse: 2001:6). Sen’s Capabilities Approach became highly influential for
policy debate in human development and the creation of the Human Development
Index (HDI), now used by the UN as an indicator to measure development. These
different, but closely connected concepts, most of which emerged from the debates
sparked by dependency theory, offered for the first time new possibilities for the practical
implementation of development that does not ignore the local culture and devalue local
knowledge in developing countries. But even at grassroot level, it is criticised by some
on the grounds that the underlying concepts of ‘development’ and ‘progress’ are still
primarily based on the perception of developed countries as role models.
2.2.4 Participatory development
During the 1990s concepts of empowerment and participation had become undisputed
parts of NGO work and development aid in general. Setting up conditions for the strong
involvement of local people in development activities and the provisions of facilities to
support this involvement, was no longer seen as a radical call for social transformation,
but indeed seemed to harmonise with official development policy.
Today the call for a greater public involvement in decision making and project im-
plementation seems to have lost most of its attraction and often seems to be little
more than a standard phrase. ‘Participation’ has its place in every project proposal
and project design across all sectors, regions and activities, from the World Banks
Structural Adjustment Programs to micro-development initiatives (World Bank (1998b),
Crocker (2007)). Participatory methods, training procedures, frameworks and guidelines
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fill bookshelves and websites, leaving the impression that participation is just another
‘social-skill’ for aid workers that can be taught and learned. The concept of participation
has been expanded to a rather amorphous interpretation, the lack of a clear definition
of what participation means led to its increasing use as a buzzword, “reduced to a series
of methodological packages and techniques” (Leal: 2007).
Collaboration and knowledge sharing between local and international partners is
increasingly common practice in development projects and often one criteria in donor
policies1 but design and control of development agendas usually remain with the external
development agencies (Melkote: 2003:139).
Manipulation
Citizen Control
Delegated Power Citizen Power
Partnership
Consultation
Informing Tokenism
Placation
Therapy
Non Participation
Figure 2.1: Ladder of Participation (Arnstein: 1969).
With a more human centered approach to development in the 1990s also came the
understanding of development as capacitating. Uphoff (1985) describes in Putting People
First that the design and implementation of projects should follow their needs and
capabilities. People are no longer ‘target groups’ but become ‘intended beneficiaries’ that
need to be involved (p. 469). According to Uphoff four different ways of participation
can be observed in most development projects claiming to be participatory in nature:
• Participation in decision-making: activities are initiated, discussed, conceptualised
and planned with the ‘intended beneficiaries’ involved
• Participation in implementation: people are actively encouraged and resources are
mobilised to take part in the implementation
1 One example is the commitment between the International Community and the Afghan Government
to channel at least 50% of development aid money though the Afghan Goverment’s core budget
instead of spending it directly (Kabul Conference: 2010).
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• Participation in evaluation: people are invited and encouraged to critique success
or failure
• Participation in benefit sharing: the ‘intended beneficiaries’ appreciate the out-
comes and enjoy the results.
Some development initiatives provide people with opportunities to access all these
four ways of participation. Many do not, and restrict participation to one or two ways.
In trying to define the meanings and practices of ‘participation’ several scholars have
over the years, made the effort to create typologies of participation, from Arnstein’s
(1969) ladder of participation and Jules Pretty’s (1995) typology of participation to Sarah
White’s (1996) typology by interests. Andrea Cornwall gives a comprehensive overview
of several of these typologies that define participation from different perspectives. Prob-
ably the best known is Arnstein’s ladder (see figure 2.1), looking at participation from
the perspective of those at the receiving end, while Jules Pretty addresses more those
applying participatory approaches and what motivates them. Pretty’s types range
from manipulative and passive participation, to interactive participation and, finally,
self-mobilisation. Both Arnstein and Pretty go from control by authorities to control by
the people or citizens (Cornwall: 2008).
While these typologies give a good impression of what participation can be or how it
might be utilised, when set in context, participation cannot be categorised into ‘strong’
or ‘weak’ so easily. Developing projects engage, in most cases, a variety of different actors
or groups of actors who bring contrasting perceptions of participation into the process.
Different types of participation may thus be possible or useful – for different actors – and
necessary at different stages during the process. What the aforementioned typologies
do not categorise so clearly is the crucial question: who participates? (Cornwall: 2008).
Who counts as a community representative, or, in an even broader sense, as ‘local’?
Social, ethnic or gender categories may be labels allocated by the aid industry, but are
not necessarily seen as primary distinguishing features by people themselves. Much
depends on the participants and their agenda, whose voices are heard and considered
and even what reason might exist for deliberate non-participation.
A third aspect Cornwall looks at, next to how participation is applied and who par-
ticipates, is the question concerning what people participate in and who participates at
which stage of the project. Many projects combine different participatory approaches in
terms of who participates as well as the relevant types and activities. Some aspects may
be decided and implemented entirely by local stakeholders, while others leave little space
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for involvement. Cornwall gives several examples throughout her paper showing how
participation is always about strategic choices, how forms of autonomous participation
are as much part of ‘development’ as ‘invited participation’. She suggests ‘clarity through
specificity’, participation made more transparent by a clearer distinction between differ-
ent forms of participation, at different stages. What are people enjoined to participate
in, what reasons are given for participation and who is involved as much as who is absent?
A general critique of the very idea of “development” – including alternative approaches
like participatory development – evolved during the 1990s among scholars like Arturo
Escobar, Uma Kothari and Wolfgang Sachs. ‘Underdevelopment’ was seen as something
invented by the West to impose interventions and a critical reconsideration of the very
idea of development came to be known as Post-Development.
2.2.5 Post-modern critique of development
The field of development and its tendencies towards defining ‘others’, identifying their
‘problems’ and legitimising ‘professional’ intervention in their daily lives (Thompson:
2004) has increasingly become the subject of critical analysis during the 1990s. For some
critics, the representational knowledge of professionals is, or can be, opposed to the
situated, local knowledge in grassroots initiatives; however, it is mostly developmental
professional conceptual foundations that in most cases legitimate discourses and shape
interventions (Sachs: 1992:4 f.).
As for grassroots development, the small-scale locally situated approach has also
been important for ‘post-development’ theorists like Arturo Escobar. Local views and
actions should be the focus rather than those acting on a ‘global scale’ imposed by
organisations from the Global North defining what is meant by poverty, capacity, ability
or human resources. International development had become an industry in itself, with
its own mechanisms and rules, with an extended administrative machinery reproducing
its own legitimacy and deciding on how the ‘West’ was to ‘develop’ the ‘Third World’.
Changes, these critiques said, only happened on a local level with slightly adapted
methods of approach and interaction, but few changes regarding power mechanisms
in decision making regarding international intervention. Escobar (1992) describes this
line of thought as an interest not in “Development alternatives but in alternatives to
Development” (p. 417).
One inquiry regarding the present power relations in the global development aid
architecture asks whether, and if so how, genuine participation is possible. Cooke and
Kothari (2001) pose the question “Participation: the new tyranny?”, by investigating
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the often ritualistic and manipulative nature of participatory processes. They argue that
the contributions to constant revisions regarding methodologies have served to legitimize
present participatory development rather than addressing some of the fundamental
problems within the current development discourse (p. 7). Nonetheless the book does
not claim to be anti-participatory. It is the over-simplification of participatory devel-
opment that is criticised, the deliberate ignorance towards the agency of development
organisations (Mosse: 2001). Instead of facilitating the concepts of empowerment and
participation as mere methodological tools that make up part of any given project pack-
age, questions of power and power-relations between the involved actors need stronger
critical consideration together with “a genuine and rigorous reflexivity” (ibid. p. 14f).
Critics of post-development accuse its proponents of romanticism and overlooking
positive aspects of modernity, development, science and technology (Corbridge, 1998
in (Ziai: 2007:7)). Others admit that post-development raises important issues, but
remains too vague and offers no real alternatives. No clear or widely agreed notion of
development exists today despite the long debate. Even multinational organisations like
the UN or the World Bank do not follow stringent concepts of development anymore.
Aid (spending) depends much more on the context, ranging from grassroot level activist
initiatives to top-down multi-donor energy projects.
2.2.6 Neoliberalism
While the grassroots approach gained importance on a smaller-scale level, on the large-
scale the Keynesian perspective was increasingly questioned from the 1970s, in part
due to the slowing rates of growth and the debt crises of the 1980s. Since the 1960s
many developing countries had taken high loans, during the 1970s increasingly from
private banks from OPEC states with low interest rates, to invest in infrastructure and
development programs. When commodity prices fell in the late 1970s, many of the
developing countries who depended on the export of agricultural products or minerals,
were unable to cover their debt repayments or even cover the interest rate (Willis:
2005:50). Additionally, interest rates went up and industrialised countries increased
import tariffs to stabilise their own economies, resulting in a growing number of gov-
ernments of developing countries not being able to meet their repayments. It was now
argued, that too much state involvement can lead to inefficiency and therefore reducing
state-interventions and letting market set prices and wages would recover economic
growth. Toye (1993) criticises the development policy approaches which gave rise to the
over-extension of the public sector, the over-emphasis of economic policies on investment
and the widespread use of economic controls such as subsidies or tariffs. Such interference
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brought, in his view, more negative than positive effects for local economic development
(p.47).
In the 1983 World Development Report, the World Bank warned about the drift
towards state protectionism
“The ministerial meeting of GATT held in November 1982 set the stage
for liberalisation. Greater participation by developing countries in GATT
would help strengthen its role as the most appropriate forum for continued
negotiations to reduce trade barriers.”
(World Bank: 1983:3)
and pointed out, that the most rapid growth rates were found in countries where the
state was least involved in “distorting the market prices” (World Bank: 1983:81). The
effects of social or political situations on economic growth were not discussed in the
report, the focus was on government involvement in economy.
In the following years there was a shift in development assistance from financing
investments to promoting policy reforms aiming for greater market liberalisation, with
the World Bank playing a key role. One of the most well known examples of neo-liberal
development theory in practice has been structural adjustment programs (SAP). This
meant certain policies had to be adopted by national governments in return for continu-
ing financial support, which included giving the market greater power by deregulation,
liberalisation and privatisation.
In the majority of cases though, SAPs led to falling wages, increased unemployment
and higher costs of living. This may have happened just as well without SAPs, but “it is
agreed that although SAPs may not have caused poverty in a direct sense, they certainly
did not lead to poverty reduction” (McIlwaine: 1998:99). As with the modernization
theories, there were plenty of critical positions, but no coherent ideological response to
the neoliberal turn (Pieterse: 2001:4), but, as mentioned above, from the 1990s there
was also greater attention being paid to the poorest in World Bank and IMF policies.
Conclusion
In summary one can say that ‘development’ remains an ongoing debate in the global
development community as a whole, with no agreement on a single objective or approach.
The tensions between top-down versus bottom-up, between providing welfare and
23
2.2 Development theories - by whom and how is development defined? 24
promoting agency, and between paternalism and partnership (Toyama & Burrell: 2009)
might not simply resolve into ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. According to Pieterse, development
thinking should stop “seeking general theories and explanations but [should be] focusing
instead on the diversity of development circumstances” (Pieterse: 2001:50). This study
aims to examine what individual development goals are; what theoretical approaches to
or models of ‘development’ are expressed by the actors and how their goals are addressed
in practice and, finally, to evaluate the different perspectives and mutual shaping of the
stated goals amongst the relevant actors.
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CHAPTER 3
Social Change by Communication and Technology
The idea that communication and technology can be driving forces in inducing economic
development and social change, originates in the role assigned to media for propaganda
purposes during the First World War (Lasswell: 1971). From the 1930s onwards there
was a growing awareness of the effects that mass media have on influencing people’s
attitudes and behaviour. For many of the modernization theorists, mass communication
media were seen as powerful instruments to manipulate people’s opinions and attitudes,
and, as a result, their behaviour, over a relative short period of time (Melkote: 2003:131).
3.1 Communication for Development
Development communication or Communication for Development (C4D) typically ad-
dresses programs that communicate for the purposes of social change, help to mobilize
support, create awareness, foster norms, encourage behavioural change, influence policy-
makers, or even shift frames of social issues. The goals themselves vary with the
underlying approach taken to development (Wilkins: 2008). It was, thus, as a field never
primarily concerned with theory, rather with policy, and more importantly, application
(McAnany: 2010).
3.1.1 The Dominant Paradigm
As in other areas of development, modernization theories provided the epistemological
foundation of the initial theories in Communication for Development (Melkote: 2003:131)
whilst the latter also drew on propaganda research conducted in the United States
between the two world wars. It was believed that the
“task of the mass media of information and the ‘new media’ of education is
to speed and ease the long, slow, social transformation required for economic
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development and [...] to speed the task of mobilizing human resources behind
national effort,”
(Schramm: 1964:27)
rejecting the notion that the population of a developing country might think indepen-
dently, identify a problem and implement a solution for it (Sparks: 2007:29). One of the
first and most influential development communication researchers was Daniel Lerner,
who had undertaken a large-scale study in the Middle-East – around the same time as
Rostow’s stages of growth model gained popularity – and whose main interest lay in
understanding the connection between mass media and development.
Lerner compared the situation in the Middle East in the 1950s with the struggles
in Western societies taking place over the course of centuries replacing step by step
medieval lifestyles by modernity and reshaping millions of individual lives (Lerner:
1958:43). He believed the “rationalist and positivist spirit” of modernization would
unavoidably prevail. In his view, modernization implied no ethnocentrism, rather it
exhibited certain components and sequences whose relevance was global: urbanization
tends to raise literacy, rising literacy tends to increase media exposure and increasing
media exposure promotes wider economic participation (per capita income) and political
participation (voting) (Lerner: 1958:46).
This passage shows clearly why Lerner set high expectations on the potential power of
mass media to support the modernization process. Modernization, as he suggests, is the
necessary and only reasonable condition for any country and will sooner or later infect
its population. And what could be more effective in spreading the seed of modernization
than mass media? As Lerner describes it, people show, if not under strong social, societal
or religious pressure, an almost natural interest to modernize. In this model it seems to
be the older generations, bound to traditional structures and, most of all religion, that
try to prevent a society from becoming modern.
Before traditional societies could modernize, people must first develop a high sense
of empathy, which Lerner defined as the capacity to see oneself in the other fellow’s
situation (Lerner: 1958:50). This empathy, however, is not interpreted as an impulse
for creative solutions by the individual to accomplish newly raised desires. On the
contrary, Lerner worries about the complications that an “own way”, as he observed
it in the Middle East, can bring. Lerner’s concept of empathy as the foundation to
modernize assumes that people in the traditional society will be willing to become good
imitators of the modernized society and, thus, the work of development would just
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be a matter of marketing, to make modernity attractive to people. Lerner suggests
that “modernization follows an autonomous historical logic - that each phase tends to
generate the next phase by some mechanism which operates independent of cultural or
doctrinal variations.” (Lerner: 1958:61). He further believes that modernization of the
Third World depended on changing the character of people living there on an individual
level (Melkote: 2003:131) and that individuals can be best reached by mass media. Thus
no modern society could function effectively without a developed system of mass media
(Lerner: 1958:55).
A few years later, Daniel Lerner puts the role of mass communication media into
even stronger focus, describing the situation in Iran. With 90% illiteracy at that time
there was a parallel overproduction of intellectuals generating media that did not have
an audience. Media systems and social systems have to go together (Lerner: 2009),
otherwise he sees the danger of rising frustration instead of rising expectations. While
he recognizes that family and community, even if seen as instruments of conservatism
and retardation can be important instruments of balance as well, schools and media
are for him necessary instruments of change, needed to promote “psychic mobility” (p.
52) and political stability. Lerner proposes that we should consider information as a
commodity, produced, distributed and consumed like all other commodities. Accordingly,
the capacity to produce and capacity to consume must be considered. Mass media are
therefore at the same time index and agents of modernization (Lerner: 2009).
Wilbur Schramm, another pioneer in development communication, like Lerner believes
that for “national economic development [...] to occur, there must be a social transforma-
tion” (Schramm: 1964:9). Moreover he regards the people from underdeveloped countries
as “being invited into modern life” (Schramm: 1964:18) depending on their will to change
if they are going to take part or if they will just watch from the sidelines. Schramm,
in accordance with Lerner, sees modernization, and with it economic development, as
depending most of all on people’s values and their willingness to accept change.
Schramm identifies three major functions which mass media have for modernization: to
create a climate conducive to change, similar to Lerner’s precondition of empathy, to
serve as a multiplier of information by reaching large numbers of people through different
channels, and to create a sense of “nation-ness” by delivering the same messages to all
sections of the population (Schramm: 1964).
Unlike Lerner a few years earlier, however, Schramm addresses the issue of cultural
linkage; innovations should be considered in terms of life, values and beliefs and not
only in terms of productivity. For the proposed change it is important to consider “what
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would such a change mean to the people who are being asked to change?” (Schramm:
1964:118). He therefore warns that mass media risk being ineffective if used without
adequate knowledge of local culture and that mass media should be as local as possible.
Schramm uses less the notion of “modernization“ and more the idea of “necessary
changes”, while in fact both seem to imply the same things. Like Lerner, Schramm had
a big influence on the field of communication as it went international, to Third World
countries in Asia, Middle East and Latin America (Singhal: 1987:19).
Around the same time as Schramm and Lerner, Everett Rogers introduced his dif-
fusion of innovation approach, originally a framework in which to evaluate the impact
of development programs (Rogers: 1995:xvi). He defined four main elements in the
diffusion of innovation: it is seen as the process by which an innovation is communicated
through certain channels, over a time, among members of a social system (Rogers: 1995:5).
Rogers questions the assumption that advantageous innovations will sell themselves
thanks to their obvious benefits and diffuse rapidly, but saw mass media channels as the
most rapid and efficient means to inform an audience of potential adopters about the
existence of an innovation.
The early diffusion research, usually on technological innovations, fitted well with the
dominant paradigm’s focus on technology and its top-down communication to the public
(Rogers: 1976a). Rogers argued that communication by itself can generate development
regardless of economic and political conditions. His emphasis lay on particular commu-
nication effects: the ability of media messages and opinion leaders to create knowledge
of new practices and ideas and to persuade others to adopt the introduced innovations.
In his first publications about the diffusion of innovation model he presented the
centralized top-down model of information dissemination to foster innovation adop-
tion, as he saw “modernization [...] essentially (as) a communication process” (Rogers:
1969:42f). Rogers later, however, dissociated himself from this inherent “pro-change”
bias of diffusion research, which follows the assumption that innovations are generally
“good”, and took a more critical perspective, as will be explained below.
The dominant paradigm ruled through the late 1960s intellectual definitions of devel-
opment and guided national development programs (Rogers: 1976a). Communication
played, as shown, a vital role under the dominant paradigm, through its perceived
potential to transmit and spread mediated experience through mass communication
(Alhassan: 2004:40). In reality though, knowing about modernity and its benefits did
not seem to be enough to modernize or make people behave as ‘moderns’, and so
the first and most crushing criticism of the dominant paradigm was that it simply
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did not work (Sparks: 2007:39f). Social change was seen as the sum of individual
change, but the fact that issues of social structure might profoundly limit the possibil-
ities of individual change was not acknowledged. The existing concept of modernity
might have worked in the developed countries, but it proved to certainly not be universal.
By the early 1970s, Latin American development communication scholars such as
Juan Diaz Bordenave and Luis Ramiro Beltran, strongly influenced by the work of
Paolo Freire, began criticizing the former hierarchical, bureaucratic, and sender-oriented
communication model and they proposed to replace it by a more horizontal, participative
and receiver oriented approach (Servaes: 1999:83). A growing critique of the ignorance
regarding the influence of society on individuals began to emerge.
“The most serious theoretical problem results from the assumption that
communication plays an independent role in affecting social changes and be-
haviour without an adequate test of such assumption in developing countries,
or elsewhere, for that matter”
(Felstenhausen, 1971 in (Beltrán: 1976:17))
By the mid 1970s it had become mostly accepted that the mass media only had limited
potential to promote change in society and that communication cannot change an unfair
social and economic structure on its own (Beltrán, 1989 in (Sparks: 2007:43)). The
successor to the dominant paradigm, like the successor to modernization theory, is not a
clear one, several approaches were developed simultaneously with mutual influence.
3.1.2 Participatory Communication
“The role and effects of communication is dictated by the larger struc-
ture...The manner and rate with which new technology is adopted cannot be
interpreted independently from the social and economic system where that
technology is introduced”
(Felstenhausen, 1971 in (Beltrán: 1976:20))
At the same time as the emergence of dependency theories in development scholar-
ship and the popularization of new social movements like the movement for women’s
rights, ecological movements or the movement for peace, there were growing objections
among communication scholars towards the dominant paradigm and modernization
theories. Beltrán (1976) and Diaz-Bordenave (1976), two Latin American scholars with
a big influence on the participatory paradigm, argued that theories like the diffusion
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of innovation and the modernization approach uncritically attributed the problems of
underdevelopment to internal social and structural problems.
In the 1970s, Paulo Freire made an important contribution to the understanding of
education by linking the process of knowing with the process of learning through an
on-going cycle of action and reflection leading to the development of a critical awareness
about the world in which people live (de Koning: 1995:24). Freire criticized that many
programs focused on symptoms rather than causes which undermines participation and
dialogue with their ‘assistentialism’ (Freire: 1973:15).
In his influential book “The Passing of the Traditional Society”, Lerner (1958) de-
scribes underdevelopment as a result of traditional practices and local resistance to
change, by failing to accept and follow the West as an example. The dependency scholars
instead argued that in most developing countries, mass media reached mainly the elites,
and the adoption of new technology was affordable only to rich farmers. Proponents
of dependency theory pointed out that many of the programs using mass communi-
cation to foster development implemented under the impact of modernization theory
were widening income and information gaps in the developing nations. The dominant
paradigm had implied that poverty was equivalent to underdevelopment and the simple
and obvious way for less developed countries to develop would be for them to become
more like the developed countries (Rogers: 1976b:125). But mere transfer of resources
and technology did not necessarily bring one any closer to the realization of a desired
state (Kothari: 1984:22). “The illusion that a farmer is an individual who has access to
information and makes his own decisions is gone” (Diaz Bordenave in (Beltrán: 1976:21)).
Esman (1974) suggests that improved performance is more a question of institutional
change than a question of improved communication because power structures of so-
ciety define who is an “innovator” and who remains a “laggard” (Esman in (Beltrán:
1976:20f)). Thus, from the 1970s onward, in the field of development communication
it was widely acknowledged that mere exposure to media messages is not enough to
trigger change, but that certain social and cultural correlations are essential; that media
and communication are necessary and useful but not exclusively and not if used out of
context. The centre of the attention must be the people that are engaged and affected
by social change interventions; communication was to be seen as a dialogue rather than
linear, unidirectional educational tool and the development communicator as facilitator
rather than as an outside expert. Diaz-Bordenave (1994) calls the need to think, express,
belong to a group, be recognized as a unique person, be appreciated and respected and
have a say in crucial decisions affecting one’s life are as essential human needs as eating,
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drinking and sleeping. The assumption that participation is a basic human right and
has to be seen as an end in itself, not for its results, found growing support in the field
of development communication (Melkote: 2003:139).
These early criticisms resulted in a number of research projects and literature explor-
ing participatory communication approaches to development and some scholars, like
Schramm and Rogers accepted the criticism. They adapted their models of communi-
cation and distanced themselves from economically centred definitions of development
(Schramm: 1964:10). Schramm (1976) remarks that the “old paradigm” lacked speci-
ficity and overgeneralized, and suggests communication scholars could contribute in
an important way to the understanding of cultural codes by studying popular culture
(Schramm: 1976). Rogers distills the four main concepts of the dominant paradigm
as economic growth, capital-intensive technology, centralized planning and the cause
of underdevelopment as lying within the developing nation (Rogers: 1976b). This led,
with respect to the diffusion of innovation, to a pro-innovation, pro-top-down and
pro-persuasion attitude, not considering reasons for non-adoption. Rogers modified his
diffusion theory during the 1970s and pursued a more culturally sensitive approach. He
proposed that diffusion research needs to integrate traditional and modern media as
well as community-based change agents and local opinion leaders (Rogers: 1976c). Most
early diffusion of innovation studies had been based on a linear message receiver model
of communication, later definitions are more accurately described by a process of conver-
gence, where participants create and share information to reach mutual understanding
(Rogers: 1995:5f).
There is no clear definition of the participatory paradigm of development communi-
cation, but there could be said to exist a consensus about a few significant differences
from the dominant paradigm: the shift from a one-way, government to people centred
approach, to a participative, knowledge sharing practice; away from being primarily
mass media centred to a stronger consideration of “little media”; and instead of trying
to create a “climate for development” through mass media, to focus on development
programs on the weaker sections of a national population (Rogers: 1989). For some,
participation was seen as a necessary tool, but just as means towards an end defined by
the institution itself, others saw the process of participation as an end in itself (Servaes:
1999:15). But the view on development in general broadened and the definition included
not merely economic growth on a national level, but also growth with equity, provision
of basic needs, meaningful employment, and rich and varied interpersonal relationships
(Melkote: 2003:137f).
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Concepts and justifications for participatory communication vary greatly, especially as
the dominant paradigm still had a big influence on what was understood as development
goals. The idea of collaboration and knowledge sharing between locals and experts and
local context and cultural proximity gained popularity in many development projects,
but the focused outcome in most cases was not true empowerment, but rather the
attainment of some pre-defined indicators of development inherited from the dominant
paradigm. Participation in self-help activities was encouraged, but the design and control
of messages and development agendas usually remained with the experts and basic
solutions to the local problems were in most cases selected by the external development
agencies (Melkote (2002:139), Sachs (1992)).
The dominant paradigm has not yet passed, as Rogers noted some 22 years ago, but
is certainly less dominant and emphases have gone towards achieving equality in the
distribution of development benefits and people participating (Rogers: 1989). Mody
(2000:194) argues that it was crucial to identify the domestic and external conditions in
a societies’ power structures, as well as political and economic conditions in their media
systems. In her view, however, most participatory approaches were old wine in new
bottles, participation may be necessary but it is not sufficient to achieve fundamental
changes.
Huesca (2002:151ff) also sees a dilemma in participatory communication, as he asks
“participation: technical means or utopian end?”. He argues that these two extreme
views of interpreting ‘participation’ can undermine the usefulness of the theory. Using
‘participation’ as basically synonymous with ‘persuasion’ misinterprets and distorts the
theory and makes participation appear as compatible with social marketing, capitalist
expansion, and global trade. Using participation as an end in itself, on the other hand,
is said to be “a somewhat romantic belief that peasants, Indians, and other marginalized
persons possess local wisdom and a virtuous cultural ethos, and that participatory
processes are inherently humanizing, liberating, and catalyzing” (Huesca: 2002:153).
The ongoing influence of the dominant paradigm and modernization theories on a
large-scale challenged true participation and social and political action by the people at
all levels and thus also prevented the desired awakening and mobilization at grassroot
level and the challenging of authority of hegemonic structures (Kothari: 1984:14).
Melkote and Steeves address power inequities as the central problem in development
(2001:36f), however, Huesca and Dervin (1994) warn that power needs to be continuously
renegotiated as today’s formula for liberation can become tomorrow’s distorting ideology
(White: 2004:15).
In the late 1970s the dependency school gradually lost its favoured position (since the
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‘radical’ late 1960s) among social science scholars as postcolonial theory, growing out of
literary studies, emerged and brought a new perspective relative to dependency theory,
similar to what dependency theory had done in relation to modernization 15 to 20 years
earlier (Kapoor: 2002). Both cover some similar territory and share important common
concerns, and in the following section the origin and progression of postcolonialism will
be discussed.
3.1.3 Orientalism and Post-Colonialism
One of the first and most influential early statements of radical anti-colonial thought
and critical reflections on the after-effects of colonization came in 1959 from Franz
Fanon (Fanon: 1959). He analyses how intellectuals from colonized countries - by him
called “native intellectuals” - assimilated the culture of the occupying power. They
were mostly studying at European Universities, shaping their intellectual work using the
techniques and language of the metropolis and worked closely with the colonial power.
Colonial intellectuals thereby often played a vital role in structuring and shaping the
influence of colonial rule (Pieterse & Parekh: 1995). At a certain point however, Fanon
describes, the “native” is disturbed, and decides to remember what s/he is. But as s/he
has only exterior relations and is not part of his/her people s/he can only reinterpret
memories or old legends in the “light of a borrowed aestheticism and a conception of
the world that was discovered under other skies” (Fanon: 1959). Finally, in what Fanon
calls the fighting phase, many of the native intellectuals will feel the need to speak
to their nation. In consequence Fanon sees the risk of stereotyped reproduction, to
create an authentic work, however, he/she must realize that the truths of a nation are
in the first place in its realities, described as the fight which the people wage against
the forces of occupation. Artists who decide to illustrate what they think is the truth
of the nation might, paradoxically, show the past and turn away from actual events.
In his own extremity of colonial alienation, as Bhabha describes, Fanon “speaks most
effectively from uncertain interstices of historical change” as one of the first to articulate
the unresolved contradiction between culture and class and the struggle of psychic
representation and social reality (Bhabha: 1994:57).
Unlike the intellectual, the mass of people maintain intact traditions completely
different from those of the colonial situation but they morph into a formalism which
becomes more and more stereotyped, a defence mechanism led by the simple instinct
for preservation. The colonial situation brings about a nearly all-embracing halt to
the national culture of the colonized country. Nonetheless, Fanon suggests that the
continued cohesion of the people constitutes an invitation to the intellectual to go
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further than producing literature that is bitter, hopeless and violent, which he sees as
reassurance of the occupying power. To create a literature instead that addresses its
own people, necessitates a new literary style for a new public. An ironic reaction to
these developments as described by Fanon, comes from the colonialist specialists, who
do not recognize these new forms but try to help protect the traditions and become the
defenders of the imagined “native style”. For Fanon, culture is mainly the expression of
nation, a sum of its preferences, taboos and patterns, of internal and external tensions.
Consequently, in the colonial situation, culture in this sense falls away and dies, and in
order to give life to national culture, the re-establishment of the nation is for him the
first necessity. The most urgent thing for the intellectual to do, Fanon states, is to help
build up his nation (Fanon: 1959:274).
Fanon’s analysis of historically-bound cultural systems stands as an important influ-
ence later on postcolonial theorists such as Edward Said. Said’s work on Orientalism
shaped not only postcolonial theory but English history, anthropology and other scien-
tific disciplines as well. Said’s work builds on an analysis of Western novels, travel and
anthropological writing, opera and media to link Western imperialism with Western
culture (Kapoor: 2002). For Said the Orient was “almost a European invention, and
had been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and
landscapes, remarkable experiences.” (Said: 1995:1). While distinguishing between
British and French imperial Orientalism, as well as between colonial and postcolonial
Western Orientalism, he argues that there is a general continuity in the way West and
East are depicted. Said does not state that the Orient was essentially an idea, as he
emphasises that the phenomenon of Orientalism deals not with Orient but more with
its idea about Orient. Ideas, cultures and histories, as he shows, cannot be understood
or studied without considering their configuration of power, as it was shown by the
dominant powerful West, speaking for the Orient. Importantly it did not matter to Said
whether the stereotype was positive or negative, since either is equally essentializing and
originates out of a desire for domination. Thus, Orientalism is not merely a structure of
lies or myths, but a sign of European-Atlantic power over the Orient, a created body of
theory and practice declaring Orientalism as a system of knowledge about Orient and
continuously reproducing itself (Said: 1995:5f). As can still be observed today across
disciplines, Said warned that even scholars that were thought to be sensitive towards
non-Western cultures, still reproduced that kind of hegemony within their research. Dis-
guised by the “rhetoric of neutrality” they are unable to escape “from a political position,
which always places them at a superior level in relation to the East” (Nieto-Galan: 2011).
To disclose this invention of Orientalism, Said suggests that society and literary culture
can only be understood and studied together, which initiated debates across the human-
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ities and social sciences. To Said all texts “must be ‘worlded’ – located in the world
and exposed for the geographical imaginations from which they arise” (Morin: 2004:338) .
Said uses the notion of imaginative geographies to refer to the invention and con-
struction of geographical space beyond a physical territory, dividing and structuring the
world according to an imperial imagination or ideology, with the ultimate objective to
control people and place. To overcome these imagined geographies, ‘knowledge’ must
be self-critical, open itself up disciplinarily and enter into dialogue with the people and
places it represents. His emphasis on the relationship between culture and imperialism
and the theorizing of the complex cultural, ideological and intellectual processes in-
volved in domination and control that accompany the political, economic and territorial
processes, laid the foundation for the field of postcolonial studies (Morin: 2004).
Critics of Said’s work accused him of being over-simplifying, in some points confusing,
that his works contain considerable technical flaws (MacKenzie: 1993) and that he should
stick to literary criticism (Ali: 2003). However, others claim that much of the criticism
on Said’s work should be treated as extensions of his thinking rather than attacks on
it. Some of the accusations, like his failure to consider resistance and opposition to
Orientalist stereotypes, by which he unintentionally reinforced an (Orientalist) image of
an Eastern subject as passive, inarticulate and lacking self-determination, Said himself
attempted to correct in his later works (Morin: 2004).
The purpose of postcolonial writing, following Said, has been to interrogate European
discourses and discursive strategies and to investigate the means by which Europe
imposed and maintained its codes in the colonial domination of so much of the rest of
the world. The rereading and rewriting of the European historical and fictional record
are seen as vital and inescapable tasks (Tiffin: 1995). Postcolonial studies are not limited
to theorizing only the conditions, but also try to understand why they are what they
are and how they can be undone and redone. It is in fact easy to condemn and attack
foreign rulers or capital in retrospect, but much more difficult to identify what values,
institutions and identities are foreign and evolved as part of colonial legacy or which
might be intertwined with their ‘native’ analogues.
In accordance with Franz Fanon, who emphasised that the solution cannot be to
simply try to preserve, Pieterse argues that “it requires not the restoration of a histori-
cally continuous and allegedly pure precolonial heritage, but an imaginative creation
of a new form of consciousness and way of life” (Pieterse & Parekh: 1995:3). The
postcolonial perspective differs from the traditions of the sociology of underdevelopment
or the ‘dependency’ theory in its focus on culture and its attempts to revise nationalist
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or ‘nativist’ pedagogies that set up the relation of Third and First World in binary
opposition (Kapoor: 2002). It refuses to provide a holistic social explanation and instead
forces recognition of more complex cultural and political boundaries.
Political decolonization has been largely completed; in an economic sense decolonization
is addressed in various forms under what is widely called development. The process of
intellectual decolonization has also been under way and here, too, a critical perspective
has become more and more common. Cultural decolonization, or the retracing of the
culture of colonialism in the Western world, has with the emergence of postcolonial
studies started to be recognized as a concern (Pieterse & Parekh: 1995).
Regarding their approach and terminology, postcolonialist scholars have been criticized
for invoking the prefix ‘post’ the illusion of a ‘colonial past, liberal present’ and disguising
the ongoing asymmetries of global power, hence a better term would be neocolonialism.
Another source of criticism is the mode of questioning, which has been informed by
methodologies derived primarily from literary criticism, often concentrating on the role
of literature and language. These methodologies are meaningful in the context of general
linguistics and the cultural turn in social science, but on the other hand, this focus
veers in the opposite direction to earlier monocentric emphasis on political economy:
either material conditions are seen as all-determining or discourse is treated as the all
embracing universe of reality (Pieterse & Parekh: 1995). Politics tend to be merely
brought in as a background variable or is discussed in a generalized way, as though
interactions between coloniser and colonised are barely affected by their different socio-
economic status. Here a reconsideration of dependency theorists’ analysis of politics,
and a concentration on the socio-economic inequality could help reveal postcolonialists’
weaknesses and bring dependency and postcolonialism into conversation. “In the end”,
Pieterse and Parekh observe, “the problematic of decolonization of imagination merges
with wider questions: the scrutiny of Western ideologies that have become part of the
‘operating system’ of global politics, in particular liberalism and liberal democracy”
(1995:15). In this perspective, not only the ‘post’ in postcolonialism but maybe also the
‘colonialism’ might need to be reconsidered, as this “operating system of global politics”
is no longer represented predominantly by the former colonial powers.
Despite the shift away from modernization theory and a critical perspective on
Western dominance, in the Communication for Development field, there is surprisingly
little literature on the influence of postcolonial theory on both research and practice
in the field. Some say postcolonial scholarship had very limited influence within the
communication discipline as a whole (see Shome & Hegde (2002), Parameswaran (2002))
or at least criticize the “lack of overt intersection” between the two (Alhassan: 2007:110)
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emphasizing the need to “uncover the unacknowledged linkages” (ibid.). Participatory
and empowerment (see 3.1.4 below) approaches imply questions about context, voice
and agency that were also central to postcolonial scholarship, while at the same time
development communication literature remains overshadowed by the accusation of having
been “an effective handmaiden of this dubious re-invention of international diplomacy
called international development” (Alhassan: 2009:120).
3.1.4 Empowerment
One ‘radical’ form of the participatory paradigm, is the concept of empowerment –
though the exponential increase of its use as part of development aid vocabulary made
its radical touch vanish. The empowerment paradigm comes from the field of community
organisation, education and community psychology and Speer and Hughey describe it
as the “manifestation of social power at individual, organisational and community levels
of analysis” (1995:730). Santo Rozario (1997), on the other hand, divides empowerment
into two primary models; one “is based on empowering the individual, not on encouraging
collective social action by the oppressed”, the other one, consistent with Paolo Freire’s
approach, deals with “conscientization and radical social action” (Rozario, in (Melkote &
Steeves: 2001:37)). Empowerment models give control in the process to local individuals,
organisations or groups involved, while models informed by the dominant paradigm
give it to the experts. Handing the decisions back to the development beneficiaries
is described as one of most significant moves towards empowerment (White: 2004).
Melkote and Steeves (2001) suggest a transition from development communication to
Development Support Communication (DSC), with communication seen as more holistic
and as a support for people’s self-determination. They argue that any development
specialist on the ground should see his/her role in promoting local people and invest
his/her own power ensure to their empowerment.
After initial resistance, DSC gained acceptance among multilateral agencies, applied
for example in the Food and Agriculture Organisation’s CATs (Community Audio
Towers) in the late 1980s, or UNICEF’s ComPAS (Community Public Address System)
in the late 1990s. The DSC approach, however, has never really taken root among
experts, which Melkote and Steeves explain by the fact that at that level of decision
making “few understand its implications because few have been directly involved in
projects” (2001:350). Similar to the discussion around ‘real’ participation in participatory
communication, empowerment was said to be frequently misunderstood and misused.
The dilemma as for many C4D paradigms is giving advice on guidance how to effect
development goals through communication in a way that others can implement on a
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wider scale (McAnany: 2010).
3.1.5 Multiplicity or the ‘Alternative Paradigm’
“The central idea is, that there is no universal development model, that
development is an integral, multi-dimensional, and dialectic process that can
differ from society to society”
(Servaes, 1989 in (Sparks: 2007:57))
Today, in the field of development communication there are different paradigms ap-
plied on different levels. While new paradigms have been introduced, older approaches
to development are still practised widely, resulting in an overlap of different approaches.
Every region or nation has unique circumstances with development programs needing to
be altered accordingly (Chitnis: 2005:46).
As in the ‘post-development’ discussion, some critics of a development industry that
appears to channel resources with worsening rather than improving consequences, posi-
tion development as a particular discourse. The term ‘development’ itself, they claim,
communicates problematic assumptions about the nature of the problems addressed,
appropriate solutions, and communities at risk (Wilkins: 2008). There is, however, some
consent among most contemporary development projects as some scholars have observed.
Regardless of theoretical orientation, the importance of a participatory component seems
to have become broadly accepted, even if as Huesca (2002) observes, "this notion is
honored more on paper than in practice” [140] and very few cases are classified to meet
the standards of genuine participation (Tufte & Mefalopulos: 2009:17).
Quarry and Ramirez (2009) attempt with their book Communication for Another
Development to reach a wider public than those who already work in the development
establishment. They offer exemplifying descriptions of both positive and negative
experiences they came across during their more than 40 years as practitioners and
call for a participatory shift. However, they also admit that their notion of C4D as a
participatory process of ‘searching’ (as opposed to ‘planning’) and ‘listening’ (as opposed
to ‘telling’) is difficult to carry out in the institutional aid environment (McAnany:
2010). The UN, as with other development agencies, “has a tendency to behave as
though its primary purpose is, for example, to create reports, arrange staff movements
and keep itself funded” Harr (2009). They extend the notion of context to the general
circumstances surrounding a project during its implementation. This includes the
circumstances of people who would benefit from the project but also, which is rarely
addressed as an aspect of context, the often debilitating bureaucratic context of the
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aid institutions themselves, like the need to spend a certain budget quickly and to
produce results within an often short funding cycle (McAnany: 2010). They also stress
the importance of project ‘champions’ (Quarry & Ramirez: 2009:62). A ‘champion’ is
defined as a local person who is well acquainted with the local context, who promotes
the project idea and stays in place for a long time. How to find and identify these
committed local leaders, however, and include them into large donor agencies’ projects
remains to be solved individually.
Conclusion
Schramm’s work still offers some insightful ideas concerning the successes, failures,
and exuberant hopes for technology and its potential to impact global development.
Nearly 50 years later, we can say that those hopes have not been fulfilled. But surpris-
ingly little has changed about these hopes of the role ICTs can play in development
(ICT4D-Jester: 2010). Scholarship in the C4D area has certainly grown beyond its
administrative and development assistance origins to recognize the contributions of
social theory, political- economic inquiry, and cultural studies (Wilkins & Mody: 2001).
Yet within development practice the promises of modernization theory and the dif-
fusion model seem to still hide under a thin layer of ‘participation’ and postcolonial
reflections. New ICT has brought back hopes of leapfrogging ‘stages’, if the population
of developing countries can simply be provided access and taught how to use it ‘properly’.
McAnany (2010) suggests a detachment between theory and practice may have de-
veloped, as much of the modernization/diffusion paradigm continues in projects on the
ground, promoted by the development establishment even in the new millennium; while
most academic writing in the field of C4D keeps a critical perspective towards the early
paradigms. “Theory in C4D may identify problems, but confronting and changing the
structures remain problems of another magnitude” (McAnany: 2010:5).
Similarly Wilkins and Mody (2001) highlight the constraints linked to the access to, and
the production of, knowledge about and for development. They question the applicability
of theories, norms and definitions of problems and solutions from dominant development
donors and researchers “which are at odds with the distinct experiences of the majority
of the world’s people who live outside of the industrialized, Northern, Western contexts.”
(Wilkins & Mody: 2001:389). “Is the field of C4D dying?” McAnany (2010) asks but
then goes on to give reasons for the decline in publications and decreasing number of
C4D courses: many areas originally addressed by C4D research have been renamed
or moved to other departments. But its relevance might be rediscovered with the
exponential growth of New ICTs and the increasing interest in them by a variety of
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institutions – from local to transnational levels, representing commercial, governmental,
and civil society interest. The experience of more than 50 years of Communication for
Development research holds a big potential in an interdisciplinary exchange.
I want to reveal these different expectations and mindsets amongst the groups involved
in the negotiation processes around New ICTs in Afghanistan and analyse how they
shape perceptions of development and, thereby, positions on ICT use. At the same time
I am interested in how the awareness of the importance of ‘participation’ – that I am
convinced is strongly present in today’s debates concerning development aid – is defined
and put into practice. And whether the common talk about sustainability includes some
of the above mentioned ideas of ‘empowerment’ or ‘champions’ for a long-term local
leadership.
3.2 Information and Communication Technologies for Development
"Telecommunication services and infrastructure are there for you and to bring
comfort into your life. It is the responsibility of every citizen of Afghanistan
to support their development and at the same time protect them"1.
ICT4D stands for the application of information and communication technologies for
international development and was established as an independent academic field – or
rather ‘label’ as ICT4D scholars still come from a wide range of disciplines – during the
early 1990s. The application of communication technologies in development projects
has a much longer tradition as already shown in the previous section. New ICTs
and (economic) development were first addressed in neighbouring disciplines, such as
communication studies (see for example Castells (1989)) or economics (see for example
Freeman & Soete (1994)). ICT4D as a distinct area of practice and research evolved
around the same time as discussions began about the ‘digital divide’ - a term used to
refer to the growing differences within societies, as well as globally, regarding access to
computers and the internet (see for example Hoffman & Novak (1998), Norris (2001)).
ICT4D, though usually defined as a multidisciplinary field of both theory and practice,
differs to previous approaches in its focus on the access to, and use of, technological
devices, including the physical infrastructure, in a low resource setting (SPIDER: 2013).
1 Taken from ‘Five-Year-Plan’ for IT development from the Afghan Ministry of Communication (MoC:
2005).
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3.2.1 The birth of ICT4D
Technology popularly was, and often still is, conceptualized to be a set of tools, machines,
materials and processes that help to solve human problems. What qualifies as a problem
in a given time and in a given place, however, depends on what is considered progress
(Prakash: 2007). During the 1990s, the Internet and digital technologies became dif-
fused in an environment characterized by the rhetoric of the technological sublime and
irrational exuberance surrounding New ICTs in the ‘West’ as well as in development
policy discussions. The new digital technologies started to be seen as bringing rapid and
fundamental changes on a social, economic and cultural level (Preston: 2001), with some
observers even claiming New ICTs could provide the means for Third World nations
to leapfrog the industrial era (Rogers: 1989). Or, as Heeks (2008) put it: “the digital
technologies of the 1990s, then, supplied a new tool in search of a purpose” (p. 27).
New ICTs received a prominent role within development initiatives to tackle development
targets such as education and economic growth. These included the "United Nations
Information and Communication Technologies Task Force" (UN ICT TF), founded in
2001 and whose work was leading up to the World Summit on the Information Society
(WSIS) in Geneva in December 2003 (see also World Bank (1998a), UNDP (2000),
WSIS (2003b)). The wider role and growing implementation of New ICTs also gained
increasing attention from different academic fields, notably Information Systems (IS),
Development Studies (DS) and Computer Science (CS) (Heeks: 2010). The Information
Systems perspective in particular offered models for understanding the human, political
and contextual factors and approaches that needed to be addressed during project design
and implementation (Orlikowski & Iacono: 2001:133) and it is therefore not surprising
that most ICT4D literature came from the IS related fields.
In terms of development projects and applied research, telecentres in rural areas were
the first prominent examples under the ICT4D label (see Wellenius (2003), UNESCO
(2006)). But after a brief time of celebrating the concept, reality proved that even if the
installed systems worked technically, the centres often failed to achieve the intended
outcomes (Ratan & Bailur: 2007). PCs and Internet connections in village telecenters –
installed to bring education and informational empowerment – are predominantly used
by young men playing games, watching movies, or consuming adult content (Toyama:
2010), the same prevalent user behaviour as in developed nations.
Another problem that few studies addressed was the question how small scale ICT
projects can increase their complexity of services and can be sustained over longer
periods with appropriate resources, including money and people (Walsham & Sahay:
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2006). It is one thing to set up a telecenter but another one to create a self-sustaining
long-term facility. Those taking over the telecenter as a running business made only a
few dozen dollars per month, while the costs of hardware, electricity, connectivity, and
maintenance quickly went into hundreds (Toyama: 2010).
The perspective of ICT innovations as the diffusion from advanced economies, adapted
to the conditions of developing countries (Rogers: 1995) involved the problematic assump-
tion that the material/cognitive entities that comprise ICTs and associated practices are
adequately independent from the social circumstances and it was questioned whether
they can be transferable, more or less intact, into any other society (Avgerou: 2009).
Technology is largely developed and produced to amplify shareholder interest in profit,
which means that on a global scale hardware tends to be designed for people working
in air-conditioned offices with cheap and stable AC power and a broadband Internet
connection. Software tends to be developed for the audiences with the greatest dispos-
able income and in languages understood by the world’s largest, wealthiest populations
(Toyama: 2010).
The increasing number of public-private partnerships in developing countries including
those by technology companies like Cisco, Microsoft, HP and others, continues to
promote the idea that ICT per se will lead to development. In a similar manner,
statements by the United Nations on ICT4D often treat technology as empowering in
itself (McLaughlin: 2005). Some critics argue that with initiatives delivered by private-
public partnerships resources would preferably be used for projects the private sector
can see potential profit in, leaving areas with few investment prospects out of the picture
(Leye: 2007). But the numbers speak for themselves regarding the growing influence
of these partnerships: whereas Microsoft, since the launch of its Unlimited Potential
program in 2003 with its goal ‘to increase computer literacy among all members of the
population’ (Microsoft: 2003), has spent a total of US $152 million in grants, UNESCO’s
International Programme for the Development of Communication (IPDC) has, since
1981, only been able to spend a mere US $90 million (Leye: 2007).
3.2.2 “ICT4D 2.0”
More recently, what I call here ICT4D 2.0 innovations (Heeks: 2009), are more likely
to occur on a smaller scale, either in adapting or applying existing technologies. The
focus of ICT4D initiatives today lies in constructing reliable new techno-organisational
structures within a given local context, which increasingly means to work with mobile
phones in their function as ‘small computers’. Though radio remains the first or only
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choice for accessing and spreading information in rural communities, mobile phones
are becoming similarly ubiquitous in many developing regions (SPIDER: 2013) and
mobile Internet has developed into an affordable alternative to fixed lines in many
developing regions. One tension though remains: wishing to standardize ICT systems for
efficiency and comparability in different settings and the difficulty in imposing identical
standards on the different local contexts. As Unwin (2008) criticizes, “all too often
ICT4D initiatives have been supply led, with insufficient attention being paid to the
real needs”
Heeks introduced a typology which identifies three different approaches to ICT4D
design: the pro-poor – designed externally for the poor and marginalized, probably
still the most common approach. Para-poor – designed in close cooperation with poor
communities and described to be the most challenging. And the per-poor - with seeing
potential in Web 2.0 technologies and Open Source Software and the poor themselves
being the innovators (Heeks: 2008). Most so called ICT4D initiatives start with the first,
some move to the second if they survive the pilot phase and sufficient attention leads to
further funding and time to rework the initial design and ideally would end in the last,
though “the poor” might at that stage already have generated an income through their
skills and devices, helping them move up from the very bottom of the famous pyramid.
Like other participatory approaches described in chapter 3.1.2, the para-poor-effort
comes with a set of related questions regarding “participation”. Who participates mat-
ters, beyond a technology-literate elite minority? How they participate and also for
what reasons? ICT4D participation, if not to happen on a mere technical level, needs to
bridge multiple divides between designers and users: techie versus nontechie; rich versus
poor; often a Western versus non-Western mindset; urban versus rural; men versus
women; young versus old (Heeks: 2008). Participation requires careful preparation on
various levels that are often neglected with a technological focus in mind.
Only addressed in a few studies but of great interest for me is the question of com-
plementary thrusts in the use and promotion of New ICTs in development projects:
one is based on the above mentioned attempts to provide access to ICTs for poor and
marginalized groups and therefore increase the ‘access for all’. One example is the rural
telecentres that keep depending, as shown by Toyama (2010) and Ratan and Bailur
(2007) on external sponsorship. These projects that I thematically link in the following
as ICT for the poor tend to compensate a pressing need, a “lack of access to” – teachers,
information, health service, and so on – which is to be (temporarily) substituted with a
technology.
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A second ICT4D approach is the development of technical and institutional infras-
tructure (Westrup et al.: 2002:11) aimed at governmental institutions and universities
but also to provide the necessary resources, like electricity and internet access, needed
by the private sector. These infrastructure projects carry high initial costs and depend
highly on external expertise, but at the same time can be seen as the foundation for
long-term cost-reduction and sustainability, as they promise to replace generators and
slow and expensive satellite internet access. These projects address lasting issues and
future benefits but are considerably more expensive and much more likely to serve the
already privileged urban elite.
Thirdly there are ICT capacity building projects, offering training to a selected tar-
get group. These trainings target two major categories: how to understand and use
technological devices and systems (more technology centred) and how to use certain
applications running on those devices for professional or personal purposes (more tools
centred). The latter one tends to benefit exclusively those using the devices, most
famously office software and basic research training at public institutions but also basic
technology usage as in telecentres or for mobile-phone based health information services.
It focuses on understanding a pre-defined function and using it to one’s benefit. More
technology centred training aims to built the capability to understand a technological
system like a computer network, be able to configure it according to particular needs
and trouble shoot a variety of problems disturbing the network. This more sophisticated
training requires technically trained personnel, is usually time consuming to establish and
difficult to maintain, as the most qualified participants will also most likely receive better
paid job offers once they graduate from such training. In a country like Afghanistan,
where technical expertise on this level is still rare, this training is the prerequisite to keep
complex systems – such as infrastructure – running, managed by local staff and thus
provide a higher potential for an independent long-term operation. But the participants
of such training are selected among computer-savvy candidates that have already gained
some experience in working with computer systems.
In looking at ICT projects in (urban) higher education, as well as rural elementary
education-technology projects, my own primary research will try to give an impression
of both and how the issues of the ‘problem of sustainability’ and ‘risk of supporting the
already privileged’ are discussed among the stakeholders. And in particular concerning
the former example, I agree with Ratan and Bailur that “ICTD projects often champion
‘welfare-based’ initiatives to the extent of undermining the agency of the local popu-
lation”(2007:7). This, I suggest, originates from two main assumptions: firstly, that
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technology needs to be built and configured by experts and secondly, that – once in
place – technology entails rule-following behaviour (Wynne: 1988). Additionally, I see
surprisingly little attention drawn to the question whether part of the lack of sustain-
ability of many of these ‘welfare-based’ initiatives is the lack of adequate technological
training and experience on the ground and how this might influence local agency. I have,
therefore, chosen examples for my case study from three areas mentioned above:
• ICT for the poor
• ICT infrastructure development
• ICT capacity building
Another area that has recently become increasingly associated with ICT4D is what
some assign to “eGovernance”, “citizen participation” or the broader term “ICT and
Democracy”. Democracy is, however, a sensitive topic in Afghanistan as it is often
regarded as “Western-imported and -imposed” (Mohib: 2011) and there is little trust
in Afghanistan’s current democratic government among the population, according to a
2010 survey (Tariq et al.: 2010). Additionally, closely related crucial questions regarding
internet freedom, (foreign) internet traffic control and censorship (see de Bastion et al.
(2014)) could due to the study’s limited scope not be fully explored. It was therefore cho-
sen not to be included as a dominant theme. The focus on technology and participation,
however, includes some elements that are also relevant in the literature on participation,
democracy and technology (see SIDA (2009), NDI (2013)).
Conclusion
Though still being harshly criticized for their technology-deterministic view on devel-
opment, especially concerning New ICTs (Leye (2009), Pieterse (2005)), the field of
ICT4D has in recent years opened up towards critical debates. However, while in
academia the importance of ‘context’ is regularly emphasized, projects that incorporate
context in ‘useful and meaningful ways’ (Ratan & Bailur: 2007) are still rare, not least
because the majority of investments in new developments in hard- and software solutions
simply tend to be made where profits are to be expected, rather than more open and
adaptable solutions. The debate amongst practitioners and development agencies is no
longer about whether ICTs are relevant or not but about how and in which area New
ICTs should be introduced and supported (Brown & Grant (2010), UNESCO (2005),
Walsham & Sahay (2006), Sein & Harindranath (2004), WSIS (2003a)). Most influential
in actively partnering with development agencies and practitioners are powerful ICT4D
actors such as Microsoft and CISCO (Leye (2007), McLaughlin (2005)), or more recently
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Google and Facebook or the One Laptop Per Child (OLPC) program, which received
considerable attention at the World Summit of the Information Society in 2005 (Twist
(2005)), with each of these partners following their own set of interests and trying to
guide the outcomes.
The history of ICT4D has shown that technology projects in developing countries
have long been treated with unjustified optimism (some would say naivety). A failure
rate as high as 70% in ICT4D projects to ‘promote universal access’ by the World Bank
was shown by The Independent Evaluation Group (2011). However, I don’t want to
make the mistake of going from technological determinism into the other extreme. There
is certainly a strong role of the social and cultural in all aspects of technology that
needs to be considered and taken seriously. But with the social in focus, there is also
the risk of losing track of the artifact itself and failing to engage with the technology as
Orlikowski & Iacono (2001) rightly observed. I argue that there lies a potential in New
ICTs for social development1, with the technical and the social in mind, and that it is a
question of ‘how’ rather than ‘if’ ICTs should be included.
1 The general term “development” which is mostly adopted from the literature (see chapter 1.2) still
carries a strong focus on economic aspects. The more people centred “human development” approach
sees development as capacitating (see chapter 2.2.3). Though its use in the literature is often similarly
ambiguous as “development”, I use the broader notion of “social development” to imply a focus on a
context-dependent perspective to “promoting social well being” ((Midgley: 1995:12)) which is not
limited to a “developing country” context.
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CHAPTER 4
Investigating the instruments
4.1 Technological Determinism
“The single most influential theory of the relationship between technology
and society is ‘technological determinism’. This is the theory that technology
is indeed an independent factor, and that changes in technology cause social
changes. In its strongest version, the theory claims that change in technology
is the most important cause of change in society.”
(Wajcman & MacKenzie: 1985:4)
Similar to the optimistic view on the power of mass media to enhance development
during the 1950s and 60s, New ICTs were seen as the solution to many development
problems in the 1990s and by some they are still seen so today. This is particularly
so within the education sector, where research on the uses of technology frequently
overemphasise its influence (Oliver: 2011:1). Negroponte (2009), for example, announced
in a presentation he gave in 2009 that there was no doubt about the positive effect
of laptops on learning, he even states “the fact that somebody in the room would say
the impact is unclear is to me amazing”. The only question, he insists, is an economic
one: how to afford it. This kind of approach, termed by its critics as ‘technological
determinism’, sees the consequences of technology on society, in this case school children,
as incontestable. Technological change in this view causes or determines social change,
including social practices such as learning.
Another typically technological determinist view suggests that technology invention is
an essentially internal process, which then sets in motion the conditions for social change
and progress. In this “immensely powerful and now largely orthodox view”, progress is
seen as the sum of these inventions that ‘created the modern world’ as Williams describes
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and “modern man and modern condition” (2005:5) are seen as being made by technolo-
gies like the steam engine, the automobile or, today, the computer. We speak of ‘steam’,
‘iron’, ‘stone’ and ‘computer’ ages and so do museums, schoolbooks, and much reporting
on technology in the media. Whole nations are associated with certain technologies
in which they have played a prominent developmental role as Wyatt (2008) observes,
“Holland and windmills, the United States and cars, Japan and microelectronics” (p.
167). Thus, taking part in ‘the Information Age’ is seen as an unquestionable goal
by most developed and developing countries alike, a step further in the history of progress.
Misa (1988) suggests the examples given above are actually two different versions of
technological determinism, “(1) that technological change determines social change, and
(2) that technological development is autonomous or independent of social influences”
(p.309). I agree, however, with Wyatt (2008:168), referring to Wajman and MacKenzie,
who describe these two statements as the main assumptions of the view that “technology
impinges on society from outside of society” (1985:4) and as the two central aspects
constituting technological determinism.
More relevant for my research is the first statement that technological change causes
or determines social change, which as ‘optimistic determinism’ as well as ‘pessimistic
determinism’ (Friesen: 2008), is quite prevalent in the development aid area. ‘Optimistic
determinism’ generally emphasises the positive aspects of this technical change over
negative ones while ‘pessimistic determinism’ warns about its destructive consequences.
Both, however, coincide in their view that technology is the cause of the change, and
simply differ in their opinion whether the change is desirable or not.
Other scholars differentiate between ‘hard’ nomological accounts, providing "descriptions
of an inevitable technological order based on laws of nature" (Bimber: 1994:81) and ‘soft’
determinism allowing additional (social) factors to influence outcomes. While Woolgar
and Grint (1997) argue that very few would position themselves as ‘hard’ determinists
there are clear examples of this in the field of technology and development, such as
Negroponte’s view on the impact of the OLPC laptop on learning.
This deterministic way of thinking about the relationship between technology and
society had been uncontested for a long time and persists in many actions taken and
justifications given. Technological determinism conforms with the vast majority of
people’s experiences with technologies they use every day, for example, devices like
mobile-phones that seem of mysterious origin and design and that most people have
no idea how they actually work (Wyatt: 2008:167 ff). Not many people would call
themselves technologically determinist, yet the view also persists in today’s popular
accounts of new technologies as mechanical rule-following devices, though individual
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technological practice is often shown to be far less clearly rule-bound and determined
(Wynne: 1988).
Scholars in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) have since the 1970s
increasingly concentrated on demonstrating the limits of technological determinism.
Through a variety of empirically rich historical or ethnographic studies they demon-
strated the great impact of the social on the processes of technological development.
Furthermore, public discourse on technology development is changing for many reasons.
Ongoing debates on “just because it can be done, should it be done?” reflect a move
away from seeing technology as detached from moral values and as neutral in itself. Yet
to simply ignore technological determinism or dismiss it as obsolete would also miss out
on the reasons for which this popular view is used or adopted by social actors in specific
circumstances.
4.2 Constructing Science
Not surprisingly there is also no shortage of (critical) writing on connections of academia,
technology and development, as shown in the previous chapters. And while science
and technology have undoubtedly served as important legitimators of imperialism and
colonialism, there is relatively little research from an STS perspective addressing these
connections (Sismondo: 2010:195f), as also described below in section 4.2.4. Nonetheless,
Science and Technology Studies offer many critical accounts of the above mentioned
deterministic ways of thinking about technology that add an important level for both
the theoretical and methodological approaches to this research.
STS as a discipline started in the late 1970s with studies on the culture of science and
how scientists constructed facts. A number of researchers had, however, previously
started to adopt new approaches of studying the culture of science. One of the earliest
works came from Michael Polanyi, describing science as “a diverse collection of different
‘local traditions’, tied up with individual scientists” (Polanyi, 1951:49 in (Schlecker &
Hirsch: 2001:75)). The Science Studies Unit at Edinburgh University, established in 1969,
was the first research unit dedicated to critical science studies and quickly attracted a
number of scholars across disciplines, like David Edge, Barry Barnes and David Bloor
(Fuller: 2000:191).
A similar constructivist view on science was taken by the early laboratory ethno-
graphies, which drew attention to the skills involved in even the most straightforward
laboratory manipulation and observation. In their influential book Laboratory Life,
Woolgar and Latour (1986) describe the ‘construction of scientific facts’ by gathering
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material which informs their discussion “from in situ monitoring of scientists’ activity”
(p. 27). Producing thick descriptions with sometimes apparently irrelevant details - “9
mins. Julius comes in eating an apple and perusing a copy of Nature” (p. 15) - they
approach the field with what they call ‘anthropological strangeness’ to dissolve the
exoticism surrounding scientists’ work (p. 29). They demonstrate that what might
later be seen as “groundbreaking historic events” in science is based on routine ongoing
scientific activities and scientists negotiating the nature of data, and other results in
conversation with each other. Such STS work helped open the field of science studies to
a more qualitative, intensively observational set of studies of scientific work and practice.
Almost 20 years later Woolgar and Grint (1997) proposed a similar approach to
technologies by introducing the notion of technology as text. Seeing technologies as open
texts which are written (configured) in certain ways by those social groups involved in
stages of development, production and marketing, and then read (interpreted) by their
consumers and users with recursive feedback loops between the different stages “elegantly
draws attention to the often unseen work by designers, financiers, marketers and others
in crafting the materiality and interpretations of devices” (Selwyn: 2008:21). These
configurations of technological objects supported by ICTs are, intended or unintended,
mostly invisible to the users. Most mobile phone users, for example, are not concerned
with hardware details, what role microchips play in the gradually shrinking size and
weight of computable devices, what kind of infrastructure provides their connectivity
or what the difference between closed and open software is. They use their phones
as a so called ‘black box’, paying little attention to the objects inner workings. But
the tendency to solve one problem only at the expense of another is as described by
(Morley: 2007:252 f) a basic character of all design practice. The ‘blackboxing’ hides
the opportunity costs of ‘naturalised’ technological ‘solutions’. Which problem this
solution addresses or, rather, whose problem is solved and who will benefit or lose from
it, depends on the context.
Similarly Rabinow sees the need
“to anthropologize the West: show how exotic its constitution of reality
has been; emphasize those domains most taken for granted as universal [...];
show how their claims to truth are linked to social practices and have hence
become effective forces in the social world”
(Rabinow: 1986:241)
Technological objects produced in and for the West are deeply embedded in social
and historical structures and offer solutions to problems that might not be the same
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or not even exist somewhere outside the ‘West’. Stable power supply and broadband
Internet are only two of the most obvious preconditions for an increasing number of
devices and applications. The objects themselves, by their specified designs, to some
extent determine their own function and what activities are permissible by their owners
(Morley: 2007:254), the more so if their software and hardware are ‘closed’ and not
intended for modifications.
By the 1980s a growing group of STS researchers began to turn their attention to the
production, design and use of technology, including ICTs, which Woolgar called “the turn
to technology” in STS. By applying mainly qualitative ethnographic methods as in the
early laboratory studies, these researchers studied the design, production, distribution
and use of technologies (see for example Wajcman & MacKenzie (1985), Pinch & Bijker
(1987), Woolgar (1991)).
They began what Latour (1987) called to ‘open the black box’ and, more importantly,
to follow the scientists in their effort to close it. Woolgar (1991) presents in his research,
carried out in an eighteen-month participant observation in a computer hardware pro-
ducing company, how the ‘user’ is seen as an outsider, in stark contrast to ‘us’ (members
of the company) as insiders (ibid. p. 73). The user (outside) is ‘configured’ (from within)
by the producers and their vision of consumers and consumption practices which is
embedded in the design of the technology. Woolgar also describes how he himself finds
it difficult to belong to both worlds: as a user he has full confidence in the ‘black-boxed’
machine he intends to purchase. During his days at the company by contrast, he sees all
the details its completion depends on and wonders how it could ever work (ibid. p.78)
and how the testers are struggling to interpret the machine correctly. Friesen (2008) gives
a more recent example of the adoption of learning management systems, such as WebCT
or Moodle, in universities. The rapid emergence of the Internet, he claims, did not mean
that it simply washed over the educational landscape, doing away with existing institu-
tional and business models. On the contrary, through a complex series of developments,
interactions and ‘negotiations’ it was refashioned through virtual learning environments
in clear conformance with the interests and management structures of large educational
institutions (ibid.). This example, at the same time, demonstrates why virtual learning
environments developed at, and for, Western educational institutions often do not show
the intended success in very different cultural and social environments. Similarly a Digi-
tal Library project, designed to be implemented by librarians from the U.S., faced several
unexpected problems in Afghanistan, as library staff returned to their previous work
habits instead of continuing to work with the digital library software (see USAID (2011)).
The ‘true nature’ of the artefacts themselves presupposes some process of establishing
that truth, a process that is social, contestable, and political (Grint and Woolgar (1997)
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in Oliver (2011)). By taking a long-term historical view with respect to meaning and
practice, STS sheds light on crucial connections between ICTs and the broader world of
artefacts and culture (Sismondo: 2008).
4.2.1 The Social Construction of Technology (SCOT)
The focus on the social processes involved in science and technology production that
STS pursues can guide us towards a range of social theories which seek, as Pinch and
Bijker (1987) put it, to open up the back box of technology. Their concept of the social
construction of technology (SCOT) proposes that the success of a technology depends
on the impact and scope of the group that take it up and promote it.
Pinch and Bijker (1984) drew parallels between science and technology, and highlighted
what they call ‘the interpretive flexibility’ in the design and use of artefacts. They
introduce ‘The Empirical Programme of Relativism (EPOR)’ approach and some of its
characteristics, which they employed in their research. EPOR has been developed in the
sociology of scientific knowledge with the aim of understanding ‘hard’ sciences under a
social construction perspective. SCOT adopts several of its concepts as its notion of
‘interpretative flexibility’ which focuses on alternative interpretations of technological
artifacts and the problems and conflicts that might arise from these different inter-
pretations. As a consequence, they emphasise the value of studying technical change
by mapping technological controversies through time to identify the social processes
involved in the formation of technological consensus. SCOT seeks to demonstrate the
design flexibility of a given technology which means it can have different meanings
and interpretations for the relevant social groups (Pinch & Bijker (1987), Bijker &
Law (1992)). A ‘relevant social group’ according to Pinch and Bijker can be various
things, institutions and organisations, as well as organised or unorganised groups of
individuals with a key requirement that all members of the social group share the same
set of meanings, attached to a specific artifact (1984:414). This means that the relevant
groups are not only the designers and producers of the technology, but can be competing
producers, journalists, politicians, users, non-users and other interest groups (Selwyn:
2008).
The focus on the social and political processes that take place around technological
development shows that both technological problems and social conflicts can arise in
the process. SCOT, again in accordance with EPOR, attempts to identify the ‘closure
mechanisms’ where a consensus about a technology emerges, involving the stabilization
of an artefact and finally the ‘disappearance’ of problems. To close a technological
‘controversy’ the relevant social groups need to see the problem as being solved (Pinch &
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Bijker: 1984:427) meaning the socio-technical system reaches a state where the technol-
ogy is closed to alternative interpretations. Pinch and Bijker give the early bicycle as an
example for this process of ‘closure’. The changing expectations that different relevant
social groups projected onto the technology led through several modifications from its
early main appeal “to young men of means and nerve” (p. 34) to the alternative design
and social image of the bicycle as a safe and comfortable transport device, appropriate
for men and women.
The social shaping of technology perspective draws attention to the choices involved
at every stage in the development and use of a technology and the way that these may
be shaped by economic, legal-political, social and cultural settings, as well as narrowly
“technical” considerations. It opens up technological innovations and developments for
socio-economic analyses and explanations and might be helpful in identifying crucial
factors for following certain strategies as it emphasises the potential negotiability of
technological change amongst a range of players. This is where it is also of interest for
this research project, helping to identify powerful players in the decision making process
of New ICTs. Who are, what Pinch and Bijker call the ‘relevant groups’ with different
interpretations of how to implement and use New ICTs in Afghanistan?
However, this can only be a first step in the process of analysing how these negotiations
are taking place and where conflicts are hidden. As Klein and Kleinman rightly point
out, the relations between those groups as well as the different background conditions
remain largely invisible in the SCOT approach (2002:30). Differences in power and
impact influencing the rules of interaction are not taken into consideration, society
is described as composed of equal groups in an essentially pluralistic view of society,
ignoring groups which “are consistently excluded from power” (Winner: 1993:369). The
preoccupation with powerful and pro-active groups has led to a neglect of marginalised
and subordinate groups (Williams & Edge: 1996:878) which, however, are of particular
importance in a context where representatives of powerful transnational organisations
are negotiating with powerful (or influential) representatives of local institutions about
solutions for those often addressed as ‘the poor and marginalised’.
There are also considerable differences of opinion within Science and Technology Stud-
ies about the extent to which the social as opposed to the material should be understood
as shaping the evolution of technology or social processes (Oliver: 2011:9). The SCOT
approach has been criticised for its tendency to substitute technological determinism
with an extreme form of social determinism. Instead of technical causes leading to social
change, society is seen as the root cause of technological change, downplaying the way
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that technologies might shape practice (ibid).
4.2.2 Actor-Network Theory
More a method or research approach than a theory, Actor-Network Theory (ANT),
developed from early laboratory ethnographies in the late 1970s (Latour (2005), Mol
& Law (1994), Latour & Woolgar (1986)). ANT argues that successful social practice
in the same manner as science is the result of “a process of heterogeneous engineering
in which bits and pieces from the social, the technical, the conceptual, and the textual
are fitted together” (Law: 1992:2). Its originality lies in the agency of non-humans
actants1; society, nature and technology are no longer seen as separate entities, instead
they can all be interlinked to form actor-networks. Each actant is itself understood as a
heterogeneous network of other actants, but whilst it is working as a stable ‘black box’,
it can normally be treated as a single entity.
ANT writers typically apply empirical methods in their research focusing more on how
networks are formed and sustained than why. The analysis of histories and observations
surrounding a network – with ANT’s characteristic equal treatment of human and
non-human actors, including technology – is seen as leading to a better understanding
of an established actor-network (Callon: 1986). ANT suggests that an object remains an
object while the actor-network constituting it is stable and the relations between it and
its neighbouring entities hold steady. ANT explores the strategies which generate this
object-ness, the syntaxes or discourses which hold it in place. Or as Latour describes
it, ANT tries to explain the history of ‘immutable mobiles’; “objects which have the
properties of being mobile but also immutable, presentable, readable and combinable
with one another” (Latour: 1990:6). These ‘immutable mobiles’ hold their shape as
a network, they are networks themselves but held in an array of secure and stable
surroundings, they are mobile and can be constant in different settings. In an interview
Latour calls the history of computer such a history of an ‘immutable mobile’, as “Leibniz’
dream, materialised at last” (Latour: 1997).
Later versions of ANT, however, have emphasised a more varied terrain, describing
the adaptation and reconfiguration of objects and practices as they travel. Due to its
focus on the operation of association and translation between its actants, ANT was also
1 Akrich and Law distinguish actors and actants as follows: “an actor is an actant endowed with a
character (usually anthropomorphic)” (1992:259)
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called “sociology of associations” (Latour: 2005) or “sociology of translations” (Callon:
1986) which avoids the highly contested ‘theory’ in its name.
ANT with its consideration of non-human actors in the ‘actor-network’ that forms
social practice, offers an interesting alternative to other perspectives. Especially with its
model of actants that remain ‘closed’ while they ‘work’ interlinked in the actor-network
and are only opened up if they fail or, rather, if one entity of their own actor-network
fails, offers an interesting view on technology within a ‘network of people and things’.
Technologies often remain invisible while included in a stable infrastructure and are still
popularly seen as these ‘immutable mobiles’ that are constant and usable in different
settings while its adaptation or reconfiguration still seems to be more ‘happening’ than
being anticipated or expected. ANT focuses on how networks are formed and sustained
by describing social practice rather than asking for a cause (Law (1997)). This led other
areas of STS to question the worth and even the morality of this approach as providing
“no solid, systematic standpoint or core of moral concerns from which to criticise or
oppose any particular patterns of technical development” (Winner: 1993:374).
In the case of decision-making around ICTs in Afghanistan, asking for causes and going
beyond mere description is crucial. Especially as many decisions in the development
and education sector are presented as being made for very moral reasons and in order
to change or influence current circumstances. ANT has definite limits therefore for my
approach when it comes to questions of reason and meaning.
Another limiting aspect for me is that actor-network studies are less concerned
about the nature and influence of broader social and economic structures of power and
interests as Williams and Edge observe, concentrating on local actors and “implying
that technologies (and social systems generally) are highly malleable to local actors”
(1996:870). In my case, the broader social and economic structures are meaningful
in many ways, not least as representatives of institutions or organisations act not
necessarily in accordance with their own convictions and might even differ in what
they are expressing to me personally and what decisions are made in the end. Also, as
mentioned above, similar to SCOT, ANT starts from an existing actor perspective, that
is helpful to identify the most powerful actors but risks neglecting the marginalised, let
alone missing actors (Star: 1991).
4.2.3 Media and Technology in STS today
The majority of qualitative STS studies continue to concentrate on technology and
technology assessment, so that the original focus on analysing the social influences on
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the content of science seems to attract less and less interest. Media and information
technologies as objects of inquiry have, however, taken some time to emerge in STS
(Sismondo: 2008:949). STS researchers began to shed light on technology production
and consumption by the early 1990s, and resulting from these studies a growing number
of researchers combining STS and communication studies have argued that “in the
technology development process, technical choices are made, artifacts are symbolically
framed, and regulatory environments are fostered in ways that have consequences for
consumption” (Sismondo: 2008:960).
These choices, however, are not made by ‘lone inventors or geniuses working in a
social vacuum’ (Mackay & Gillespie: 1992:688) but are negotiated in a fundamentally
communicative process (Bucciarelli: 1994:20f) with the final result as the outcome of
these negotiations. Bucciarelli (1994) talks about technology design lying somewhere
between a technology-driven ‘best solution’ approach and the human ‘needs’ or markets;
similarly I would suggest that decisions on the ‘design’ of New ICT structures in devel-
oping countries lie between these same poles, with the interesting question being, who
defines the ‘needs’ and who states the ‘market’?
STS’s basic principle to situate the material aspect of technology within its various
social, temporal, political, economic, and cultural contexts and its long-term historical
view illuminates the crucial connections between particular technological systems and
the broader world of artifacts and culture. Just like other technologies in the examples
given above, the development of new media and information technologies is not just a
matter of engineering or optimal solutions to technical problems but can be characterised
as a socio-technical phenomenon (Lievrouw: 2006:247).
As New ICTs have increasingly become commonplace over the last decades, at least
in the Global North, questions of consequences, and also the prerequisites of new
technologies as infrastructures have been addressed, for example by Star and Bowker
(2006). The ethnographic perspective that helped reveal the inner workings of science or
technology research and development can be just as helpful in interpreting infrastructure
(Star & Bowker: 2006). For all their potential wonders, as Morley (2007) points out,
technologies are only as good as the material, social and institutional structures in which
they are embedded (p. 239). If organisational structures, the necessary infrastructure or
the financial system cannot offer the necessary environment, then e-government, mobile
phones and credit cards are of little use. Technologies are, as Williams and Edge observe,
in part prefigured by existing forms of work organisation, they embody elements of
how divisions of labour and expertise were inscribed into their design and production
(1996:876).
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As in the case of New ICTs in Afghanistan, technical change is often also partly
motivated by particular ideas about how the technology should develop or support
certain organisational structures and may even be designed and implemented with
particular objectives of transforming work in mind (Williams & Edge: 1996:876). But
technology mostly depends on structures that are relative to working conditions. It
never stands apart from the people who design, maintain and use it (Star & Bowker:
2006). Here infrastructure is an often neglected aspect that plays an essential role in
my study especially in light of its widespread physical absence in Afghanistan in 2001
and the importance of the above mentioned historical dependencies. What was once
an object of development can, especially in industrialised countries with a long history
of communication infrastructure, sink into an invisible infrastructure over time that
is only remembered when it fails. Star and Bowker (2006) also point out, referring
to Tanenbaum (1996), that there is no predefined assignment of different tasks to
different bodies of specialists in the design of communication infrastructures. Building
up infrastructures often represents a number of possible distributions of tasks between
hardware, software and people. Western models do not necessarily work in a very
different context under very different conditions and should not be assumed to be
the only option. Subsequent infrastructural developments are often based on existing
infrastructures as each generation of engineers imports solutions from one infrastructure
to the next. These underlying structures, however, might not exist elsewhere and thus
allow different and even more effective solutions. Many of the early ICT4D initiatives
neglected local infrastructural considerations such as availability of telephone lines for
dial-up internet connections, the cost of maintenance and supplies, and privacy and
security issues. Like donations of outmoded computers to a ‘needy’ classroom, not
recognising the lack of power supplies, telephone lines and, most of all, computer skills
of the lecturers. More recent work has, however, begun taking these considerations more
seriously by working locally, cooperatively and designing localised solutions (see chapter
3.2 for details).
its normative work is multiplied.
4.2.4 STS and human development
One interesting question raised by STS in recent years is who should legitimately
participate in technical decision-making?. The solution to scientific and technical
controversies rests mostly on judgements by experts and these judgements, as we have
learned, depend on the context, the environment and, thus, also the location of expertise
rather than on any formal scientific method. How open this technical decision-making
should, or should not be, is even called by Collins and Evans “the pressing intellectual
57
4.2 Constructing Science 58
problem of the age” (2002:237). Similarly, Cozzens et al. (2008) suggest that by treating
different forms of knowledge symmetrically, instead of valuing “professional knowledge”
from the North higher than local knowledge from the South, an STS perspective helps
draw attention to the asymmetries of power in decision making. The questions they
suggest STS helps highlight are also among the ones I attempt to address in this research:
“Whose project is it? What knowledge do the various actors bring to the interaction?
Whose knowledge gets respect and deference? What are the outcomes of the project for
the everyday lives of the people involved?” (ibid. p. 790).
Jasanoff (2005) suggests that there is no single template for diverse settings and
contexts, but that historically grounded and locally situated understanding of techno-
scientific politics demand historically grounded and locally situated normative approaches.
This question, how expertise, participation and locally situated understanding and ap-
proaches can improve techno-scientific development cooperation, is also addressed in
this thesis.
4.2.5 Appropriation
The claim that technology is not neutral has, as I have shown, been central in science
and technology studies for the past three decades (Pinch & Bijker (1984); Wynne (1988)).
How technological products are designed within a certain socio-technical context and
how certain social values are embedded in those technologies has by now been explored
in various cross-disciplinary studies. Functions depend on an expected environment
of infrastructure and services and software applications are developed to match the
assumed user behaviour. What constitutes ‘technology’ goes beyond the devices, it
includes practices and knowledge that are related to them and the social arrangements
that form around those devices, practices and knowledge (Lievrouw: 2006). Technology
embodies fundamental choices, about how it ought to be used, by whom and for what
purpose, which makes any technological implementation inherently political (Pinch &
Bijker (1984); Winner (1986); Pisani et al. (2007)).
As described above, Woolgar (1991) shows in his study how the user is ‘configured’
by the producers, embedded in hard- and software design. These embedded choices are
shown, however, to be flexible to some extent: technology is interpreted by its users in
intended or unintended ways and can be ‘re-negotiated’. Wynne (1988) remarks, that
there is – and remains also 25 years later – a misconception of technology as mechanical
rule-following behaviour, while technological practice is shown to be a far less clearly rule-
bound and deterministic. Eglash (2004) calls this process, in which technology that has
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Figure 4.1: Appropriation of science and technology (from (Eglash: 2004:5))
been produced by professionals with high social power and is reinterpreted, adapted, or
reinvented by users with low social power, the appropriation of technology (see figure 4.1).
What differs greatly from most STS approaches to socio-technical systems is that
designers, developers or scientists are not at the centre of the research, but rather
‘users’ and use-culture. This also allows the study of a technological system that is
geographically separated from its site of production (Odumosu: 2009). Eglash displays
production and consumption as two antipodal extremes, see figure 4.1, implying they
are separate procedures. He also differentiates between stronger and weaker forms of
appropriation which he positions along the consumption/production axis (see figure 4.2)
Figure 4.2: The consumption-production dimension (from (Eglash: 2004:6))
Pisani et al. (2007) take a similar approach in their study on mobile technology
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appropriation in Latin America. For them the appropriation process is a “battle for
power over the configuration of a technological system” (p.2). Like Eglash, they propose
technology evolution as a three-step process in a cyclical manner with phases of adoption,
appropriation and re-configuration, where the technology’s evolution oscillates between
providers and users. In the first phase users adopt a technology when it becomes
available, basically by following the usage script suggested by the technology provider.
However, “for a technology to evolve and become better adapted to its users needs and
ever more important to their social and economic development, something more than
mere adoption is needed.” (Pisani et al.: 2007:2), which is what happens in the second
phase. It starts when more aspects of a technology have been explored and the device
gets better integrated into the users’ lives. New practices are invented which transform
both the device and social practice. Finally, Pisani et al. (2007) argue, the third stage
of re-configuration takes place when the limits of the technology have been reached and
a re-design, usually involving the technology provider, takes place. Once a re-designed
technology is in place, the cycle repeats or rather jumps back to the first phase. In
contrast to Pisani et al., I argue appropriation can be, but is not necessarily a power
struggle over a device. It can also be an intended or even required feature of a technology.
Another related approach towards appropriation is presented by Odumosu (2009)
in his research on the adoption of mobile communication in Nigeria. He argues for
an ‘extended theory of appropriation’ that avoids the opposition of layperson and
professionals, with ‘production’ and ‘consumption’ as a continuum rather than two
opposing poles or a repeating cycle. I agree with Odumosu, in seeing appropriation as
a continuous process and would also suggest that technology appropriation does not
necessarily only happen on an individual level, but can be influenced by a variety of ac-
tors or ‘mediators’ that shape the use and adoption of ‘ready-made’ technological systems.
Some technologies are more amenable to being used for a range of purposes (Mackay
& Gillespie: 1992:702). In particular technologies that are deliberately ‘open’ for ap-
propriation, as I would argue many technological systems are. Most hand-held devices
are black-boxed in the users’ own interest, and they freely trade personal data and
control to receive uninterrupted services and connections in return (whether this ceding
of control is always advisable is an entirely different question). Others, however, like
open source operating systems, offer the users the ability to cross the boundary between
consumer and producer by modifying settings or code on different layers of the system.
This may be for personal appropriation, to share the results with others or even to
work collaboratively in developing new applications, extend existing ones or change
certain features. And, although this adds new features and even new meanings to the
60
4.2 Constructing Science 61
system, I would not call this a re-invention in the sense that Eglash (2004) suggested for
technology appropriation but rather a form of intended re-configuration. This study does
not only look at the users, consumers or ‘beneficiaries’, nor does it take the producers and
designers as an opposing distant starting point, but tries instead to examine the inter-
face where external and local attempts at ‘making sense of a technology’ meet and mingle.
Orlikowski (2000) proposes a view of technology structures, not as embodied in given
technological artefacts, but as enacted by the recurrent social practices of a commu-
nity of users. She introduces the distinction between technologies as artefacts and
technologies-in-practice, the latter are in her view never fully stabilised but only treated
as black boxes for a certain amount of time. This also corresponds with how most users
experience their own technology use, where both devices and use are adapted over time,
until the device reaches its (hardware) limits and is replaced by a different type that
offers the desired additional functionalities like increased speed, smaller size or new
features. Similarly Carroll (2004) argues, referring to social constructivist approaches
(Bijker & Law (1992)), that there is no linear path between the design, use and impact of
a technology, as technologies can be adapted and interpreted in different ways. According
to her, this appropriation process involves mutual adaptation of the technology’s features
and the user’s practices. She goes on to argue that this appropriation process can also
be seen as completing the design process of the artefact, instead of working against it.
She differentiates between ‘Technology as Designed’, representing the underlying theory
of use, and ‘Technology in Use’ as the completion of the design process through the
appropriation of a technology by the user (Carroll: 2004). In complex environments,
technology requirements can often not be accurately analysed in advance, but instead by
observing the user’s interaction with a technology and how it is refined and shaped to
meet contextual needs. A new system, therefore, needs to be malleable but its function
at the same time comprehensible to the users. Carroll calls this an evolutionary design
approach, where users complete the design as part of the appropriation process.
This process, to explore, adapt and appropriate a new system can be encouraged and
supported by managers, trainers and peers, who also increase the likeness of users’
acceptance. Carroll also suggests on-going training, directed to users’ current progress
“initially to understand the malleability of the features and capabilities of the technology
and the constraints on use, then later to support them as they adapt, and adapt to, the
technology.” (Carroll: 2004:8). When the limits of malleability of a technology is reached
by the users, it’s functions, features or as Carroll writes ‘capabilities’ need to be extended.
I want to extend this notion of ‘technology in use’ to what I call participatory technology
appropriation, an interactive process that includes exploring a technological system and
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dynamically testing its potential against one’s abilities, needs and demands. Examples
and possible implications for the participation in, and appropriation of, technological
systems will be discussed in chapter 11.5.
4.3 Research Agenda
This literature review has juxtaposed three areas of literature that are not usually
brought together, even though they deal with closely related topics. Apart from some
fundamental differences that have been addressed above, they all have one thing in
common: that the view of the world’s poor and the conception of development need to be
reconsidered and deconstructed (Heeks (2009); Quarry & Ramirez (2009); Smith (2009)).
Communication for Development can offer an important historical perspective on what
role was seen in media and communication technologies for international development
and how methodologies and conceptions changed with the broader discourses. It offers
many lessons learned – that have not necessarily been taken up by other disciplines
– and the persistence of influential concepts such as modernization or the diffusion of
innovations, remind us that “The Passing of the Dominant Paradigm” (Rogers: 1976b)
might never have been complete. The field of Information and Communication Tech-
nologies for Development appeared at a time when C4D’s relevance seemed to decrease,
shifting attention from (mass) media to digital technologies and from communication
to access. Its focus on technology caused massive criticism, while at the same time
distinguishing it from previous approaches: the field attempts to offer technical and
practical solutions, which despite much academic disdain, received broad attention
and approval from the development aid sector. Science and Technology Studies offer a
perspective on technology and development practice that helps reveal the networks that
surround them and that can easily be overseen. In preparation for this research I was
guided by those scholars that ‘crossed the disciplinary borders’ from one field to the
exploration of another and all three fields started to shape my questioning, methodology
and analysis and add complementary elements to this study.
My research starts with trying to identify how and between whom the introduction
of New ICTs is negotiated; and how concepts taken from the literature like those of
‘opinion leaders’ (Rogers: 1969), ‘participation’, ‘relevant social groups’ (Pinch & Bijker:
1987), ‘actor-networks’ (Callon: 1986), ‘modernization’ (Lerner: 1958) or ‘appropriation’
would apply in the field.
Thinking from a techno-deterministic perspective with technology as the missing
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link to education and economic opportunities is, as I want to show in my research, as
problematic as thinking from a mere human-centred participatory perspective, which
treats technology as a neutral element in the process. Technology is socially shaped in
its design, implementation and the way it is adopted (or rejected). But a certain level of
technological understanding is necessary to make informed choices about technology as
is an awareness that technology has been designed through the reification of particular
kinds of practice that might not exist in a different context (Oliver: 2011).
Applying and combining elements of the above mentioned perspectives offer a useful
framework to consider both, global structural problems as well as local realities that
are important when looking at technology and development (Heeks & Stanforth (2007),
Walsham & Sahay (1999)). They also help reveal the complex relations and interdepen-
dencies between different human and non-human actors that influence how context and
participation are taken into account.
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CHAPTER 5
Afghanistan
In the following sections I will try to give a short introduction into what I feel is relevant
information on the political and cultural history of Afghanistan and that helped me gain
better understanding of some of today’s issues. I have divided the chapter into one more
general review and two shorter sections on particular issues of the past 100 years: one is
the development of media and technology and the other is education. Some numbers
are, due to a lack of reliable data and due to the below mentioned controversies, only
estimations, while some of the findings are based on interviews and personal experiences.
5.1 Background
The borders of land-locked, mountainous Afghanistan were delineated in the 19th century
by international agreements, and as a barrier to neighbouring countries’ influence and
expansion, but do not reflect the regional networks or local ethnicities. The South, near
Pakistan, is mainly populated by Pashtuns, while the border region to Turmenistan,
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in the north, is home to Turkmen, Uzbek and Tajik ethnicities.
The central part of the country is mainly populated by Hazaras, whose allegiance to Shia,
rather than to the Sunni Islam, – unlike the majority of Afghans – has been the source
of persistent conflict and discrimination (Chr. Michelsen Institute: 2005). Afghanistan’s
current challenges cannot be viewed outside of their historical context. This is of course a
truism that applies for any country. But few have been confronted with so many collapses
of state power, political turmoil and global power conflicts within the past 100 years.
Between 1901 and 2001 every succeeding Afghan head of state – and there were plenty –
either died violently at home or was driven into exile abroad (Barfield: 2010). And with
each change came a concomitant change in how history was written, meaning there is
still no agreement today on how the past 40 years should be portrayed. One result is
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that for the new school history curriculum in 2012, textbooks kept information about
the past four decades at a bare minimum as “there is no national consensus”1. For a
short introduction to Afghanistan’s history since its independence in 1919 see appendix C.
1978 - 2001
The period from 1978 - 2001 was characterized by internal and external conflicts with
one million Afghans killed and more than six million refugees (Amnesty International:
1999) displaced during the Soviet war, the following civil war and Taliban rule. The so
called ‘Saur Revolution’ resulted not only in the killing of president Daud, his family
and many key figures of the old regime, but also turned into a hunt against any potential
or real opponents in the country and soon within the new regime. The internal conflict
weakened the communist party PDPA, the number of troops and police loyal to the
regime dropped considerably and their reforms were met by strong resistance all over
the country. The Soviet Union watched the approaching collapse of the new member of
the socialist bloc, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, with alarm and, when one of
its main allies was killed by the former prime minister, and then president, Hafizullah
Amin, they invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, killed Amin and replaced him with
Babrak Karmal as new ruler (Barfield: 2010:234). The Soviet invasion demonstrated the
limits of Soviet influence in Afghanistan and its inability to stabilize the country without
military force. The following ten year occupation was marked by ongoing fights between
the Soviets, supported by the PDPA, against the US and Saudi Arabia funded, Pakistan
based ‘holy warriors’, the mujahideen (Rasanayagam: 2003:105f). This war forced not
only the opposing urban elite, but also hundreds of thousands of rural Afghans to leave
the country and seek refuge in Pakistan and Iran, after farming, which constituted the
majority of Afghan’s livelihood, had become impossible.
After Russia’s withdrawal in 1989, the then president Mohammad Najibullah re-
mained in power and tried to end the ongoing conflict with persistent financial and
military assistance from the Soviet Union. He managed to cut deals with a number
of commanders, who were willing to end what was now an internal conflict and no
longer easily justifiable as jihad2 against Soviet occupation. Yet this common enemy
had also had a uniting effect on the regional forces, who started to become rivals for
power again. Once the Soviet aid ended, with the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union
1 Quote from the Minister of Higher Education during a BBC interview
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18579315
2 “A struggle against enemies of Islam” (Morgan: 2010:87)
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Figure 5.1: Afghanistan in 1989 (source: Wikimedia Commons)
in 1991, Najibullah lost his financial power base and mujahideen forces quickly defeated
his now weakened troops and he was forced to take refuge in the UN compound in
Kabul. A peace agreement on the distribution of power had been established among
the mujahideen leaders in Peshawar, but was immediately broken after they arrived
in Kabul (Barfield: 2010:250) and a new struggle for power between the mujahideen
fractions lay Kabul in ashes throughout the following three years.
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, founder and leader of the Hezb-e Islami political party, associ-
ated with Pashto interests and supported by the Pakistani Secret Service, ISI (Mielke:
2009:77), attacked Kabul and the troops of the new president Burhanadin Rabbani,
leader of the Tajik-related Jamiat-e Islami, and his ally Ismail Khan. In 1994, Hekmatyar
cut a deal with the Uzbek faction leader Dostum, however they failed to gain power,
meanwhile the Tajik faction leader Massoud fought in the city against the Hazara forces
of Ali Mazari. A common agreement was far out of sight and Afghanistan as a state was
lost in anarchy, with Kabul’s population suffering the most, while regional structures
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gained more independence and influence.
The Mujahideen after the Civil War
Mazari was killed by the Taliban in 1995 which destroyed the confidence Hazara had
initially put in the Taliban. Massoud was assassinated by the Taliban in 2001, Rabbani was
killed in a suicide attack in 2011. Hekmatyar was repeatedly reported as cooperating with
the Taliban but has also been involved in peace negotiations with president Karzai in 2010,
Ismail Khan and Dostum are part of the current Afghan government. The involvement
in politics of former mujahideen commanders is widely seen as controversial, as none of
them was held liable for their war crimes. This is also one of the reasons given why the
Afghan population shows little trust in their current political system and its representatives
(Democracy International: 2012)
In 1994, the Taliban1 entered the chaotic scene from the refugee camps in the border
region, armed and trained by Pakistan and funded by Saudi Arabia under the United
States’ approving eye (Rasanayagam: 2003:143). The population longed for stability
after more than a decade of war and anything seemed preferable to the ongoing chaos.
The Taliban’s “law-and-order” attitude and promise of security concealed the radical
Islamist ideology that dominated their political course later on (Barfield: 2010:257). The
Taliban soon had most of Afghanistan under control, except for the north-east where
fights with the Northern Alliance, now consisting of Massoud’s forces, persisted. Today,
the Taliban era is probably the best known period of Afghan 20st century history. In
1996, Mullah Omar was elected Amir al-Muminin2 by a shura3 of 1200 ulema4 and
mullahs5, and introduced a legal system based on their interpretation of the shari’a6.
Questions of government, economy and social development remained largely unanswered
and the Taliban never really made the transition from a movement to a government
(Barfield: 2010:261). They banned all forms of entertainment, in particular music, films
and images, and excluded women from virtually all forms of public life, employment
and education, with harsh punishment for any disobedience. The Taliban’s initial
popularity soon turned into fear and an opposition between the ‘government’ and the
population. Apart from the political conditions, the already war-torn country suffered
1 Plural of the Arabic talib, meaning religious student (Rasanayagam: 2003:143)
2 ‘Commander of the Believers’
3 Arabic for ‘consultation’, a consultative council in Islamic societies
4 Muslim legal scholars
5 Islamic religious teacher or leader
6 Islamic religious law
67
5.1 Background 68
three successive years of drought between 1998 and 2001, and had little employment
outside a precarious agricultural industry. By 2001 the World Food Program was
feeding three million Afghans a day while any assistance was delivered under the most
difficult negotiations with the Taliban (Rasanayagam: 2003:199). The Islamic Emirate
of Afghanistan was only recognized by three states: the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan
and Saudi Arabia; it had become headquarters of a pan-Islamic terrorist network. The
Taliban provided foreign Islamists shelter and support, but never showed much intention
to get involved in fighting for a world Islamic revolution like al-Qaeda and its leader
Osama Bin Laden1. Bin Laden’s call for an international Jihad even posed a threat to the
Taliban’s yearning for international recognition (Strick Van Linschoten & Kuehn: 2011).
Yet they repeatedly refused to extradite bin Laden, including after the 9/11 attacks, with
the consequence of another war entering Afghanistan as ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’
in October 2001.
2001 and after
Within weeks of the invasion of US and British troops, the Taliban positions unravelled,
most Taliban retreated to Pakistan and the al-Qaeda presence was eliminated. The
intervention’s quick success seemed beyond the most optimistic expectations, but its
preservation proved to be far more difficult. In December 2001 at the Bonn agreement
in Germany, an Afghanistan Interim Administration (AIA) was appointed and further
steps agreed to establish a “broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully repre-
sentative government” (United Nations: 2001). First elections were held in 2004 and
Hamid Karzai became the first publicly elected president of Afghanistan, with the first
parliamentary elections following in 2005 (AREU: 2012).
In the years directly following 2001, an estimated three million Afghans returned to
the country. Many of them, born and raised in other countries, knew life in Afghanistan
only from their relatives’ narratives. Many did not return to the farms their families
had left and the urban population increased drastically. Most strikingly was the capital
Kabul, whose population more than doubled between 2001 and 2010. The develop-
ment of housing, public institutions and employment opportunities cannot keep up
with societal demands. Despite the many welcome changes in most areas of society,
initiated or supported by international aid over the past decade, Afghanistan remains
highly vulnerable. Conflicts with the Taliban persist, the new government is entangled
in countless cases of corruption and Afghanistan’s drug production has reached an
1 Bin Laden’s assassination by US military forces in 2011 also provoked little reactions in Afghanistan
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all time high (Dorronsoro (2013), Chossudovsky (2013)). And with an estimated per
capita GNI of US $700, Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world
citepWorldBank2013a. The role of the international intervention in Afghanistan has in
recent years been seen in an increasingly critical light. Despite the current government’s
dependence on international aid, most international spending “on” Afghanistan is not
spent “in” Afghanistan but on international contractors working for the development
sector and on imports like equipment and supplies for projects (World Bank: 2012). After
several requests by the Government of Afghanistan over the years (Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan: 2005:xxii) an agreement by the international donor community at the
2010 Kabul Conference was reached, to realign their financial assistance mechanisms
by channelling at least 50% of development aid through the Afghan Government’s core
budget (Kabul Conference: 2010).
5.2 Media & technology in Afghanistan
Afghanistan joined the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in the 1920s,
after king Amanullah had started to build up the country’s first telephone- and postal
system. By the early 1960’s the telephone system had expanded countrywide with sev-
eral thousand connections but, altogether, Afghanistan’s communication infrastructure
remained marginal and limited to the bigger cities. Starting with the Soviet occupation
and followed by 30 years of war and ongoing conflicts what little structures had been
built up were almost entirely destroyed.
The (re)building of Afghanistan’s communication infrastructure after 2001 was seen as
one of the most crucial and enabling factors for the reconstruction process, “information
can be used by citizens to facilitate their endeavours and enhance democratic values
for sustainable human development.” (MoC: 2003). Making New ICTs available for
an increasing number of the population is one of the often mentioned priorities of the
Afghan government, and, in particular, the Ministry of Communication and Information
Technology (MCIT). The MCIT is frequently highlighted for being one of the most
effective Afghan government bodies, successfully facilitating and implementing ICT
innovations (Hamdard (2012); Wentz et al. (2008)). This positive image was not shared
in all interviews and several critical remarks were made regarding the MCIT’s lack of
technical expertise. However, all agreed that compared to other ministries its achieve-
ments were substantial. And while other ministries like the Ministry of Education (
MoE) and the Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) had frequent replacements in their
leadership, Amirzai Sangin has remained in office as Minister of Communications and
Information Technology for the past ten years.
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Investment in communication infrastructure has accounted for the majority of the
overall total investment in the ICT sector, with the four mobile operators, AWCC,
Roshan, Etisalat and MTN, followed by the Afghan Government, financially assisted
by donor organisations, as the largest investors (Hamdard: 2012). Afghanistan has,
with regard to its ICT infrastructure, no doubt undergone tremendous changes. From
less than 20,000 fixed telephone lines, no mobile phone networks and zero internet
connectivity in 2001, it moved to more than 20 million mobile subscriptions in 2014
and a vibrant and growing ICT service industry. The total number of Internet users
for 2013 was estimated at 5.9 million according to ITU (2013). The telecommunication
sector has with annual average revenue of $139.6 million, constituting more than 12%
of total government revenues, become one of the largest revenue generating sectors in
Afghanistan (Hamdard: 2012).
The quality of the available ICT training and education offers, however, was seen
by most interview partners as insufficient to cover the need for ICT professionals at
universities, ministries and the private sector. The demand for ICT professionals in the
Asia Pacific region is, according to United Nations (2009), expected to continue to rise
sharply and the need for ICT training and retraining will grow as ICT penetration and
diffusion take off.
The national fibre optic backbone project, also mentioned in chapter 8.1, is currently
in its last phase of completing the laying of 4810km of fibre optic cable connecting
23 provincial capitals and several principal cities to its five neighbouring countries:
Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Hamdard: 2012). Internet
access is, in general, not restricted. However, regarding content, which is according to
constitutional law under the responsibility of the Ministry of Information and Culture
(MoIC), there is a ban for websites promoting pornography, gambling, dating or alcohol
(Freedom House: 2013). In reality its actual enforcement is reported to be weak. There
has been no evidence so far that the government has monitored e-mail or Internet chat
rooms (U.S. DoS: 2011). The government has, however, made use of its control over
internet content and blocked websites like YouTube to prevent certain controversial
content from being viewed1 (Freedom House: 2013). One comment I heard repeatedly
regarding censorship was that people were not sure whether it was the government’s
support for freedom of expression or their inability to implement censorship on a technical
1 In 2012 YouTube was blocked because of a film about the Prophet Muhammad that was perceived
as an insult to Islam. Previously reports about Koran burnings had triggered deadly riots in
Afghanistan.
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Figure 5.2: The planned optical fibre ring (source: the World Bank in Lokanathan
(2012))
level that led to the current situation. Also suggested was that it was simply the general
discordance within the government that – like in so many other areas – prevented
decisions and political action.
5.3 The education sector in Afghanistan
Prior to the twentieth century, education and training were provided at home, in the
mosques, in religious centres (madrasas) and through informal apprenticeships and on
the job training (Samady: 2013). King Amanullah was the first leader to promote formal
secular education in Afghanistan. In the 1920s he introduced six years of compulsory
school-education, campaigned for access for women to higher education and established
international academic exchange programs for students and academics (Sahrai & Feld-
mann: 2008:5). These were, however, radical changes at the time and his successors were
more careful not to provoke the religious leaders any further with fundamental reforms.
Though the significance of public schools and formal education has fluctuated strongly
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in the following decades up until today, the country-wide literacy and higher education
rate has never been exceptionally high, in particular for women and girls. In 1948,
according to both Soviet and Western estimates, the literacy rate was only 8%, there were
around 2800 teachers in the country and about 100 000 pupils (Vartan Gregorian (1969)
in (Barfield: 2010:201)) with an estimated population of about 11 million (Samady: 2001).
In the 1960s, the first significant development of public education took place and
spending on education was increased considerably. With financial support by the United
States and the Soviet Union, more than 1000 schools were built, including high-schools
for girls in all bigger cities (Rasuly: 1993:146). Similarly to today, the universities
were unable to cope with either the quickly rising number of applications or the rising
expectations regarding the quality of education and many high-school graduates went
to study abroad (Schetter: 2004).
By the late 1970s Afghanistan’s primary, secondary and higher education populations
had grown to over a million students, including 20% girls. The majority of technical
positions in the public administration were at the time already filled with Afghans who
had studied or been trained in the Soviet Union. Some 750 came back with higher
degrees and in 1967 the Kabul Polytechnic University (KPU) had been set up with
some 50 Soviet instructors (Rasanayagam: 2003:66). KPU was mentioned in several
interviews as being still controlled by former communists.
Despite the efforts of promoting education by the communist regime during the 1980s,
school enrolment went down to 630 000 in 1990 due to the fighting and the massive
emigration. Additionally the war destroyed most of the educational infrastructure in
rural areas (Samady: 2001) and government schools operated mainly in the cities. In
higher education the numbers increased slightly and there were 14600 students enrolled
in Afghanistan by 1990, most of them in Kabul. The universities, however, were reported
to be in a generally bad state. Another 7800 students were at the same time enrolled in
Soviet universities (Samady: 2001).
During the 1990s primary and secondary education numbers went up again with
international assistance, with a particular emphasis on basic education in rural areas.
One strategy that proved successful were Radio ‘soap operas’, combining educational
messages with entertainment in the form of a family drama produced by UNESCO in
cooperation with the BBC (Samady: 2001:79f). In higher education, however, enrol-
ment decreased and universities were operating under extremely difficult conditions,
in particular in Kabul, due to the ongoing fighting between different political and
ethnic factions (ibid. [81]). With the arrival of the Taliban, girls were banned from
education and continued international support became increasingly difficult. Despite
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the decreasing number of girls in school, the overall number of schools and enrolment,
however, continued to increase slightly (Samady: 2001:89). In 1999 girls enrolment in
primary education was down to 7%, secondary and higher education were limited and
most universities were often closed and did not function effectively (Samady: 2013).
After the fall of the Taliban, education became one of the priorities in rebuilding
Afghanistan. From 2002 to 2005, the number of enrolled students increased by four
million, 35% of them girls, and the number of teachers has grown seven fold, with sub-
stantial interventions by the international community but badly coordinated according
to the (MoE: 2006). Higher education enrolment went from 7900 to almost 40000 in 2005.
The new constitution, adopted in 2004, includes nine years of compulsory education
for boys and girls between the ages of six and fifteen (Samady: 2013) and education in
public schools and institutions of higher education is free. This compulsory education
can, however, in the current situation neither be guaranteed nor can it be enforced and
only about 58% of school age children attended school in 2012. The quality and capacity
of schools and universities also led to the establishment of numerous private education
institutions, from primary to higher education, vocational and special training. As of
2013, Afghanistan has an estimated 8.6 million pupils enrolled in school, including 3.2
million female students and an estimated 100 000 students enrolled in the 31 public
universities, with an unevenly proportion of 19% female, as well as about 50 000 students
enrolled in the current 81 private universities (World Bank: 2013).
What continues to be discussed across all areas of education is teaching methodology
and the general perception of what constitutes “good education”, and how quality and
access can be improved. This pedagogical aspect cannot be discussed here due to the
limited scope of this thesis and will be addressed briefly in the empirical chapters. For a
comprehensive discussion on Islamic and Western education see Karlsson & Mansory
(2007). For more on higher education policy and funding in Afghanistan see McNerney
(2009).
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CHAPTER 6
Methodology
As one might expect, research in Afghanistan has generally been rare in the past decades
and the body of research on related topics is even more limited. To date, few studies
have been found by the author combining contemporary Afghanistan, New ICTs or
education (for exceptions see Sengupta et al. (2007), Karlsson & Mansory (2007); Sahrai
& Feldmann (2008); McNerney (2009)) and very few apply ethnographic methods. On
the other hand, ICT has received a lot of attention in all sectors of development aid
in Afghanistan – economic development, health, education, human rights and others –
producing countless reports, recommendations and strategy papers that have had some
value in the preparation of this study. The present research developed out of several
years of personal experiences as an ICT practitioner in Afghanistan, it builds upon my
masters thesis (2009) and is mainly based on qualitative methods.
From where I started
As demonstrated by Woolgar and Latour (1986) and many other STS scholars in their
work on scientific practice, scientific facts and artefacts are far from objective, neutral
‘achievements’. They depend on the choice of approach and methodology, personal pref-
erences and previous experiences influencing the results, as well as, the interpretation
by the researcher. In this account instead of ‘the author’ I mainly use ‘I’, as addressing
oneself in third person often seems to conceal this subjectivity. This thesis is not about
finding an objective truth, but about the very opposite, the subjective personal views,
fears, expectations and hopes people associate with technology, its application and how
it is organised. And about how these individually shaped human-technology-networks
develop, are planned and set up and how they evolve and change; how they are inter-
actively socially constructed. The notion of social construction provides, according to
Sismondo, three important assumptions (or reminders!) for Science and Technology
74
6 Methodology 75
Studies: that science and technology are social, that they are active and not themselves
natural (2010:57).
This research does not apply a ready-made theoretical framework as a point of depar-
ture but builds on concepts drawn from three sets of literature (see Chapter 2), that are
deemed meaningful in answering the research questions (see chapter 1.3) and has a strong
emphasis on STS in its methodological approach. As my research questions demonstrate,
I want to analyse networks of people and things that shape and influence ICT initiatives
in the Afghan education sector. To identify the actors, to be able to understand their
motivation and to see and experience them as part of the network I was looking at, I
had to spend a considerable amount of time in the field. By participant observation I
have been able to observe interactions between these human and non-human actors and
experience how technology is included in different forms of communication, organisation,
work and other aspects of life, giving an impression of what role (certain) technologies
play for different actors.
Though not deliberately using ‘grounded theory’ some of its elements, namely ‘gener-
ating theory and doing social research [as] two parts of the same process’ (Glaser: 1978:2)
made up the initial phase of my thesis. Having been working in the field prior to, during
and after the three months reserved for “data collection” made it possible to revise initial
questions and assumptions, include new stakeholders and consider upcoming issues.
This flexibility was both helpful and necessary as, for example, some of the identified key
persons were not available for interviews at all, while others could be interviewed later
and again others were sometimes unexpectedly included when the opportunity came
up. When entering the field I had a broad idea of the (then two) ICT4D areas I could
look at, broadly themed “IT infrastructure” and “Technology for the poor”. During
my research “ICT capacity building” as a third aspect developed from being part of
the latter two to a being an important theme in itself. To “unite the research process
with theoretical development” (Charmaz: 1996:28) had a similar effect on my theoretical
approach, which became more focused while being tested and compared in the field,
some concepts turned out to be less useful, while others took a more prominent position.
To investigate my observations I applied what Toyama and Burrell (2009) call a ‘non-
dogmatic’ approach, not insisting on any particular theory or technique but flexibly and
creatively adapting and combining different tools or approaches that seem at the time
best suited to gain a better understanding. These include ‘common’ research methods
such as participant observation and structured interviews, but also hard to categorize
aspects such as giving technical support or personal conversations regarding ‘Western
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behaviour’ with a colleague, which can lead to a significantly better understanding
of the context. Bot, interviews and informal conversations often led to invitations to
visit ICT facilities, offices or projects and other (potential) interview partners being
introduced to me as relevant to the area. I followed several actors in their daily routines
and interactions to identify and include the pieces of an actor-network. In the following
sections I will first describe my access to the field and then give account of the different
methods applied for data collection.
6.1 Access
There is a saying about Afghanistan that “you either never come back or keep coming
for the rest of your life” - I seem to belong to the latter and sometimes it is hard to
explain why. In late 2004 a friend at the computer science department asked me if
I might be interested in teaching at an Afghan university. They were interested in a
gender balanced team and were looking for another female lecturer for the next term.
I was immediately interested, the situation was said to be reasonably safe, even if the
media still carried stories of occasional suicide attacks, Afghanistan had been displaced
from the front pages by the war in Iraq.
I started working in Afghanistan in 2005 as a lecturer at the Computer Science Faculty
at Herat University, I did not know what to expect, I had never been in a post-war
country before and I had also never taught at a university before. It was an intense and
not always easy time for a number of reasons, some of which are partly dealt with in this
thesis. Dealing with information technology at Herat University opened up questions
that I had not been aware of before and was unable to answer. Teaching and using
technology is not the same thing in Berlin as in Herat - that much I was soon sure
about.
In the following years I worked at Kabul University and the Ministry of Higher
Education and was involved in different ICT projects within the higher education sector.
I had the opportunity to visit several of the universities and to meet lecturers of various
higher education institutions during ICT training workshops and conferences that I had
helped organising at the MoHE and KU between 2007 - 2010.
I attended and observed processes around ICT implementation in Afghan higher
education, from the early stages of the decision making till the final implementation and
adaptation process. The most dominant and visible actors involved in these processes
are the donor organisations, the project practitioners and the local partners. In my
master’s thesis about ICT in Afghanistan I had concentrated on ‘the local context’ which
is particularly in such a diverse and rapidly changing country something that needs to
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Figure 6.1: Students at Kabul University preparing the network (source: the author)
be re-negotiated during the whole implementation process itself and was in most cases
impossible to predict (for a short summary of the findings see appendix D).
During my work at the MoHE I also gained insight into project negotiations with
various international organisations and development aid procedures in general. Some
years later, as a freelancer for a local IT company, I could observe these negotiations from
the practitioner’s perspective. I was employed as a consultant for education technology
and for Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) by an Afghan-European company in Kabul
that was the main driver behind the laptop for schools project. This position allowed me
access to areas like schools and training facilities in the provinces, that would otherwise
have been rather difficult to enter for a female foreigner, and also included attending
meetings and negotiations with ministries and donors.
I experienced the struggle of finding an agreement between people with very different
backgrounds and expectations, which has strongly influenced my research interest. My
doctoral study can benefit from my previous research in the field as it gives me a better
understanding of the local situation. For the present research I fundamentally broaden
and change the focus. As a complement to my studies of urban higher education I also
consider ICT projects in primary education in both rural and urban areas. I also include
international stakeholders and their agendas into my analyses of the negotiation process.
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6.2 Case Study
The present research is a case study, surrounding ICT projects in the education sector
of Afghanistan from three main areas: infrastructure, training/capacity building and
what I labelled (in reference to how it was discussed in the field) “technology for
the poor”. These were no pre-defined themes, instead when selecting the cases and
interview partners the primary focus was on covering a broad range of ICT in education
projects with what I initially could only vaguely identify as ‘most common patterns of
cooperation’.
ICT for the poor
The theme ‘ICT for the poor’ describes technology used to compensate for a lack – like
a lack of teachers, schools or time in the cases described here. Technology is either
manufactured or localized to serve the needs of the users: low power consumption,
alternative charging methods or content adapted to local educational resources. I
have been involved in the M&E of some projects and was able to speak to primary
school pupils as well as parents and teachers, literacy class participants and their
teachers, to tech-companies helping prepare the devices and consultants advising the
implementation, and I visited several ministries that were involved in the process (in
particular the Ministry of Education) and spoke to several employees. I also interviewed
volunteers and staff of NGO’s involved in educational technology projects and scientists
researching education technology. Some of the data I collected contributed directly to
this study, while other data contributed to selecting a suitable project and environment
for the research.
ICT infrastructure development
Within this theme I look at infrastructure development, mainly the university connectivity
project, but also touching on something like the fibre-optics project (see figure 5.2) for
national broadband internet supply, and the general education-related ICT infrastructure
at the universities. Within this theme I was able to attend meetings and accompany
IT professionals and consultants during their daily routine (if such a thing exists). I
interviewed several international consultants advising the Ministry of Communication
and Information Technology (MCIT) and the Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE).
I visited (predominantly young) Afghan IT professionals at their workplace in the
ministries and universities, and was lucky enough to be shown around and introduced. I
78
6.3 Data Collection 79
was also able to speak to employees of the MCIT and the MoHE in an official interview
context, as well as in some personal conversations.
ICT capacity building
ICT capacity building had been an important issue when working in Afghanistan all
along, but only during the extensive field trip in 2011 did it become clear that it was
indeed a separate theme rather than part of the previous two. Capacity building takes
place on a number of levels within three major areas: basic training in computer literacy,
as offered to students and staff at universities and ministries; training of professional or
work-related computer-applications, in the public sector mostly targeting administrative
staff members; in-depth training in system administration, hardware trouble-shooting or
web-technologies for an already ICT experienced group to manage, localize and maintain
particular tasks and systems.
I came across all three kinds of training frequently during my previous work in the
education sector. I had myself organised, offered and attended these types of training
and could easily visit facilities and interview trainers as well as previous participants.
Some of the projects within the above mentioned themes also offered training themselves
to the users or local technical staff that was to become part of the implementation and
maintenance.
6.3 Data Collection
The data collection is mainly based on, though not limited to, qualitative research
and its main methods are interviews and observations. The selected projects were all
special in themselves and often unique, but also resembled ICT project dynamics either
in Afghanistan or other developing countries with similar purposes and are thus seen
as appropriate examples to answer the research questions. Not all findings from this
research are meant to be or are applicable for generalizations. Yet it is expected that
even if taken from this very particular context the analysis regarding how ICT projects
are planned and implemented and how different roles are assigned to, or taken by, the
actors offers certain statements that can stimulate the analysis of other multi-stakeholder
ICT4D projects or ideally sensitize future project planning.
Another, though less determinant reason for an almost entirely qualitative approach is
the limited body of research and literature available on Afghanistan and a lack of reliable
statistical data to be considered, even if both domains have been growing in recent years
(see for example AREU or above). Where available I included statistics and reports
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from the ministries, the World Bank and the above mentioned sources. Most of these
publications are, however, rather limited in detail due to the current difficulties of data
collection in large parts of Afghanistan. Additionally in some areas, like literacy rates,
ethnicity and the diffusion of ICT, the findings are highly contested as these categories
have no clear definitions and often depend on different interpretations. Nonetheless I
have been able to extract some useful numbers and impressions from these sources that
are not available elsewhere.
Figure 6.2: Random snapshot of a Kabul street corner (source: the author)
My data collection consists therefore of a combination of semi-structured interviews,
informal conversations, observation notes, photos (mainly taken by myself) and where
available documentary evidence (reports, newspaper articles, online sources and so on).
The photographs often serve two purposes: they document a particular setting during
my research, which can serve as an aide de memoire, in particular in situations when
taking notes was impossible or inappropriate, and they can can help make important
aspects visible or, rather, visual to the reader. Figure 6.2 may serve as an example here,
as it shows a typical Kabul street corner with its global as well as local (or at least
regional) influences: traditionally dressed men as well as women in burkas next to a
man in a western-style business-suit, which also contrasts with the rather simple dressed
workers with stained second-hand clothing in the right side. Modern vehicles sit next to
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a self-made wooden carriage. Advertisements for ‘modern infrastructure’ like Samsung
phones and prepaid cards (the mobile-phone provider Etisalat on the umbrella) next to
the dysfunctional sewing system. What is missing in this picture is one of the many
fruit and vegetable sellers that line many junctions in opposition to the omnipresent
Nestlé products.
Researcher Role
As described above, my role as both participant and researcher in the field and how that
influences my view and research perspective, as well as how I am perceived in the field
places a special emphasis on reflexivity (Hammersley & Atkinson: 1983:14 ff) within
all my field work. My role as ‘participant as researcher’ raises the risk of potential
bias and can also limit the access to the area as “the participant will, by definition,
be implicated in existing social practices and expectations” (Hammersley & Atkinson:
1983:94). I realized how much this was the case when in certain situations my role as the
representative of my employer hampered access to people and information. In one case a
meeting was set up between several stakeholders to discuss possibilities for cooperation.
The meeting was initiated by a donor contractor that some people at the MoHE were
in disagreement with. My participation, even if just out of interest, would have been
considered as representing the Ministry, a position I could not risk to take. This was
partly the reason why I resigned from that position in 2010 and continued working as a
freelancer making sure to communicate at all occasions that I had no direct affiliation
towards one employer and no conflicts of loyalty.
Afghanistan is (in)famous for the segregation of men and women from a certain age
in the public sphere, meaning access to certain kinds of information is mostly linked
to gender or family relations. A rather unexpected advantage, however, came about
precisely because of my being a foreign, non-Muslim woman. Teaching young men
roughly my own age was already a concern I had before I first started working in
Afghanistan. However, I came to realize that while I was treated with the same respect
and caution as Afghan women, at the same time it was clear to my students that I was
living a different life in Germany so my behaviour was not judged by the same standards.
“How does that work, as a woman doing research in Afghanistan?” - is a regular question
I get asked and thinking of the burkas that dominate the image of Afghan women in
Western media it is not surprising. This may be partly luck or a coincidence but I have
thus far not experienced any personal hostility directed towards me.
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I agree with Hammersley and Atkinson that “common cultural stereotypes of females
can work to their advantage in some respects. In so far as women are seen as unthreaten-
ing, then they may gain access to settings and information with relative ease.” (1983:85).
At the same time they limit women’s access to particular domains. But what if those
stereotypes are not applied to all women alike? From the beginning I was predominantly
working among men; I could be frank to my closer colleagues about living on my own
far away from any parental or fraternal protection, which is something that would be
judged as unacceptable for most Afghan young women. I also had access to family
dinners and could sit and chat with both women and men, while my male colleges often
experienced the women remaining in the kitchen during their presence. On the other
hand, being, as a foreigner, part of the expatriate (“expat”) community made it easier
to be invited to (and allowed to attend!) informal gatherings or parties where often
important introductions and decisions took place while drinking beer for $10 a can. This
does not of course eliminate the fact that I am seen and treated in a certain manner,
but again I try to reflect where this might influence situations or interview responses
and be as transparent as possible about it.
My main data collection methods, as described below, were participant observation,
semi-structured interviews and a field diary. I knew the institutions and environment I
was interested in, but the individual interview participants and the projects / locations
I visited were to some extent undetermined at the beginning of my first three months
fieldwork, as I wanted to be open to react to the circumstances and what I would
experience. I also consider flexibility to be key in approaching meanings and core
themes in certain situations, instead of insisting on strict consistency in the way research
methods are applied.
6.3.1 Participation and Observation
Participant observation helped me to get an insight into the different processes of ICT
project realization. In addition to interviews, it was an important method used for
collecting information, though observation and interview data collection techniques
overlap and are not necessarily distinct. During interviews and conversations, reac-
tions to certain questions can sometimes reveal much more than the actual answer
given and strongly influence the researcher’s interpretation. Similarly, the environment
where an interview takes place can matter and provide additional information about
the interviewee or lead to an uncomfortable situation for the researcher that might,
without active self-observation and note-taking, be forgotten before the interview gets
transcribed. Observing certain behaviour was also fundamental in interpreting interview
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statements correctly. Seeing how people interacted within socio-technical systems –
including technologies as well as people working with them – could often tell much more
about their role within that network than asking about their formal position.
Observing one’s environment can be crucial to understand the context. Things that
have become invisible for those who live in the setting, can be important for outsiders
to understand it. This, in fact, is also a danger for a researcher, like myself, who has
already spent considerable time in the field and may overlook things that might appear
striking to others. It is impossible to observe everything, one would simply get lost in
detail. What one notices or decides to pay attention to depends on previous experiences
and personal background. Reminding oneself, however, to consciously observe a setting
will always reveal something surprising and noticeable – even if not necessarily relevant
for the research.
As many have noted, there are different forms or levels of participation and observation.
My approach to the research is what Junker (1960) calls “participant as observer” (p.
36), though the categories he and others describe are, of course, at times overlapping
and shifting (see also Adler & Adler (1987), Hammersley & Atkinson (1983), Spradley
(1980)). Karlsson and Mansory (2007) describe “a continuum from complete immersion
as participant to complete separation as onlooker”. I would describe my involvement
at times as both extremes, but during most of the research as being in-between the
two poles. I have tried to maintain in most situations a balance between insider and
outsider (“moderate participation”) but at other times have been ‘doing what other
people are doing’ (“active participation”) beyond merely gaining acceptance (Spradley:
1980:59-62). Active participation can help better understand social and cultural rules for
behaviour, being actively involved in some decision making processes myself, I was able
to both participate in and observe negotiations. However, I was not actively involved
in all the settings I attended and sometimes also took a more peripheral membership
role (Adler & Adler: 1987:33), as a guest of someone or was simply introduced as “she is
doing research in the field of technology”. I was extended invitations by several people
to accompany them to one of their projects and even invited to attend several meetings
related to their work and projects.
One salient aspect of many of these participant observation situations was the informal
conversations, which often gave a hint or revealed details that would not be mentioned
during the more formal interview situations or that might not seem relevant enough
for the participant to mention during an interview (one such situation is described in
appendix A.1.)
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My having been professionally involved in the field implies several advantages and
levels of trust, like being invited to attend meetings and getting information beyond
the ‘official interview scenario’, but my role as a former consultant to the MoHE also
influenced reactions and responses to my interview questions. Working in the field
and knowing most interview partners from previous or then current work cooperation
obviously gives rise to several questions about the relationship between the observer
and the observed. I am aware that knowledge about my field that I generate teaches
something about my membership role. The questions I asked as informed member
of the working context, their missions and organisational models are different from
the questions an outsider might ask. The purpose of this particular mixed methods
approach is also to distance myself from my own experiences and try to understand the
meaning that the actors themselves ascribe to their identity, their project involvement
and participation and their activities in order to gain a reflexive approach within each
of the target groups. Addressing these issues, as mentioned before, I resigned from my
position at the MoHE and from then introduced myself as a researcher, interested in
the dynamics of decisions on ICT projects. Not surprisingly this changed my position
towards some of my previous colleagues and employees but did not seem to cause any
distrust.
6.3.2 Listening and asking questions
Unlike than interviews in quantitative research, that tend to be clearly structured and
specified, qualitative research consists mostly of in-depth interviews that are more open
with regard to the different directions the interview can take and issues that can come
up during the process. To investigate my observations and get further information I
conducted unstructured and semi-structured interviews with more than 30 individual
actors involved in the three areas, as well as five group-interviews, combined with data
collected during countless informal conversations. Both, interviews and some of the
conversations, were guided by a number of themes derived from the research questions
related to context and participation, perceptions of technology and interaction between
different stakeholders. The way these questions were phrased and embedded into the
overall conversation could, however, vary greatly depending on the person I interviewed.
I would not ask a teacher at a provincial school why he chose to work in Afghanistan,
but I would ask him, as well as an international consultant, what changes they had
experienced in Afghanistan in recent years.
Particularly considering the very different cultural and often social contexts my in-
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terview participants and I are part of, how a question is posed and received, and how
it is translated can be tricky. A senior ICT expert from India, for example, flying in
for one week of consultancy work for a big donor agency seemed to feel puzzled, if
not insulted, by the question ‘When did you first use the Internet?’. Being able to
elaborate the question and explain why I posed it to all my interviewees, visibly relaxed
the atmosphere and led to a detailed account of the excitement of sending his first
email. I prefer a conversational interview mode, where interactivity is not suppressed,
questions can be clarified and responses can be elaborated in whatever level of detail
the participants prefer (Suchman & Brigitte: 1990). This is again, as mentioned above,
part of keeping a situational flexibility that helps improving the accuracy of findings.
Some interview participants seemed familiar and experienced in the interview situation,
while others behaved either very personably and open or were tense and suspicious and
answered as briefly as possible. In particular young students and adults seemed eager to
make a good impression and to answer “correctly”. In these situations it was often most
challenging to convince the other person that their identity would not be disclosed and
to create a relaxed atmosphere.
As perceptions of technology and participation are often strongly connected to personal
experiences and one’s own history I tried to ask the introductory questions as openly as
possible to allow the participant to decide about the direction he/she wanted to take.
I consider it important for my research focus to see the participants as experiential
experts, as storytellers not as respondents and to make them aware of that. They are
the experts about their life and experiences and should feel comfortable in their position
and not worried about saying ‘something wrong’. When statements that were made
during an interview, contradicted other accounts I had heard or experienced regarding
the same topic, which happened on several occasions, I decided not to intervene directly.
If it seemed important for clarification, I addressed the issue again later during the
interview, but did not confront people about these inconsistencies directly. I have
no reason to believe they deliberately tried to deceive me, but rather had different
perceptions and interpretations of certain issues. There were a few exceptions where I
tried to deliberately challenge someone during the interview if I had more information
and wanted to know more details. This is tricky as it can have the opposite effect of
people refusing to tell more if they feel trapped or interrogated. On the other hand
it can also encouraged people to tell more if they identify you an “insider”, who knew
what they were talking about and understood the basic procedures involved. I had
experienced the tense relationship between some of the students and their lecturers,
but I also knew that respect towards lecturers and elders can work as a self-censorship
among students. When asking about the situation at the university I knew I needed
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to find the right balance if I wanted to avoid getting a normative answer about how
ideal respectful interaction ought to be. However, I tried to utilize this knowledge very
carefully and only in situations where I considered it important enough and worth the risk.
I see myself during these conversations mostly as an enabler which is also how I
tried to present myself during the interview. Some ways to support this “enabling”
are asking open questions, following up, clarifying and rephrasing unclear statements
and keeping silent to allow reflection and making links (Kvale: 1996:133-135). To share
situated details of certain experiences is crucial to understand why, for example, certain
technologies are welcomed by some but seen as a threat or inappropriate by others. At
some later point in the interview agenda I also included some direct questions concerning
more formal issues, issues that might influence the interview outcome if asked too
early. For example, a question asking how certain things in the company/institution are
organised and funded, which not all participants could answer so easily.
If possible, I arranged not more than one interview per day. One reason was the
necessary temporal flexibility that comes with Kabul traffic, security alerts and last-
minute appointments – see also my comment in section 6.8.2. The other reason was to
be able to impose (on my side) no time constraints regarding how long the interviews
should last. Some interviews included a lunch- or dinner break but continued afterwards,
others were interrupted by several phone-calls. Therefore, the interviews lasted from 30
minutes up to more than two hours, with most interviews, however, somewhere around
90 minutes. I tried to create a relaxed atmosphere during these interviews by letting the
participant chose the location and — as far as possible — interview time. I started the
interviews usually by introducing myself, explained what I was doing and asked some
more general questions before announcing the start of the actual interview.
I recorded most of the interviews, all except one participant agreed after I reassured
them that all the data would be anonymized and all personal details removed before
publishing. In most cases the participants seemed to forget they were being recorded
after some minutes. On two occasions, however, I was explicitly asked to turn off
the machine for a few minutes because he/she did not want certain statements to be
connected to them personally but thought it important for me to know in order to
understand certain details or context.
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Language
The main drawback for a Western researcher (or other foreigner), as Karlsson and
Mansory (2007) describe in their research on education in Afghanistan, is the language.
To rely on translators implies a serious difficulty and brings another level of uncer-
tainty with it, in particular in a surrounding where conflict between different groups
is ubiquitous. Was the question considered rude? Was it translated correctly? Is the
interviewee reluctant to tell me something or does the presence of the translator cause dis-
comfort? An Afghan translator may in certain situations feel as foreign as the researcher.
Figure 6.3: Interview situation with interpreter (source: the author)
The majority of my interview partners spoke English fairly well as they work with or
for foreigners. Dealing with ICT and international cooperation, a conversational level
of English was a prerequisite for most stakeholders. If the interviews were conducted
in English, I have kept them mostly intact, errors included, unless where the meaning
is obscured by language or grammar mistakes. Interviews that were conducted in
German were translated by me. About 10% of the interviews, however, depended on an
interpreter. As indicated above, I am aware that, in addition to myself, an interpreter
influences the interview situation and in my experience this can be to a large degree.
More than once I had to remind my interpreter Waleed, who had worked with me often
in recent years, that he should not try to mediate between the other person and me.
His translations were often more polite and diplomatic than what had actually been
said. In one example a very short answer in Dari given with a broad smile turned into
a long explanations in English, which after me insisting on being told the truth, put
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my interpreter in an embarrassing situation. He was ashamed for his countryman, he
admitted later, who had forced him into the situation of making something up. “He
said her organisation is rich, they can pay for everything” he explained later. It has
remained difficult to convince him or others who translated for me not to alter what is
asked or replied. Another interpreter explained “sometimes you ask in a way that they
don’t understand. I have to give examples or add some details to make it clear”. So on
other occasions the interpreter actually works as a cultural mediator.
6.3.3 Field diary
I am aware that I enter the field not only with perceptions based on by my own social-
ization within a certain cultural context, family, profession, and broader society which
shapes the way I interact and phrase my questions, but also how I interpret the results
even if I objectively formulated my research interests. Additionally there is a tendency
in the literature to address people in developing countries as ‘indigenous’, ‘poor and
marginalized’ or ‘natives’ - terms hardly used in the other country’s contexts. When
working or researching in a developing country context, one is often confronted with
superior attitudes towards those “in need of development”. A field diary can help detect
such tendencies in one’s own thinking and behaviour and reflect on one’s own role within
such a setting.
Reflexivity is thus not only a matter of considering the impact of my own presence,
and how that influences the field, but also of considering my assumptions about tech-
nology, education, equality, gender roles, and development (Toyama & Burrell: 2009).
“Anthropological methods involve a subjective component” as Sillitoe (2007) rightly
points out and a field diary can be a means to freely address this subjectivity before
assessing how it influences the research. It can help reflect one’s environment and role
in the field as well as one’s own struggles to accept or understand certain conditions
and to give a “thick description" (Geertz: 1973) of meaningful situations.
I have been writing a sometimes more, sometimes less detailed field diary over the
course of several years and various visits. In the three months of intensive research I kept
a detailed record of each day, while in previous years regularly taking notes of significant
events or exemplary comments. I also use it to reflect on my research methods, including
a brief statement on every interview situation. I specified how I felt myself and how that
might have influenced the interview conditions and described in as detailed a manner
as possible the environment where the interview took place, whether there were any
time constraints, interruptions or physical reactions to certain questions or during the
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conversation. These additional details often seemed trivial directly after the interviews,
but often turned out to be helpful in preparation for the next encounter.
And finally, I am also aware that one does not just leave the field behind. I have a
keen interest in the issues I address in this study and have, since conducting the research,
been back to Afghanistan several times. I hope my self-reflexivity also helps contribute
in presenting my findings in an unbiased manner and makes the “subjective component”
explicit to the reader.
6.4 Actors
“Follow the actor”, a vital piece of advice from Latour and Woolgar (1986) that influenced
my approach to the human and non-human actors that make up part of my research.
However, to only follow the actors in the heterogeneous network of relationships that
forms ICT projects in the education sector would be a different approach to mine. As
discussed above, my participation and observation roles change, I might try to observe as
invisibly as possible at times, but I was also actively taking part in some of the networks
that I intended to analyse. Additionally and possibly due to my active involvement, I
strongly agree with Fujimura;
“In contrast to Latour, I am still sociologically interested in understanding
why and how some human perspectives win over others in the construction
of technologies and truths, why and how some human actors will go along
with the will of other actors, and why and how some human actors resist
being enrolled... I want to take sides, to take stands.”
(Fujimura 1991 in (Star: 1991:28f)
At the same time I am very careful not to exclude what Star calls the “invisible work”
(Star: 1991:29). Not all actors that are part of the processes I explore are recognizable
by outsiders. Some chose to remain hidden, others are intentionally excluded and again
others were simply overlooked. These “missing actors” were of particular interest in
some of the projects I explored.
The interviewees were chosen by “following the actors” within the selected projects and
depending on their availability, accessibility as well as ethical and logistical reasons.
Ethical Issues
During the data selection process I realized that I would have to take three aspects into
consideration: some would not accept being questioned if they could be identified, or at
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least would be very selective in their replies. Some might talk freely and not realize they
put themselves at risk regarding colleagues, employers, or others if some of their remarks
became public. And thirdly some would probably not like the way I put their statements
in context and I did not want to risk my impartiality by deciding not to use certain
information in fear of insulting someone I had known for a while. I asked all of my
interview partners to sign and accept a signed consent form stating I would do my best
to protect their anonymity. I repeatedly had to insist before interviews and meetings,
that I would not disclose any names and direct affiliations, “In terms of discussions with
me feel free to quote me, to use my name” (P. R. ), was a regular reaction of people who
were entirely content with the value of their work and happy to make it public. Some
changed their minds during the interview and made remarks such as “you can use this
information, but you don’t have this from me”. My role as an informed insider, however,
and my access to different “nodes” of one project network brought conflicting statements
together that made anonymity necessary. A small number were reluctant to talk to me
until I made it clear that I had no interest in exposing individual success or failure, but
was more interested in the interaction and dynamics between different stakeholders.
All names, including those of smaller companies, institutions, organisations and NGOs
have been changed by the author. This was partly done to protect the participants
anonymity, partly because my aim is not to reveal one specific organisation’s routines,
with its strengths and weaknesses, but to draw more general conclusions from individual
behaviour within these constellations. Prominent organisations’ names might distract
from what I believe are broader dynamics. For some institutions, such as ministries,
these precautions would have altered the context and, thus, could not be made, but
considering the high number of staff and contractors involved, I believe individuals can
still not be identified. The ICT scene in Kabul consisted of a relatively small group in
2007, when I started working there more frequently. It has gained considerably in size
and importance since then, however, those working in the education sector and living in
Kabul and/or working there beyond one project contract (like me) mostly know each
other or had heard of each other’s work. It was through this network that I got in touch
with the majority of my interview partners. The reception of each other’s projects was
mostly critical, possibly because there were few clear success stories, possibly because
contractors were in competition with each other for funding, cooperation with local
or international partners, expertise – first of all qualified local staff – and innovative ideas.
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6.5 Limitations
This study concentrates on perceptions of technology and technology related decision
making and all the people in this study, students, teachers, practitioners, consultants
and others are in some way affected by it. There is no ‘neutral observer’-voice (if such a
thing exists) neither can the complete context and reasoning for certain positions fully
be understood and taken into consideration. Though different perspectives on some
of the issues were heard, and observations made, not every statement could be tested.
Most statements were accepted as representing the interviewees opinion and could only
be compared with other accounts and data collected during the research. This may in
some cases cause irritation. For reasons of accessibility considerably more men were
interviewed, in some areas even exclusively. This ‘male perspective’ may, in the view
of some, not be sufficiently challenged, yet with substantial obstacles for interviewing
anyone in traditional rural areas, being granted interviews at all with male teachers
could already be seen as a gesture of goodwill towards me. It also reflects the ‘public’
discourse on technology for education, where some women were most likely consulted
by their male relatives at home, but invisible to all other stakeholders. While in this
particular area I refrained from asking too many personal questions, at least the issues
of one’s daughter’s education/home schooling could in some cases be raised.
Though I justify a male dominance in the interviews here, I am also aware that
this was one issue where my personal bias might have been perceived by some during
the interviews. As already indicated above, I agree with LeCompte and Schensul that
“predispositions constituted by [...] age, gender, ethnicity, physical size, physical and
intellectual ability, social class, religious and cultural background, educational level,
and personal style” (2013:29f) have a strong influence on choice of topic, methodology
and field. I have also repeatedly felt unmasked, I must admit, remembering Said’s
writing, during my field research. Not joining a ‘modernisation thinking’ turned out to
be difficult, when much rhetoric around the judgement of institutions or attitudes was
based on the linear thinking of ‘more Western means more advanced’.
Finally I was not entirely free in choosing the time and the sites where I could conduct
research. It was clear from the very start that doing research in Afghanistan would not
be a question of funding, but of a safe environment which could only be provided by
working and living there together with others. In that regard, however, I was extremely
lucky to be accepted in a position that was ideal for the research at an acceptable time
and most of all consisted of unusually open and supportive employers who helped me
organise some trips that were not without risk, left me enough time for my own research
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and allowed me to use all the data I collected while working for them.
6.6 Data analysis
The first preliminary data analysis was already being done in the field and during the
interviews; questions were adjusted, interview atmosphere and physical reactions to
certain questions were recorded in a notebook and remarkable comments registered for
later investigation. One consequence, due to its strong presence during the interviews,
was the choice to make “ICT capacity building” an independent key area instead of
a sub-category of the other two. The second level of data analysis took place during
the interview transcription with a software called f4, when passages that were deemed
relevant were marked in different colors and attached with preliminary coding schemes.
During this phase most comments were free associations regarding my own experiences,
exceptional statements, possible categories or recurring topics.
Following the transcription, the interviews were coded with a qualitative research data
analysis software called ATLAS.ti. All interviews were added as Primary Documents
(PD) into one Hermeneutic Unit (HU), which led to a collection of 42 PDs, some of
which were follow-up interviews with the same person. The choice of a data analysis
tool was tricky, as I mainly work with Linux and most (user friendly) qualitative data
analysis software is only available for Windows or Mac. After briefly testing three
different applications, Atlas.ti was selected and installed on separate Windows systems
that were mostly used during data analysis. The fact that I had to work with different
computers during the data analysis, because of working from different places, turned out
to be problematic as the document management of Atlas.ti was unreliable when working
with online (cloud) storage, even when the HU with all documents had been ‘bundled’
for export. Several documents could not be restored and I repeatedly lost already coded
interviews. These two “barriers” - the need to boot a separate system and the problems
during synchronization - led to using Atlas.ti not to its full extent. Nonetheless Atlas.ti
was experienced as a helpful tool to categorize and organise the material and identify
the central themes. More on how to use Atlas.ti in qualitative data analysis can be
found in Friese (2012), examples of using Atlas.ti for different methods and approaches
can be found in Rambaree (2013).
The individual PDs were first assigned to ‘PD families’, depending on the intervie-
wees’ background, position and the project(s) they were involved in. In a second step,
interviews were coded as openly as possible, however, the research questions and theory
certainly influenced the choices. The coding was therefore both data- and theory-driven
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(see also Braun & Clarke (2006)). To preserve some context, the coded segments usually
included surrounding data. After the coding process was completed, all codes were
grouped into broader ‘code-families’. From these groups of codes, the themes and
sub-themes were defined. Again some of these themes were inspired by the literature
or research questions while other repeating patterns had been identified during data
collection, transcription and the coding process. But in most instances it was hard
to identify the initial ‘impulse’ for a theme. No themes had been pre-defined, those
suggested by the literature and research questions also had to “prove” their validity
within the data, and those identified during the coding and categorization often turned
out to reflect the literature or research questions (see also table 6.1).
The theme “adapting the user”, for example, had been developed during data analysis,
while also being evident in some STS literature and one of the research questions.
Similarly had appropriation and participation been relevant in the literature, but only
became a combined theme when the code-families revealed that codes grouped under
“participation and cooperation” and those grouped under “ICT adaptation and appropri-
ation” had a large number of intersections. When re-reading the segments coded under
these two themes, the correlation became evident.
Themes influenced by the literature Themes influenced by the research ques-
tions
Themes primarily from the data
- modernization - participation - participatory appropriation
- technology appropriation - context - adapting the context
- technological determinism - flexibility of technology - paternalism
- technology design and configuration - change of strategy - conflicts between different groups
- influential local actors - dependencies
Table 6.1: The final themes (without sub-categories)
The PD families helped structure the empirical chapters and making sure the different
actors and their views are represented. Together with the coding, they also helped to
identify similarities in certain views or statements regarding background and affiliations,
like conflicts between certain groups. During the final writing process the interview data
was again re-read, the themes refined and data extracts selected and put in context.
The themes were then also linked with some of the available reports and papers. At this
stage, Atlas.ti was only occasionally consulted as most of the writing was done under
Linux.
With “context” being one of the central themes for this study, it was clear that detailed
descriptions of the field, cases and actors would constitute an essential part of the thesis.
The use of themes for my data analysis supports this “contextualist” approach, which
acknowledges “the ways individuals make meaning of their experience, and, in turn, the
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ways the broader social context impinges on those meanings, while retaining focus on
the material and other limits of “reality” ” (Braun & Clarke: 2006).
I chose to separate the findings from the interpretations to demonstrate to the reader
how the themes had evolved and to let the empirical material speak for itself. I am
certainly aware that the findings are a selection made by me, but by revealing how the
themes were selected and by using a lot of verbal statements, I hope to stay close to the
original voices. As this study is so heavily based on empirical research, which might
allow different (and additional) interpretations, I decided to link my interpretations with
quotes to the empirical findings and allow the reader to review the quote within the
context of the findings if necessary.
Despite the inclusion of reports, unpublished project data and strategy papers, the
number of ‘Afghan’ publications was too low and their background often fairly unclear
to undertake a discourse analysis. Additionally, except very simple statistical data, no
Pashto and Dari publications could be considered as the selection of suitable material
and their translation would have exceeded the author’s time and financial means. Much
of the recent papers published by the Afghan ministries are expected to be modelled
after examples from other countries or to be a product of the work of international
consultants - despite being published in the name of the ministry1 - and are not necessarily
representing the ministries’ actual view or course of action. Due to the ongoing conflicts
between governmental institutions and individuals and frequent changes in staff, strategy
and cooperations, most of these publications were treated in this study with extreme
care and not given too much weight. Decisions, as it was experienced by the author,
currently depend to a large extend on negotiations between groups of individuals and
are less determined by official papers. Had this study concentrated primarily on the role
international organisations play during these negotiations, a discourse analysis would
probably have been taken into consideration.
6.7 ICT4D in Afghanistan - three examples
After discussing some of the broader implications of ICT in development in chapter 3.2,
there are three prerequisites for my approach, which I would argue are widely accepted
and which I will be taking for granted:
1 MoC’s ICT Policy (2003) is a good example for this, while the MoE’s Education Strategy (2006)
was explicitly mentioned by the MoE to be a first step towards self-determination.
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• ICT can have a positive effect on the education sector, though what this ‘positive
effect’ implies can vary
• ICT has become an intrinsic part of the global communication infrastructure, with
a strong influence on social and economic development (see also Mansell & Wehn
(1998))
• The majority of people have an interest in using ICT and see intrinsic benefits in
them. What these (actual or assumed) benefits are, depends highly on the context
of where and how ICT are used.
I am aware that these statements are not uncontested and risk following “the nar-
rative of progress” of international development (Mosse: 2013) to some extent. These
statements could, of course, also be made with no reference to the present research or
the aid sector altogether, yet the fact that “the majority of the worlds people still lack
access to such goods and services” (Escobar: 2012:ix) raises the question of how this
lack is addressed in a context like Afghanistan. And with the ‘aid industry’ as the most
dominant driver in that regard, questions of ‘solutions’, power and relations will also
need to be addressed in the following chapters.
Furthermore I take the following situations as (currently) given parts of the develop-
ment industry, without going too much into further detail explaining its inner workings1,
with Afghanistan currently being one of the top priority countries for large donors like
USAID or the World Bank2:
• Several donors allocate money to be spent on ICT in the education sector3
• There are companies and organisations writing proposals to get their share of that
money or, as Monika Krause puts in her book on humanitarian relief, “agencies
produce projects for quasi market, in which donors are the consumers” (Krause:
2014:168)
• Once a contract is signed, the goal is to produce a project with the predefined
outcome under the allocated budget.
1 for critical accounts regarding development practice see (Mosse: 2005) on Aid Policy and Prac-
tice, (Krause: 2014) on decision making at humanitarian NGOs or Mosse’s collection focussing on
Development Professionals (2011).
2 see for example US overseas spending in 2012 http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/fast-facts.html;
or the World Bank spending on Afghanistan http://data.worldbank.org/country/afghanistan
3 see recent article by the World Bank blog on the “Promising uses of technology in education”
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These procedures are, without a doubt, highly controversial and have been contested
by practitioners and researchers from various disciplines for good reason. But I take
them, for the present research, as given to shift the focus from “the global aid system”
with its competing interests and interdependencies, to the individual pieces of the
network that make “the project”. Also, they have been experienced and observed in
the present cases as more or less accurate. The following chapters will show how these
procedures influence decisions and outcomes, but they also show critical aspects of ICT
planning and development that go beyond the aid industry.
6.8 Setting the scene
6.8.1 First impressions
Our first nights in Kabul in 2005 my colleagues from Technical University Berlin and I
spent in a small hotel near the main road of Shar-e-Naw - the New Town. I remember
the whole team gathered in one of the rooms, walls and floor decorated with thick
Afghan carpets, sitting on the beds, laptops on our laps and chatting on Skype. With
each other. Only later did I realize that the fact that we had a working wireless internet
connection and electricity (to run the router) was not something to be taken for granted
there.
The hotel was placed around the corner from Chickenstreet and Flowerstreet, the main
shopping area for expatriates and visitors. The improvised run down little shops with
often beautifully carved wooden doors and balconies full of ancient looking treasures
reminded me somehow of my recent visit to India and I was both excited to explore
this place and full of premonitory disappointment that in a few years this would be
organised professionally and run over by tourists and would lose what I supposed to
be its ‘originality’. This thinking is particularly ridiculed by two factors: first my very
being there as part of ‘development’ efforts, one of which was making Afghanistan a safe
enough place again for locals and visitors to walk around freely. The other was the fact
that these shops were actually the remains of Kabul’s tourism infrastructure as part of
“the hippy trail” from Europe to India during the 1960s and 70s and far from being the
‘original Afghan culture’ I had projected onto them at first sight.
During our first night we were shocked to hear gunshots from a nearby mountain area
and only a few days later an internet café some of us had been to, was attacked by a
suicide bomber. These first impressions were extreme but marked a combination of
excitement and fear that I later experienced in many conversations with international
aid workers in Afghanistan. The inaccessibility of most of the country made the work
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adventurous and potentially risking one’s life seemed to give any assignment an air of
significance.
6.8.2 Daily routines
One of my longer and more difficult stays in Kabul was in 2007 for three months during
the winter. The temperatures were well below zero for weeks in a row and the cold
never left my side, at the university, at the Ministry, in the restaurants, in my hotel
room. There was a constant slight draught from windows and doors, and dripping taps
and showers. I was aware how much better my conditions must have been than most of
my colleagues’ and I felt squeamishly German with my never ending complaints to the
hotel lobby about broken sockets, no internet, the malfunctioning heating, my flooded
bathroom or the broken TV. The reply was always “we will fix this in a minute”. And
sure enough some time later a young man would knock on my door, fail to find the
problem but would reassure me my complaint would be taken seriously and he would
call the engineer to come the next day and fix the problem. And, more often than not,
within a few days the problem would be temporarily solved. Everything can be fixed
there, even if it is just temporary. The potential to improvise is extraordinary, because
no one can afford “broken”. The streets on my daily 30 minutes drive from the hotel in
Shar-e-Naw to Kabul University were lined with shops selling objects I would struggle to
find in Europe, perhaps on Ebay if at all. Car supplies of any brand, from rusty engine
parts to car key cutting pushcarts were available, the food bazaar had live chicken and
10 litre oil cans on offer, while the technology bazaar held hundreds of different types of
mobile phones I had never seen before (mostly Chinese and Indian as I later found out),
generators, cables and spare parts. Each area specialized in one type of bazaar, and
if you were searching, like I was, for glossy paper and a blue printer cartridge to print
invitations, plus 50 envelopes in the same color, you would go to the office bazaar. Most
of the shops acted as if not in competition with each other, but rather complemented
each other’s goods to cover the widest possible range. After being sent to 10 different
shops I usually found something close to what I was looking for and, as in many other
occasions, I had to learn that these things take time and that making requests by phone
would never deliver the same result as going in person. Trying to split up my days into
time-slots with different tasks -– getting up, having a shower, eating breakfast, being
picked up for work, first morning meeting with my colleagues -– quickly failed to predict
Afghan reality and the countless cups of tea. Even my German Pünktlichkeit soon gave
up on me. Opportunities needed to be taken, only delays exceeding 30 minutes were
announced and contingency plans needed be prepared for any and every event.
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Figure 6.4: The electronics bazaar (source: the author)
Fitting in
In most areas of public life in Afghanistan there are clear rules for ‘male’ or ‘female’
behaviour. In my work environment at the Ministry of Higher Education and Kabul
University my colleagues’ interpretation of how to behave towards me resembled what I
started to call ‘a third gender’. Going to lunch and dinner in male only company as I
often did, would for most young Afghan women only be acceptable if her husband or
another family member was present. At the same time, I would never be hugged or
approached physically as it was common among men.
In the city centre of Kabul foreigners and ‘Western clothing’ have become a common
sight. The situation is different in the provinces where (foreign) women were less
commonly seen in public. My presence there caused visible confusion, especially among
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younger men, which led to a feeling of insecurity on both sides, of not knowing how to
behave ‘appropriately’.
After a while I sought advice from my female colleagues about how to dress “Afghan” –
as if they had long waited this question they laughed about the black baggy linen pants
I was wearing to make sure I did not ‘show too much’. “This makes you recognizable
as a foreigner at the first glance. No Afghan young women would wear this”. It should
have been quite the opposite, I learned, as young urban Afghan women show as much as
they are allowed to. Certain rules had to be complied with – long sleeves, butt covered,
headscarf – but combined with tight jeans and blazers, transparent scarves, high heels
and make-up was acceptable. In the field of higher education, young women as superiors
are still a minority, but also seem to be widely accepted. The promotion of a young
female elite by international programs offered many new opportunities, although at the
same time, not being married by 25 was still seen by many as a stigma. My then 23 year
old colleague Nadima told me how her fiancé came for four years asking her parents for
her to marry him “but I said no. I don’t love him because I have only my studies in mind,
but he loves me very much”. Being allowed by her parents to finish her studies first
before agreeing to marry a promising candidate is a privilege she was aware and proud of.
Keeping out
"You’re into Computer science? You have to meet my friend Hila. Oh and this is
Ramshid, a nephew of President Karzai. Can I get you a beer?" Behind a barrier where
we had to leave the car and after three checkpoint controls, two sets of concrete walls
and a name-list, I was in the packed backyard of an old Kabul house somewhere in
Wazir-Akbar Khan. Very few Afghan looking faces and at least 200 internationals and
one was reminded of Rajak’s and Stirrat’s (2011) account of the “expatriate lifestyle” in
ghetto-like social cocoons. Possessing and consuming alcohol is illegal in Afghanistan
– at least for Afghans. For foreigners there were some exceptions made, a number of
bars and restaurants sell alcohol openly with the side issue that some of them explicitly
ban Afghan nationals from entering to avoid trouble with the authorities. There are
expatiate guest houses and compounds that hold regular events that range from social
gatherings over sports to parties, and either being well connected or owning a non-
Afghan passport is usually enough to ask someone to get your name on the list at the
entrance.
I was reminded of the ‘Afghan Scene’ booklet that is being distributed for free at restau-
rants, where at first sight you wonder if those images of drunken people smiling into the
camera subtitled “Bruce and Clara as we all know them” were actually taken in Kabul.
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There was loud music, free beer and cheap long-drinks; a crowded inflatable paddling-
pool and girls in bikinis. After weeks of trying to hide any kind of femininity, and
being treated in a rather gender-neutral manner, this resembles a holiday-resort party. I
quickly got involved in a number of conversations: “So where are you from? And what
are you doing here? Who are you working for?” which led to the discovery of mutual
acquaintances and recommendations along the line of “you should talk to my friend X he
does something similar with the Ministry of Y”. What followed were stories of personal
experiences in the country so far and shared perspectives of ‘the locals’ in an attitude of
companionship and ‘speaking openly’. We were all able to tell personal accounts of our
work with ministers and army generals, how we almost got killed, what we accomplished
with international money or contribute a sarcastic remark on how many millions we had
seen being wasted for a ridiculous purposes. It is also these expatriate cocoons where
contacts are exchanged, new alliances are formed and ideas are developed. Justice (1986)
rightly observes how this companionship among the foreign aid community distances
them from the local population, “most foreigners, therefore, serve as their own reference
group, remaining socially and culturally apart from the people they aim to serve” (p. 41).
In the following chapter I describe, based on interviews and participant observation,
different views on projects from different actors involved in three areas: Technology for
the Poor, ICT Infrastructure Development and ICT Capacity Building.
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CHAPTER 7
ICT for the Poor
7.1 Project initiation
7.1.1 Sonatec
I was introduced to Florian, who works for Sonatec, a European-Afghan IT company
in 2007 in Kabul, by a common friend at a small garden party in the backyard of the
German Cultural Institute in Kabul. The number of people working in ICT was or still
seemed small and I had heard about the company from a Computer Science student
at Kabul University where Sonatec was trying to recruit new staff. After Florian had
joined Sonatec some years previously, the company had expanded quickly, targeting the
most common problems at the time like Internet speed and localisation, but also what
he calls “using IT to overcome human capacity challenges” (F. P. a : 01:00). Florian
and a colleague emphasised on different occasions that Sonatec was an Afghan-foreign
joint venture but at the same time he admitted that all the sophisticated technical work
was done by him or outsourced and that he found it next to impossible to find qualified
staff at reasonable rates in Afghanistan (ibid. [1:11:18]). At the time Sonatec had
two permanent and one freelancing international staff and, depending on the projects,
10 - 20 Afghan employees. However being an Afghan IT company with salaries only
slightly above the local wages Florian said it was hard to compete with international
organisations.
7.1.2 Laptops for schools
The project idea evolved from a previous cooperation between Sonatec and UCon, who
were implementing economic development projects and worked as a contractor for a
big U.S. donor organisation (UDon). The project, thus, needed a business component
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to justify involvement and funding via UCon. The laptop itself is not a commercial
product, it is described by the producer as a “rugged, low-cost, low-power, connected
laptop (...) [for] self-empowered learning” ((SLAP: 2014a)) designed and destined for
children in developing countries. Being a learning laptop for children its purpose is first
of all to help and encourage learning among school children. The official partner for
school related projects in Afghanistan is the Ministry of Education (MoE) and the main
project partner within the MoE was the head of the Computer Department (CDME),
Hameed Daoud. Furthermore, a local mobile phone provider (AFtel) and the Ministry
of Communication and Information Technology (MCIT) were involved in the project
initiation, but took no leading role during the implementation.
The roll-out-plan was developed by Sonatec, UCon and the MoE, mainly based on
research and statistics on primary education and economic development in Afghanistan.
Primary education, at the time of the research, faced two major problems: the lack of
buildings and the lack of qualified teachers. Between 2001 - 2005 the number of children
attending school increased from one million to nearly five million and rose to more than
eight million in 2014 (see also chapter 5.3). The laptops were described to be introduced
as an ‘in-between’ for some years, until enough teachers would be trained (H. D. :09:39).
The laptop’s operating system included, according to Florian, interactive games that
were thought to help overcome the memorization practice most common in Afghan
education and encourage creativity (F. P. a :17:55). The Afghan rote learning was
regularly criticised, as it was from a Western perspective seen as suppressing critical and
analytical thinking. The laptops’ purpose was to operate independently from the quality
and methodology of the schools and the teachers and, therefore, be independent from
the possibly ‘learning-hostile’ environment it was used in. Instead it was conceptualised
to be robust and complete in itself and would only need to rely on the pupils’ interest
and self learning abilities.
For the economic development element, which was crucial for the funding, Sonatec
and UCon had developed a concept on how the laptop could help generate or increase
income. One aspect was a health information package on the device, that was designed
to inform the parents about hygiene practices (F. P. a :38:28). The second package
were micro business training units, as Florian explained, informing the parents about
micro-business they were suggested to start (ibid. [27:10]), to decrease the “number of
economically unproductive people in the households” (ibid. [22:25]). Florian described
their approach as a way to partially ‘refund’ the laptop, not directly to the donor, but
because generating an increased income for families would contribute to justify its costs.
The project could, therefore, be funded under an economic development scheme and
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concentrate on primary education at the same time.
Within the MoE there were differing opinions about how and where technology should
be used for schools. Initially, the MoE had envisioned computer labs with the laptops,
but SLAP refused to supply laptops under these terms, because of their one-to-one
policy (A. S. :14:59) that was crucial to the above described concepts of self-learning.
In the end, the MoE accepted the conditions because the funding was external and not
used from their ‘core budget’1 but remained discordant on the topic.
7.1.3 The Ministry of Education
I had tried to contact Hameed Daoud for several weeks and it was my first visit to
the Ministry to interview him. Mr Daoud was responsible for the area of information
technology within the Ministry and his office was decorated with pictures and artefacts
from the laptop project. He seemed well equipped with different devices, two mobile
phones on his desk, one of the small school laptops lies on a table next to another laptop,
a desktop computer and a printer. Mr Daoud treated me in an extremely friendly way,
he seemed very interested in what I do and happy to chat about the project to someone
who is interested in the details and his perspective.
One week later I returned to interview Abdul Rahim Sharif, as an advisor to the
Minister he holds a prominent position within the Ministry. I had been warned about a
conflict between Sonatec and the Ministry beforehand and I had not been not sure either
of them would accept my interview request, as I might be affiliated with Sonatec. But
both had confirmed the interview after a mutual acquaintance had insisted I should talk
with them and probably mentioned my name. Mr Sharif was rather busy, the interview
was interrupted a couple of times, but he also gave detailed replies and showed no sign
of impatience.
Primary education
Despite much progress in the education sector since 2001, according to Mr Sharif, very
basic problems remained the most urgent task for the MoE to solve. About 40% of
school age children from grade 1 to 12 still do not have access to education, most of
1 The core budget is the official government budget, consisting of an operating and a development
budgets, funded by domestic revenue, multi-donor trust funds, and donors’ budget support. Most
donor money, however, is still spend as ‘external budget’ outside the government budget (World
Bank: 2012)
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them girls. 50% of the schools do not have proper buildings and cannot provide a safe
and conducive environment. 70% of the teachers do not have the minimum standards
set by the Ministry. There are not enough textbooks, and the number of pupils is still
increasing. On top of that, everything depends on the funding available to the MoE.
Technology is one of the priorities of the Ministry but only mentioned last in a long list
of shortcomings.
“And also the use of technology, it’s very important. We have a plan for
the use of technology, computer lab for schools to learn the computer. Now
we have introduced that from grade 10 – 12, [...] now we think it’s too late
for the children to start computer in 10 – 12, so maybe the revision will
introduce it earlier.”
(A. S. :23:51)
Mr. Daoud is a strong supporter of the laptops for schools project and had to fight
for it within the Ministry itself. He saw them as a chance to improve teaching quality
within a short time. The MoE had managed to increase the number of students but not
to improve the quality of teaching at the same level.
“Introducing this machine in-between can minimise the role of teachers
to some extent. Because it really takes years and years for someone to
become a teacher. And with our situation, 77% or even more, they are not
teacher. In some cases we have, the teacher is [graduated from] grade six,
and he is teaching grade 9, 10. Imagine what he is going to teach. But
somehow, I’m really upset that the high administrative leadership they’re
not understanding”
(H. D. :09:39)
The Ministry’s view concerning the use of technology at schools seemed to be generally
supportive, but the focus of the MoE was far from technology. According to Hameed
Daoud, the MoE was struggling to cover expenditure on salaries and dormitories1 from
its core budget (H. D. :32:29). Technology projects would currently only be acceptably
if they were paid by ‘external-budget’ money, as Mr Sharif explained, and donors who
wanted to support them should follow the MoE’s 5-year strategic plan (A. S. :19:59).
Mr Sharif insisted that support of the international community is needed but only on a
1 education in Afghanistan is free and a lot of students from rural areas stay in state-run dormitories
during their time of studies
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financial level (A. S. :40:25). Previous cooperation and coordination of tasks between the
government, the donor and the implementation partners were described by Mr Daoud as
unsatisfactory. According to him, the Ministry had been, and still was, at many instances
completely left out, leading to situations where two schools were built in a very short
distance and none in other areas (H. D. :40:31). The procedure of international projects
to pass on tasks to countless subcontractors was described as leading to unnecessarily
high prices and a lack of accountability. Other than the Ministry, Mr Daoud goes on to
explain, the contractors left when their work was done and questions of responsibility
were often left unsolved (ibid. [43:18]).
“So that’s the area we need the international support, to build more schools,
and quickly, and that will create employment in the rural area but also
provide conducive learning environment for girls to attend. But then the
people in the rural area will also say yes, we have a government and it’s
delivering, that’s the school, nicely built and its education is being well
and they send the kids to school every day. So every day they say we are
receiving something from the government. That’s how it builds the trust.
Otherwise it’s difficult.”
(A. S. :40:25)
To build trust in the government and its services was also a strong argument for invest-
ment I heard from other stakeholders1. At the same time, the MoE, and other ministries,
had its share of corruption cases and had been accused as well of a lack of account-
ability, poor quality buildings or investments in ‘ghost schools’2 that never got built at all.
7.2 Project design and conceptualisation
A pilot of 5000 laptops was agreed to be distributed starting in mid 2009 over a period
of 12 months, which was later extended until early 2011 due to delays. UDon provided
most of the funding via UCon. Sonatec and the Ministry acted as the main implementing
parties. The Ministry was to choose five provinces and nine schools for the 5000 laptops
to be delivered. Those schools selected by the MoE, were to receive one laptop for
each pupil in grades four to six. According to the initial one-to-one plan the children
1 The more trust people have in the government, the argument runs, the less they would be at risk to
rely on the Taliban for support and join them.
2 Although I also repeatedly heard these accusations from different sources, these ‘ghost schools’ have
not widely been confirmed, see for example World Bank South Asia Region (2014)
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were supposed to keep it during those grades, after grade six they should pass it down
to grade four again. The teachers responsible for those grades should also receive laptops.
Sonatec were commissioned to do the localisation of the existing operating system,
consisting of language translation and selecting from the available programs those to
be included. The development of additional content consisting of schoolbooks and
the business package was to be done cooperatively between UCon, Sonatec and the
MoE. The MoE was supposed to provide the education expertise, UCon the economic
development input and Sonatec the technical skills to digitise them. Aftel were to provide
connectivity to the schools and parts of the funding for laptops. SLAP committed to
supply the laptops.
According to the plan Sonatec would then visit the selected schools to talk to parents
and teachers, to make sure they are receptive, undertake the teacher training and the
electrical wiring and also install the server and the network. Finally they would invite
all stakeholders and the media for a ceremony (F. P. a :47:36). The MoE acted as the
main partner towards the schools and would also take over the entire project after the
implementation.
7.2.1 The laptop
The laptops have been developed by the School Laptop Project (SLAP) with the mission
“to empower the world’s poorest children through education” and
“[T]o provide each child with a rugged, low-cost, low-power, connected
laptop. To this end, we have designed hardware, content and software for
collaborative, joyful, and self-empowered learning. With access to this type
of tool, children are engaged in their own education, and learn, share, and
create together. They become connected to each other, to the world and to
a brighter future.”
(SLAP: 2014a)
According to the manufacturer each child has to get his/her own machine and keep
it. The laptop had been build to resist heat, dust and humidity. It is advertised to
have low power consumption, an average battery life of 3h, 256MB of RAM and 1GB of
flash memory. The standard keyboard had been replaced with Dari and Pashto keys.
The price at the time was around 200$ per item, not including costs for localisation,
implementation and the school server.
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The laptops had a standard operating system with educational software on them,
translated to Dari and Pashto by Sonatec. The only additional content for the Afghan
schools in the first phase of the project were PDFs of all the schoolbooks and the business
material for the parents. Each new installation had to be signed with a SLAP developer
key in order to be installed on the laptop, otherwise the system did not accept it. This
was done to ensure the laptops would not be used for other purposes or have any other
operating systems than the localised education system installed.
7.2.2 The wireless school-network
In addition to the laptops, each school also received a wireless school network. This
infrastructure included a router for each classroom, so the children could connect among
each other, and access a digital library with selected Dari and Pashto websites and
books on a school-server. The school server was a netbook, connected to the internet
and configured to update preconfigured content. Therefore the internet connection was
only between the server and the WWW, avoiding the risk that the children would access
inappropriate content themselves, as Florian explained (F. P. a :39:52). The risk that,
for example, pictures of girls or women could end up on the laptops was repeatedly
described by him as a threat that could risk the project’s local acceptance.
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Figure 7.1: Server-room at School One with a car battery, an inverter and a multi-
socket connected to them. (source: the author)
7.3 Project implementation
For the first distribution in 2009, 5000 laptops had been promised as a donation but
only 3800 were delivered, 1200 laptops never arrived according to the MoE (H. D.
:26:58), leading to tensions with SLAP. Selecting the schools took the MoE longer
than envisioned and started to delay the project and frustrate Sonatec early on (F.
P. a :46:36). The cooperative content development between Sonatec and the MoE
caused conflicts, according to Florian, over questions who was responsible for which
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aspects and how the financial resources would be distributed among them, which further
delayed the deployment (ibid. [41:18]). These unplanned delays and reassignments
of resources would foreseeable cause serious financial problems for a small IT com-
pany like Sonatec, whose staff were mostly hired on project basis. The MoE insisted
it needed those resources to build its own capacity, in particular regarding technical skills.
Figure 7.2: First laptop distribution in Kabul in 2009 with stakeholders from all groups
attending the ceremony (source: the author)
Despite the already mentioned delays and tensions, Hameed Daoud described the
cooperation between the stakeholders as positive and as a joint effort. All partners
contributed and in return got what they were looking for within the project, whether it
was publicity as in the case of AFtel or gaining experience as in the case of the MoE (H.
D. :29:08). The issue of capacity building and improving technical skills to be able to
continue similar work independently was repeatedly mention by Hameed as one of the
critical factors.
The delay of the project had left less time for the implementation and by the time
Sonatec received some feedback from the schools, most of the project resources had
already been spent and the assigned time for the pilot was almost over. The parents
and teachers had been asked for their support but not been otherwise involved in the
planning. Asked when he first got in touch Florian explains:
“[A]fter the contract was signed. And the MoE said this is the school you
go to. So go to [that province], go to the school, sit down with them, that’s
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were the first picture of me with a bunch of old bearded guys turned up,
with a laptop (sounds amused). And all, you know, seemed rosy. But of
course it’s pretty easy to be rosy and optimistic when you can basically say
‘hey, I’m gonna give you 400 free laptops’. You’re not gonna get many people
go well you know, that’s very nice of you, but they’re not really gonna solve
my problems. And here’s the answer to my problems.”
(F. P. a :32:08)
During these first visits, the project seemed broadly accepted among teachers and
parents, according to Florian, and Sonatec had felt they could address any issues that
came up appropriately. Some of the older teachers had been critical at the beginning
and a few weeks after the first ceremonies, Florian explained, there had been a crises of
confidence among some teachers and they felt they had to take initiative and react.
“We mounted a rescue mission, ran to [the province], did extra teacher
training, appointed a few of them as being like lead trainers, brought a few
of them for, you know, motivational boost training to Kabul. Usual stuff.
[...] Non of [that] was in the plan. Non of it. The plan was a big fat lot of
papers to make the Ministry happy.”
(ibid. [34:45])
The precondition had been, that the teachers needed to be supportive of the project,
which was to be achieved by motivating them to use the laptop. But, as Florian
described, Sonatec soon realised they had overestimated people’s capacity to take care
of the project, and they felt the teachers did not really seem to have the motivation.
In his view, Sonatec would have needed to provide much stronger supervision than
they had planned for the project. Initially the teachers were seen as sole problem, their
“lack of capacity” to understand and take care of the project, rather than the device
and its conception were questioned. Later, however, Florian explained, he realised that
the teachers would or could not adopt the role that had been anticipated for them.
The laptop did not offer any solution to the problems the teachers or schools were
struggling with. Big class-sizes and short school-time made it difficult to work through
the schoolbooks and they had no additional capacity to work through the laptop as well
(F. P. a :50:41).
“Around that time I started to (pause) I guess this illusion, [...] that we’re
gonna take these laptops and change the world, was falling down. Was really
falling down. I thought ok, we can get to this illusion if I get the teachers
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buy-in, get some extra relevant local stuff on there, then we’ll achieve it.
With room to spare. No.”
(ibid. [55:50])
Florian realised it was not the content the schools were missing but most of all
time and feedback. So he started researching online, he explained, and found in some
UNESCO report what seemed to be the problem:
“You have to have some sort of defined curriculum, you have to have the time
to learn that curriculum, you have to have feedback on learning outcomes, if
you are missing any of these - it’s not effective education. This doesn’t seem
like rocket science.” (for the full quote see appendix A.3)
(ibid. [57:24])
When he asked the teachers, they confirmed his assumption and Florian started
looking for a way to address this problem with the help of the laptops. The original
laptop software already included interactive learning-games that were popular among
the children and Florian got the idea that if the schoolbooks were turned into interactive
content in a similar way, the pupils could use them for self-training and the teachers
could finish the books faster. So he decided the content needed to be reworked to become
relevant to the teachers but in a way that could easily be reproduced and would not
need software developers.
“Say, ok, we have got to be able to McDonaldise this, we can make this like
Burgers.”
(F. P. a :57:24)
Within the remaining three months Florian developed a tool that would allow creating
games by simply adding content, without any technical knowledge required. This was
necessary in his view to make the process easily reproducible for either his own staff or
the MoE that did not have the necessary technical experience to develop other solutions.
This tool was then used to turn the schoolbooks into interactive games, which replaced
the static PDFs on the school laptop. Most of the resources had at that point already
been spent and the development of the interactive books was mostly covered by Sonatec
itself. But Florian described it as an investment and solution for future projects (ibid.
[1:05:03]).
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7.3.1 Technical skills
Skilled IT staff are difficult to find in Afghanistan and according to Mr Sharif certainly
not at an average public service salary, so IT professionals were mostly hired as project
staff with a project salary (A. S. :34:19). Mr Sharif did not see the need to consult
international contractors, technical expertise was in his view locally available, there
had been a lot of capacity building at the MoE, the only problem he saw was making
the resources available for the Ministry (ibid [39:10]). This situation, however, that
most technical staff were only there for a limited time was seen as much more critical
by Mr Daoud, who considered them as the backbone of the Ministry. His department
was responsible for all technical areas in the MoE, from basic support, to project imple-
mentation and project proposal development. Even the university graduates, he said,
were not up to these tasks (H. D. :36:23). All technical staff were paid through project
money and thus all IT services depended at the time on external funding.
Once the international organisations left, Hameed remarked, salaries might go back to
normal, but the MoE will also have less resources available. Therefore, he explained,
he tried to keep the numbers low and at the same time train the existing employees
to become able for the tasks (ibid. [52:12]). But he admitted that it was difficult to
prepare for that moment, while funding was still plenty. No one was trying to think
ahead, he worried, and consider the consequences of current investments that would
need to be maintained in the future (ibid. [53:17])
Sonatec was less optimistic regarding the MoE’s capability to maintain the laptop
project and part of their frustration, as Florian explained, resulted from the Ministry’s
inability to technically support the project, while at the same time not acknowledging
the fact that they needed external expertise. According to Florian, they were not even
able to distribute the remaining laptops they still had in stock without external help.
Sonatec showed them basic maintenance tasks, he said, but it would take years to train
the CDME for the necessary technical expertise. And Sonatec’s contract did not include
such training for the Ministry (F. P. a :1:14:38).
7.4 Project operation
7.4.1 The schools
To evaluate the experiences at the schools during the last laptop project I visited three
schools in different provinces that received the laptop between one and two years before
my visit. School One is a 30 minutes drive outside Kabul, I accompanied Florian, his
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colleague Waheed and and two employees from the MoE for the official project handover.
Their attitude towards us – I was seen as part of Sonatec – was reserved. The schools
winter-break was about to end the following week and Sonatec needed to test all routers
and the server to make sure everything worked when they hand over. As many times
before, I was surprised Florian had to go and do these tests and configurations himself
instead of sending one of his employees. We were led around, it was still very cold as the
school has no heating facilities. The classrooms were very simple with old wooden chairs
and tables, about half the newly installed sockets were already broken, which did not
seem to worry the principal. He explained that the electricity at the school only worked
for some hours a day and the school did not rely on electricity. He added that some
teachers openly disliked the laptop and did not want the pupils to use it at school. He
added, they felt they did not get enough support to know how to integrate the devices.
Another problem he reported was the fact that not all teachers had received a laptop
and training, but only those of grades four to six. In the new term the teachers had
gotten different classes and now some of the teachers with no laptop and no training
taught in a class with laptops and had thus banned the devices from class entirely.
Figure 7.3: Class-room in school One (source: the author)
It took another half hour to configure the routers and check the server – a re-purposed
netbook – to demonstrate the system’s functionality for the handover. I had the im-
pression none of those present believed this school network would ever be used by
the students but each played their part in this final ceremony of the project. The
tech-company had delivered a working system, the school had agreed to cooperate and
shown gratitude and the Ministry took over responsibility, made sure the systems were
in place and supported the school. We left after about one hour with the impression
that there was little interest to turn the project around. It was the first laptop school I
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got to see and it seemed to confirm my worst expectations1.
School Two is in Kabul, it is a girls school, but in the lower grades there are also
some mixed classes. Florian and I visited the school unannounced one morning but were
warmly welcomed by the principal, seated in his office and soon teachers and students
lined up with broken laptops and chargers or questions about the software. We talked
to the principal and some teachers and were invited to walk through the laptop classes,
where on average 2/3 of the children carried their laptops with them. The school had
received the laptops in 2009, among the first distribution.
To visit School Three I had to travel several hours by car, which turned out difficult
to organise. It was not primarily my own safety that was in the way but the attention
I might attract if the car was stopped. Not only Taliban were a risk in that case, but
I would be a promising victim for professional kidnappers and there had been several
cases of kidnapping where the drivers had been shot. On May 3rd after several rejections
and a delay2 I finally had a seat in a car of the Sheik Mohammad Foundation (SMF)3,
promising I would wear a hijab, cover myself entirely and not speak if we are stopped.
Abdul-Aziz, who works for SMF and supervises various schools and educational
projects in the region, accompanied me to the school. The SMF had not been involved
in the laptop project, but they were clearly committed to support the school in making
best use of them.
The lack of space was obvious when we entered the school. All classrooms were packed
with children and several provisional tents were set up in the yard, equally crowded.
The school had recently introduced morning and afternoon shifts and yet there was not
enough capacity to cover all pupils, as the principal Mr Fahim told me (M. F. :47:56).
The previous year 50 students had graduated from grade nine, while 200 students had
registered for grade one, but the school did not get more money to hire additional
teachers. When they asked the district for advice, the principal explained, they were
1 Much to my regret due to the tensions between Sonatec and the Ministry I had not been able not
visit the school again later, during its regular operation. I decided to mention this brief visit as it
suggested what some of the shortcomings also observed in other schools could lead to.
2 On May 2nd Osama Bin Laden had been killed in neighbouring Pakistan and the trip was put on
hold; his death seemed, however, to provoke very few reactions and one day later we could start our
journey.
3 SMF could at the time still move much more freely, they were primarily working in Muslim countries
and often associated with Islam and they recruited most of their staff from the region which clearly
distinguished them from most “Western” organisations and led to a much higher acceptance among
the population.
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told to send them away to other schools (M. F. :01:23:05). The laptop made School
Three even more attractive and became an additional incentive to the already growing
number of school registrations.
7.4.2 Inventory
At school Three around 10% of the laptops were broken after one year, at school Two
25% were reported broken after two years. A considerable number of chargers is broken,
so are a few batteries. The battery life is reported to have gone down from 3 to about
1 1/2 hours. Several laptops are said to have a screen problem. During the visits it
was observed and reported that the laptops had different or incomplete versions of the
software, probably because different or faulty versions of the image were distributed
(School Two).
While the number of working devices had decreased, the number of students had
increased considerably at both schools. At the initial distribution only teachers of grades
four to six had received laptops and training, with the new school year allocation of
grades changed, while the teachers kept the laptops. At School Two this led to a mix
of classes where some of the teachers and some of the students had laptops and others
did not. Mr Fahim from School Three explained, they had decided independently to
distribute the laptops after the winter break only to grades five and six to have at least
complete coverage in those grades (M. F. :00:14:29). Due to the restricted software,
however, this was only possible during the winter break when someone from the Ministry
had come for the updates to be installed on all devices. Otherwise the laptops did not
contain the respective books. Yet more pupils joined those grades during the school
year leading again to exclusions.
The school-server had not been in use in School Two and Three and no one had been
able tell me whether it still existed or where I could find it. Most of the routers in the
classrooms of School Three were unplugged or the cables were ripped off; it is possible
that some worked but this could not be validated.
During our visit at School Two Florian explained the principal that chargers, to
replace the broken ones, could be purchased on the electronics bazaar in Kabul. No one
had been aware of this easy fix. Other than for mobile phones or commercial notebooks,
there were no repair shops for school laptops where parents or teachers could have gone
to ask. The parents were prepared to spend money for the laptop, had they known where
to go. At School Three the parents had readily agreed to take financial responsibility
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for the laptop, as Mr Fahim explained, one family already paid a small regular fee for a
loss (M. F. :00:27:48).
During the winter break the laptops were all collected and stored because the school
was worried they might go missing, according to the principal of School Three. To
reach family members, in particular parents and girls, and to encourage the pupils to
study during the four months winter break, as was initially intended, was limited by this
precaution. The break was also said to be used to install the new software, though this
would usually be done by mass-installation within a few days, as Florian explained. The
installation was done by staff from the MoE, the teachers themselves or the engineer.
On female teacher, who did not even have a laptop herself, showed me a USB stick and
said she also knew how to install it, but there had been a problem with the software the
MoE copied her on the stick, some of the books were missing (School Two).
7.4.3 Laptops at schools
At two out of the three schools the teachers seemed supportive towards the project, even
some of those teachers who received neither laptop nor training had made an effort to
support its use as well as they could. But with a salary of around $120, most teachers
could not afford a personal laptop or even regular visits to internet cafés. Both schools
reported they repeatedly requested support from the MoE, for more training, for repairs
and for more laptops. The MoE had promised to come back but nothing had happened
(T. 3. :00:05:56).
The schools worked in shifts, Mr Fahim explained, to cover all classes and each class
was about 35 minutes (M. F. :00:47:56). Integrating the laptop would take additional
time which was impossible with the already extremely tight schedule (T. 3. :00:14:16).
The laptop demonstrated no obvious advantage for their daily class-routines, therefore,
instead of supporting them, the laptop placed an additional burden on the teachers.
One regular remark by the teachers was, that they would prefer to have projectors to
connect to the laptop and show things during class, but the laptop had no video output,
and the schools could also not afford projectors. Those who used the laptop criticised
it also as too slow and said that they had to delete some games in order to store files,
because of the low storage capacity. None of the teachers could report any positive
influence the laptop had for their teaching, but this did not seem to undermine their
belief in the importance of digital technology. Despite the obvious lack of evidence, the
narrative of the power of technology persisted.
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While at Kabul based School Two the teachers could still be expected to have some
access to computers, the situation in rural areas is quite different. At School Three
the principal had decided to hire an “engineer” to help with technical problems, the
updates and to teach the children how to work with the laptop. The engineer was paid
separately by the Provincial Education Directorate, but his contract only lasted for six
months. This was, however, only a temporary solution. What the school needs, Mr
Fahim explains, is qualified teachers with access to computer skills.
The students at both schools were reported to understand the computer very well and
to be happy to work with it. Since they contain the interactive schoolbooks, however,
some teachers complained that the students played the test-games instead of following
the class (School Two). The children I met in class eagerly showed me their favourite
applications, digitally drawn pictures and took photos with the built-in camera. However,
not all children used all programs as figure 7.4 suggests.
Figure 7.4: One of the laptops in School 3 (source: the author)
Figure 7.4 demonstrates three interesting facts:
• The screen shows an LCD leak, a typical problem that was observed in numerous
cases, in some, a critical part or even the entire screen was black and no longer
usable. Replacing the display required spare parts that were not easily available
and the laptop has no video output for an alternative screen.
• Personal appropriation: there is a mouse attached to the device, which was not
part of the delivery. Thus the parents (most likely) had invested some money to
improve their child’s ability to work properly. Other examples, as the problem of
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broken chargers, showed that essential knowledge about the machine was lacking.
• Educational appropriation: the start-screen shows which applications had been
used by the child1, in this case the boy had not started the majority of the
applications several weeks after he had received the laptop back after the winter
break. This suggests that only a few of the programs were used at school.
At School Three the children also reported that they used the laptop at home and that
their parents were interested in the programs. There had been no additional resources for
promoting these programs to the parents. Florian had only done a sample questioning
at one of the schools which had suggested that about two out of ten parents had used
them (F. P. a :27:54). Though initially a critical factor for funding, the impact of the
economic development package had never been assessed. The teachers at School Three
also criticised that the laptops were distributed, but no evaluation of the situation at
the schools took place (T. 3. :00:56:33).
7.5 Consequences
The funding and cooperation had officially been over at the time the interviews at the
MoE took place and there was no other entity currently supporting the project, Hameed
explained. He felt they were now able to run and maintain the project independently,
as had been intended.
“[L]uckily from the last one year now we have taken the initiation ourselves
and we have developed the necessary capacity and Ministry is taking the full
ownership and we are doing it ourselves. That’s a very good and positive
point. This project can be maintained easily.”
(H. D. :20:31)
Mr Daoud described the projects as mostly successful, and saw the schools having
responsibility now to make proper use of the laptops, which he attested most schools
did (H. D. :14:04). At the same time, however, both interview partners at the MoE
mentioned that they never saw the project as a long-term self-sustaining intervention
and, without continued external funding, it was expected to come to a halt soon. One
1 Florian gave me an introduction to the device and explained that the activities are coloured if you
have used them before, the ones that you have not used are grey. This way I could see if the kids
had at least once tried all programs. Whether this is a general function in the operating system or
whether he configured them that way was not clear.
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of the most critical problems was seen in the still rising numbers of children every year,
also described by the schools. The other was the limited life-time of the laptops and
the increasing number of damaged devices they could not repair (ibid. [1:02:51]). Mr
Daoud mentioned that SLAP had a meeting with president Hamid Karzai and the
commander of the International Security Assistance Force. In terms of funding, he
explained, compared to military expenses a country-wide laptop deployment did not
appear that inconceivable (H. D. :14:55). Mr Sharif, however, pointed out that even if a
country-wide implementation and deployment of laptops would be covered externally,
the MoE would not be to able afford the operating costs (A. S. :18:22).
At that time, Hameed Daoud had no support within the MoE to extend the laptop
project and little influence on higher rank officials. He strongly identified with it, but
it was also clear that the producer’s narratives he adopted to explain the laptops’
importance, were not easily transferable into the Afghan context. And he understood
the resistance within the MoE.
“They will say that, come on, we don’t have a building, we don’t have chairs
to sit, and you are coming with this luxurious computers? But, I totally
disagree with them. Because as [...] the founder of these laptops, he said
something very good and it really touched me. He said that these computers
are like someone who needs food, you cannot just say that no, food is not
important for you. These computers are something like food.” (for the full
quote see appendix A.4)
(H. D. :11:10)
He emphasised the laptop project would need scientific evidence on its impact to
convince donors to further invest, but SLAP could not provide any and no one seemed
to be interested in funding impact analyses (H. D. :18:43).
Three aspects caused tensions that made a continuation of the laptop project among the
same group of stakeholders unlikely. First of all the pilot had done little to change the
MoE’s official view to prioritise buildings, enrolment of girls and teacher training (A. S.
:40:25) and they seemed likely not to support the laptop project any further. Secondly,
an ongoing frustration with external contractors that were seen as expensive and
unaccountable, increased the tendency within the Ministry to claim more responsibility
and funding to commission local contractors or build up their own capacity. Finally
Sonatec which had done most of the work in developing and initiating the first phase,
was not included for the follow-up proposal as it was seen as a conflict of interest. In
the end, CDME together with a different group of stakeholders, submitted a proposal
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to a potential donor that concentrated on capacity building and the maintenance of the
existing project, but it was rejected.
In Florian’s view, the surplus in funding opportunities had led to a mentality among
the local stakeholders to take the money for granted without seeing the need to develop
meaningful projects. And, as he intended to take a different approach, Sonatec also
started seeking partnerships outside the MoE for a new laptop-project.
“Spending this much on just a few thousand kids doesn’t make any sense -
and it doesn’t. Unless it’s part of a wider pilot validation, research and all
the rest of it. I don’t think that’s something they really understand. Not
to be patronising, I just honestly don’t think they see it that way. So in
the sense right now, [Sonatec] and the Ministry are in competition for the
same funds to do the same thing. So [Sonatec] happens to be the entity that
can actually do it and the Ministry happens to be the government body in
control of that subject.”
(F. P. a :1:22:59)
Sonatec managed to secure funding for another small pilot at School Four in one of
the insecure areas. Through military funding and, as he explained it, with building
security and trust among the population instead of education as the primary goal, they
could avoid direct involvement of the MoE, as Florian described (F. P. a :1:30:03). And
the military, he continued, would also be willing to spend considerable amounts on
larger distributions of the laptop if they could show at School Four that the device had
a positive effect in on stability1 (ibid. [1:44:15]).
7.5.1 Lessons Learned
Hameed Daoud saw little need for changes from their side, most suggestions from his
side depended on ongoing or extended external funding. The server solution with off-line
content did not prove to be working and for future projects, Mr Daoud suggested to
provide internet access to the pupils directly, funded by AFtel or the MCIT. There
would have to be some filtering he added, but the children also needed a bit of freedom
(H. D. :0:23:53).
1 One of the calculations Florian explained to me was the following: considering the estimated $250
million the US spend on military expenses in Afghanistan in 2013 every day (National Priorities
Project: 2013), giving tablets, smart-phones or laptops to all eight million pupils that are according
to UNICEF currently in school UNICEF (2013) would at a price of $330 per device including training,
cost $2,4 billion. An amount equivalent to 10 days of military expenses.
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While inappropriate content, downloaded from the internet, seemed less of a concern to
Mr Daoud, he saw the need to develop more localised and culturally embedded content
for the laptop to make it a success. Most of its applications he said, were built for
Western kids, while in his view Afghan children thought differently. The books and
interactive content developed by Sonatec were just a start as he said, which he intended
to continue with his own team (H. D. :0:19:23). The localised interactive books would
then also show the teachers when they made a mistake, he continued, and they could
use it themselves to prepare for the lectures.
“That way the teacher will understand it, he is not damn teaching well,
because as soon as he teaches, if he performs the quiz, you will see that
non of the kids can really perform the quiz. You realise that there is some
problem, either with his teaching method or he doesn’t know how to teach.
So that way he can improve himself.”
(H. D. :21:09)
The project was, according to Mr Sharif, too technology centred and a country-
wide deployment was not seen as acceptable under the current terms. The content
development had been done only partly and not with sufficient quality and expertise.
“[T]he Ministry, initially, when we had discussion with them their objective
was injecting technology, computer into the education system. Without
looking into how schools can make best use of technology. [...] So for any
computer technology to be massively employed in schools, we need to invest
in developing a digital curriculum. Otherwise it would be just a computer
for computer literacy, not for education.”
(A. S. :09:54)
Mr Sharif agreed that ICT was important, but the laptop project was the wrong
approach in his eyes. He saw no longer the need to use special hardware, the prices of
computer had gone down and they could buy much better quality for the same price
locally (ibid. [27:35]). Yet, though Mr Sharif repeatedly acknowledged the relevance of
ICT, he emphasised that building PC labs as important as it is, was not on top of the
Ministry’s priority list. First they needed to build schools (ibid. [31:08]).
Sonatec on the other hand, looking back two years later, identified several issues
that went wrong, but Florian also added that there were no guidelines they could have
followed.
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“There was very much learning as we were going. I mean remember, even to
date, there is no textbook implementation where people will say ‘this is how
you do one-to-one laptop program, everybody watch and follow’. [...] And
actually, we took it very much like bite it off as you can chew it. You’re
first issue is gonna be convincing the teachers. Cause if you don’t have the
teacher support, you are just doing everything for nothing.”
(F. P. a :18:54)
In retrospect, he explained, they could learn from their experience, but he also admit-
ted that there were some problems with the content development and teacher training
on their side. He acknowledged he had not only overestimated the Ministry’s technical
capacity but also of his own staff. He had expected the creation of training materials
would be an easy task, but his staff had problems with it. So he decided to develop a
clear step-by-step manual for them, how to create teacher training material. Some of
his employees, he added, saw this as a threat to their jobs, because this manual meant
anyone could follow it. But in his view this was the only way to assure consistent quality
of the teacher training (ibid. [48:21]).
For future projects, Florian said, they were now willing to change some things, like inte-
grating the parents and teachers in the process. The first phase of the laptop project, as
described above, had been centred around translating the operating system and offering
additional educational content on the school server. After Sonatec had identified the
missing time-per-class as the central problem, the interactive books came for them into fo-
cus as a solution. They had never asked the teachers in advance, he admitted, what their
biggest problems were. It should have been Sonatec’s role, as he saw it in retrospect, to
identify the problems and offer them the appropriate solution. “So we didn’t really do our
like market analysis or homework. We were all a bit like carried away [...]” (F. P. b :1:19).
One result of the missing time, Florian described, was the lack of feedback the children
received from their teachers and in his view the laptop could help overcome this problem.
Together with rote learning1, which, Florian mentioned, was still dominant in Afghan
education, the way teachers tested and evaluated the pupils was in his eyes a serious
problem to education.
“There is no standardised testing of any form in Afghanistan. One of the
things which is really messed up right now is that basically each teacher
writes their own test. No kid is objectively assessed. You’re the first position
1 A learning technique based on repetition
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holder, the second position holder, the whatever. So even if the kids are
almost all the same, there’s like ten marks between them, like A’s and B’s,
you have one kid saying daddy I’m the greatest and the other kid’s like I
suck, I must be stupid. For no reason. [...] even in high-school. The first
standardised test anybody in the state Afghan education system will see is
the concour1 exam.”
(ibid. [1:37:10])
Though the teachers’ formal education was described as insufficient by all stakeholders,
even by the teachers themselves, a change of teaching methodologies or how to use the
laptop for didactic reasons had not been discussed with the MoE or the teachers. The lack
of a standardised measurement system that would allow the students to judge their own
achievements over the school year, as is common in most Western education systems, was
assumed to be the result of three things: short class time; an outdated education system;
and the fear of the teachers that standardised testing would prove their low teaching
quality. The laptop was seen by Sonatec and Hameed Daoud as a workaround to all three.
Despite the conflict with the MoE and a number of negative experiences during
this first pilot, Florian still said he believed the laptop could in the current situation
save a generation. To train the minimum number of teacher necessary, he went on to
explain, would take no less than 5 - 10 years and with the laptop they could have quality
education instantly and also gain control over what was being taught in the provinces,
which was, according to him, currently not always the case. The laptops could reach, in
his view, the girls at home who currently did not attend school because of the lack of
female teachers. A countrywide implementation, as Florian saw it, could tackle all these
problems, but it would need to be done now, while Afghanistan still mattered and the
funding was still available, and he rather saw the military as a promising partner, not
the Afghan government (ibid. [1:38:52]).
How such a digital school system would be built up, supported and maintained,
however, did not seem to have been discussed by Sonatec and the CDME. Equally, the
question how such a system could first be introduced in an instant and after five years
simply be removed from the schools is not posed.
1 University entrance exam
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7.6.1 School Four
While a cooperation with the MoE was described by Sonatec as problematic and at
best would be avoided, regional cooperation with Provincial Education Directorates
(PED) was possible without direct confrontation with the MoE or dependence on the
core-budget. School Four was one of the schools selected for the second phase of the
project, funded by the US military and located in one of the so-called insecure provinces
with persistent Taliban presence and influence, the main reasons why few Afghan and
even fewer international NGOs were active there. This situation made funding via the
military possible, but there was also a general interest in finding solutions to support
these insecure provinces, without putting aid professionals in danger. We could only
travel there from Kabul by Helicopter, as the roads were not considered safe and we
stayed as guests at a military camp during our visit. As I was hired by the project as
monitoring and evaluation officer, I could conduct interviews with teachers, parents and
pupils.
We left the camp the morning after we arrived to meet with the education director and
the school principal in the neighbouring governors compound. Our interpreter Samie
embraced both men like close family members and to my surprise first the education
director Dr. Sangin Zadran and after him the principal took my hand to welcome us.
Samie was not a professional interpreter but emigrated with his family to the US where
he was raised trilingually in Dari, Pashto and English. He clearly struggled with some
of the translations he had to master.
Compared to other places, Mr Zandran described, the education level in this province
was very low. In other provinces education was seen as a means to get a better future,
whereas here the security situation and a general distrust of and reluctance to develop
education led to the current low literacy level. Mr Zandran’s replies often seemed to
represent the inner conflict between Taliban, the government and the international forces,
all exerting pressure on the community and his resistance to take sides. Unfortunately
some of the nuances of his thoughts most likely got lost in translation.
Mr Zadran said the laptop project was his first education project with technology
involvement in Afghanistan and the first one he had heard about in this province. He
was sure, he added, the schools were excited about technology, but he was also worried
that people were not aware what a computer can be used for. The risk of people using
computers in a wrong way, was a recurring factor he mentioned during the interview.
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The majority of people had no computers in their homes because there was no electricity
and generator fuel was expensive, he explained, but some visited friends in the office
to use a computer, download songs and check their emails, and some also had mobile
internet access (S. Z. :00:24:04).
Because computers often are associated with Western culture, entertainment and inap-
propriate content, the laptop was introduced here by Sonatec as “the electronic book”.
There was also no internet access planned to avoid any risk of unwanted content being
spread through the laptop. As an electronic book it was hoped, the image would not be
that of a computer but of a technical learning tool.
Despite his critical comments about computer use, Mr Zandran also emphasised his
support for computer technology, especially in his current situation. When he could
not move around freely, he could still communicate and send files without travelling.
When he first heard about the laptops for schools project, he said, he was hoping to
get the project to their province as well. During the course of the interview, details
of the conflicting situation he found himself and the province in, became clear. He
criticised the fact that the government acted ineffectively and intransparently and no
one knew where all the money had gone (ibid. [53:25]). He also accused the government
of cooperating with uneducated people locally, who might belong to the elders and be
well respected but could hardly write their names (S. Z. :42:39). Simultaneously Western
influenced projects like some of the TV stations, promoted in his view, inappropriate
content and drove religious people to the Taliban (ibid. [59:24]).
He was sure, however, if projects would be done with more respect towards Islam,
they would not be seen as enemies and get into trouble with the Taliban. He then
carefully elaborated how they had to find a way to get along with the Taliban. The
Taliban had their own education people working in the province, while Mr Zadran and
his staff work for the government. He said it was dangerous work, not only for him
but for the Taliban education people as well, because those working for the Taliban
were arrested if they were caught in public. And not only them, he continued, but also
teachers who were suspected to work with the Taliban were arrested by the coalition
forces and these arrests, in his opinion, only worsened the situation.
“ If we don’t arrest these people so we will be able to coordinate each other,
so we will be working, so the education will be getting more day by day. If
you are going to catch these people, if you are going to arrest them so the
next people, they have a lot of people, they are gonna come, they are gonna
close all the schools.”
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(S. Z. :01:07:37)
There seemed to be a need for shifting identity between Taliban or simply a religious
person, depending on the threat or support scenario. Most people seemed to care for
their children’s education, but with religion as a central part of it. Mr Zadran gave an
example how they managed to deal with these conflicts between government and the
local community: the Taliban had complained about inappropriate content in one of the
schoolbooks. The teachers, he explained, presented the Taliban with the choice: if they
did not want to accept the books, they would need to provide new ones. This, he added
laughing, they refused, so they accepted the books (for the full quote see appendix A.2).
When new books had been introduced, he went on, they had given them to the elders
to show to the Taliban, to prove that no inappropriate content was in the books, and as
a result no changes had been requested. If they involved the Taliban, he was sure, they
in turn would not start closing the schools unannounced (ibid. [01:05:44]).
Parents and Teachers
In the following days we met the teachers, pupils and the parents at the neighbouring
governor’s meeting hall. We had originally envisaged visiting the school, but we would
have needed a military escort, we would all have been obliged to wear helmets and
body-armour and decided such an appearance would give a more frighting than likeable
impression to the children. Therefore 450 children together with the teachers took the
3km walk to the compound to participate in the the baseline test and (at least some) to
be interviewed by me. Samie was again translating all conversations. Florian started
each group-interview with a short introduction and presentation of the electronic book
and answered questions about the project.
Though the groups were introduced as ‘the teachers’ and ‘the parents’ and ‘the pupils’
we knew in advance that all participants would be male. The atmosphere during the
interviews was first slightly tense but then friendly, relaxed and respectful; the fact
that the interview was led by a female seemed completely accepted and not to limit
the discussion. The tendency to give a very positive picture of the school was obvious
during all interviews.
One of main issues raised during the group interviews was the increasing number
of students and the lack of buildings, as had also been described at the MoE. The
school had been promised some tents that they were urgently waiting for. One parent
remarked that there were up to 700 students in grades four to six. Florian replied that
the official number was 410 and there were 450 electronic books, but the parents insisted
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that the numbers would go up because some other schools had to close due to a lack of
teachers and buildings and those students would register at School Four. In particular
when they heard about the electronic book, another father added, there would be even
more interest. They were worried this would cause trouble between those students who
received a laptop and those who did not. Florian assured them that they would not risk
a fight, if there were not enough electronic books, they would have to reduce one of the
grades (PG1 :01:15:24).
The parents were also worried about who was in charge, how to keep the devices
safe and what to do if they were stolen or broken. Florian explained that from their
experience in other provinces they knew that they could easily be repaired and that
somebody would be trained to fix them. This remark surprised me, as the repair service
that the MoE was supposed to offer had never been realised. One of the lessons learned
mentioned earlier by Florian, however, had been to introduce repair trainings to local
mobile-phone repair services. The details were yet to be decided. The parents suggested
to involve the teachers in the distribution as the students respected them and would
be more careful if the teachers were involved. They also assured that both parents and
teachers, would make sure the children treated their electronic book with the necessary
care (PG1 :01:30:43).
The parents reported that the security situation had improved considerably; before
they had been afraid of sending their children to school, now the boys could walk the
3km to the school in groups of 20 or 30. The number of first graders at the school was
mentioned to have doubled and the fact that there were computers1 at school, that they
had a computer instructor, and that the school had chairs and desks, were all mentioned
as positive change.
“Most of the students, their parents are farmers, they have been working
really hard, they are [repairing] holes in the [roads] and stuff, but they never
say to their children you have to work with me or help me out. They always
tell them to go to school, do your job, work hard to get more educated. This
is more important for us.” (The quote is a summary by the interpreter.)
(PG1 :01:49:59)
Though the situation was generally reported as having improved, most of the girls
could still only get home schooling in groups of 20 - 30 up to the sixth grade (ibid.
1 There were some Desktop computers for the higher grades, but they were reported to be too few
and in rather bad condition. This showed, however, that computers were by no means negatively
connotated at the school.
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[02:22:21]). This learning environment had not been evaluated for distribution within
the laptop project, though the support of girls and women was one of the high priorities
of both the MoE and the donors. The only option that had been considered was that
the boys who received a laptop at school, would share it at home with their family.
The most pressing problem, however, was said to be the arrests of teachers by the
coalition forces. More than 40 teachers had been arrested, the parents explained, causing
not only personal problems for their families but also worsening the already difficult
situation at the schools, with too few and poorly trained teachers (PG1 :02:04:51). A
teacher training centre that had opened only a few months earlier had to be closed
because its director had been arrested. One of the teachers described how he experienced
the current situation.
“I have the pressure from both sides. From the government and from the
Taliban. Especially the teachers. Those teachers wearing nice cloths, having
no beards and so on they are being forced, arrested and given hard time by
the Taliban. If you have a long beard, turbans and the like you are getting
a hard time by the government. And most of the teachers are still being
arrested, maybe they are in Bagram jail, they are in Pul-e-Charkhi jail,
somewhere, so nobody knows where they are.”
(TG1 :00:08:31)
The security situation was perceived by the teachers as good and they attested to a
lot of positive changes, yet they were afraid of these unpredictable arrests. They could
easily get a better paid job with an NGO or in an office, they said, but they believed in
education and wanted to be teachers to help their people.
The lectures and schedules were described by the teachers as similar to the other schools,
with big classes and too little time to cover the books (ibid. [00:27:24]). They felt their
job was appreciated, but the government only paid them 3000 Afs per month (less than
40€) which was not enough to support their families and even this salary often came
with several months delay (TG1 :00:21:16). The question whether this electronic book
would support them in their teaching led to a discussion among the teachers. There
were still several questions unsolved like the number of laptops and the exact grades.
One of the teachers expressed his doubts that the project was really going to happen,
another one asked to put someone in charge to take care in the long run. Previous
negative experiences, they explained, taught them how these supposed donations often
brought little actual improvements (TG1 :00:43:07).
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“You say for one year my company is taking care of everything, have someone
in school and so on. I’m saying after one year, what will happen? Maybe
you can give it to some other NGOs? Because we are really worried about
these things for the future, it’s not just for one year.”
(TG1 :49:06)
Florian assured them that the teachers and additional staff would be trained in ad-
vance, and that the laptop could be repaired easily, “like a Toyota car” (ibid. [00:49:54]).
Most teachers reported they had used computers at internet cafés or at the premises
of the provincial education director. They confirmed that computers were seen as
important and should be taught more in school. However, apart from the cost of the
hardware, there was also the lack of electricity which made it impossible for the school
to afford. But more than a PC lab, they said, they would have liked to have a science
lab to show the children experiments (TG1 :00:58:26). Florians reaction was to tell
them that these things could be shown on video on the electronic book, but Samie was
reluctant to translate and suggested not to make too many promises in advance.
Asked about what they saw as most important for their children to learn, the parents
mentioned Islamic culture was the highest priority, followed by English, Science and
Technology (PG1 :02:33:09). The teachers also mentioned personal development as a
Muslim came first together with respect for family and elders (TG1 :01:07:52).
The Pupils
The morning before interviewing the teachers, all 450 students of grades four to six
had participated in a baseline test which was developed by Sonatec according to the
national curriculum for science, maths and religious education, the subjects, that would
be as interactive books on the laptop. The Afghan school system did usually not involve
testing and Sonatec soon realised that they had not taken this into account sufficiently.
After the papers were distributed the teachers started reading the test questions aloud
in front of the students for all three grades. Some still had trouble reading they said.
After the test had started, all children started talking and copying from their neighbours,
which the teachers did not seem to care too much about. Our idea of testing seemed so
entirely foreign to both teachers and pupils that the poor results in the end were not
surprising.
An interview with a selected group of about 20 boys took place after the baseline test,
also accompanied by one of the teachers. Samie and I sat on a couch, he translated again
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Figure 7.5: Interview with the pupils from School Four (source: the author)
and managed with jokes and friendly encouragement to establish a relaxed atmosphere.
The children sat around us on the floor and all seemed to enjoy the attention but also
were unprepared to be asked for their opinion. Most of the questions appeared to be
answered according to their teachers expectations. Maths, languages and Islamic studies
were listed as the most popular subjects and they all confirmed they liked going to
school. When asked what they tell their parents at home about the school the replies
sounded almost rehearsed, Samie summarised the replies.
“When they go back to home they say the teachers are so nice and the good
thing about teachers is, they are not beating us. So still they give us more
subjects to read and to write. [. . .] they go home and they say to the parents
that all the teacher were present today at school and the reason we are so
happy about the teachers is because they treat us very well.”
(SG1 :00:03:26)
With the complaints by the parents about the arrested and absent teachers still in
mind, I was increasingly sure the pupils had been prepared for the interview and even
without one of their teachers present I would probably have received the same answers.
Later they also mentioned the arrests and that their teachers had disappeared (SG1
:00:40:06). When asking what subjects they would have liked to have more of or what
was missing, the first reply was “Islamic studies” and then with a laugh followed by
“computer!”. They really need computers one said, but then another again repeated how
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well they were treated by the teachers and that there was nothing else they need (SG1
:00:35:32).
Asked about their career aspirations they gave the same list of professions I usually heard:
doctor, engineer and teacher. Their parents, they explained, were mostly shopkeepers,
one was a teacher, one a policeman, all seemed to have some agriculture as well.
To my surprise when I asked about mobiles phones and computers, several boys
showed me their phone and five reported they have a computer at home and that they
knew how to use it. Others had used one in Pakistan or in their father’s office. Would
they like to use a computer? All raised their hands. They said the computer helped
with studying, with home work and learning English.
7.7 The International Development Bank
With the interactive books, Sonatec was convinced about having found the missing
piece to make the laptop for schools a success. Another option for continued funding to
deliver the necessary results for an extended deployment was seen in the International
Development Bank (IDB). I joined Florian and his colleagues Tim and Yonos in a
meeting in the Wazir Akbar Khan district in Kabul. We were greeted at the entrance
and accompanied by a guard to meet Amrita Chaudhary, the director of the education
section of IDB.
Mrs Chaudhary was not an IT person herself, as she repeatedly emphasised, but she
was in the position to make decisions and recommendations for future program plan-
ning. After hearing about Sonatec’s concept of using technology for self-training Mrs
Chaudhary was instantly interested. These devices, she commented, held the prospect
of reaching out to areas that are considered too dangerous for most NGOs to become
active there, meaning spatial as well as societal areas like reaching girls in insecure
provinces. In the five insecure provinces, she told us, all efforts of IDB had failed so far
to get girls enrolled in school (IDB). At the same time, she added, there was a general
fear that computers might be seen by the Taliban as pornography and western ideology
which would have had the opposite effect. But there needed to be an opening up, Ms
Chaudhary insisted, in a subversive way, showing the children the world out there over
the internet (IDB).
Elaborating on the possible steps of a pilot implementation, Ms Chaudhary emphasised
the ministries’ roles. Though the money was managed by IDB, it was part of the ‘core
budget’ and directed through the Ministry of Finance to the relevant ministries and
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they would not easily give away several million of their funding. She suggested capacity
building at the MoE in order to enable them to manage the project in the future and
react if something went wrong. This had been one of the critical points in the previous
project and Florian suggested instead to de-skill some of the tasks involved and offer
those to the Ministry. He was openly sceptical about how capable the Ministry would
be in managing any edutech projects, and whether it was possible to build the MoE’s
IT department to a level that it could handle severely complicated processes.
Tim and Yonos confirmed that the relationship to some people in the Ministry was
tense but that others were very supportive. Tim added “one mistake we made with the
original plan, is, there was not a single carrot in it for the Ministry” (IDB). They did
not offer the MoE new equipment, he explained, not much training, no trips abroad and
no research trips. Mrs Chaudhary agreed that these were important incentives.
Independently from Sonatec’s plans with IDB, I returned one month later to meet
one of IDB’s IT consultants Mr Soumitra Gopal for an interview to find out more about
IDB’s view on technology projects, in general, and in the education sector, in particular.
Mr Gopal saw his, and IDB’s role, more as a change maker than as technological transfer
and described the process of getting the ministries’ approval as time consuming but
necessary. The technology, he explained, was only a small part, the more difficult task
was to get people to change their current processes and stop resistance against change
(S.G. :16:15).
Managing this change needed persistence, Mr Gopal was convinced, that foreign led
projects often lacked. People came from developed countries as experts to Afghanistan,
he went on to explain, made good money, were highly accustomed to computerised
system and were getting frustrated with their local partners when they realised things
were not going the way they were intended to. So they left. Afghanistan needed
people whose priorities were development, “at the core of their heart” (S.G. :17:35). He
compared the ideal aid worker with a mother that patiently needed to teach her child a
lesson.
“You know, every child is told by the mother: keep those slippers in its right
place. Right? I’m sure your mother would have said that to you at some
point of time. Do you know psychologically how many times a mother has to
say this to the child before it could possibly become a habit with the child?
[. . .] Psychologists have said that this needs to be repeated 25 000 times in a
period of ten years before it could possibly become a habit with the child. It
works exactly the same way in the developing world. To make that guy move
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away from current process, current way of working, current thinking and
to come to computerised system and tell him: stop seeking rent. Imagine,
you’re also actually hitting at a social revenue1. [...] He’s making big time
money and you’re saying stop making that money. So imagine how many
times you’ll have to say this for what period of time. It’s a herculean task,
it takes sometimes centuries to change nations. And you’re trying to change
a nation.”
(S.G. :18:47)
In order to assure a long-term commitment, in his view, the projects needed to be
affiliated with local institutions, projects should be rated according to their sustainability,
not regarding quick results, ribbon cutting and and press coverage. And this sustain-
ability, he was sure, could only be achieved by the aforementioned institutionalisation.
Backed not only by the head of one department, as he said, but by broad support within
the institution, with everyone believing in and depending on its success (S.G. :52:15).
Following his argument, the laptop for schools project would be one such example
for ‘quick results, ribbon cutting and press coverage’. It was lacking the institutional
support within the MoE, run exclusively by Computer Department (CDME), separate
from MoE’s other operations with no obligations or consequence for any of the other
departments.
Similar to Florian’s view Mr. Gopal also doubted that local capacity needed to be
built in all departments and in all provinces. He suspected part of it as the desire to
increase one’s own ethnic group to gain more influence within an institution.
“IT systems are built by IT companies. They implement it and then they
are managed by the respective departments. But these people want, ‘oh
no, give us four people, we’ll develop it ourselves’. So there is a very strong
desire to in-house keep everything. [. . .] everybody wants to build their
empires. [...] So I get a feel that there must be a Hazara or a Pashto sitting
there who wants to get five of his Pashto brothers to come in and get into
the department. Probably that is what is driving him.”
(ibid. [01:06:36])
1 He referred to the argument that computerised systems would reduce the possibilities for individuals
to influence decisions and would make corruption more difficult
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In his opinion the government needed to have more confidence in the private sector and
let the market forces take care of communication and the internet infrastructure. The
government should provide political stability, he added, and simply act as a regulator
(S.G. :1:18:00).
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CHAPTER 8
ICT infrastructure development
“Infrastructure” is, when working with ICT in Afghanistan, an issue one can hardly fail
to address. There have been efforts made to design devices that function ‘independently’,
as in the case of the school laptop. But even those have been shown to depend on
cooperative services, technical or otherwise, to run smoothly. Infrastructure is what
runs “underneath actual structures” (Star & Bowker: 2006) and remains invisible, or
black-boxed, while everything runs the way it has been designed to. The current level of
stability in infrastructure including roads, electricity, water or, more recently, broadband
internet in most of Europe, was reached over centuries of (re)building. Providing
internet access to universities in Afghanistan means reproducing similar conditions
in order to make systems work that are built to run within certain institutional and
organisational structures and depend on certain services. An uninterrupted, steady
supply of electricity is still an exception, as are technologies and services that provide
secure internet access. But the achievements in the area of internet and mobile-phone
penetration are considerable (see also chapter 5.2) and are regarded as a combined effort
of the private sector, the Afghan government and international donor organisations
(Hamdard: 2012:10). When Kabul University received its first satellite dish in 2004,
connectivity was still expensive and not widely available. Since then charges have
dropped steadily, countless ISPs have started their service, internet cafés have opened,
and access and usage have increased exponentially. By the time the Ministry of Higher
Education and the military alliance agreed on a cooperation to connect seven more
provincial sites in 2008, a country-wide fibre optics ring was already under construction.
8.1 The broader infrastructure
I met Ekran Sherzai, who works for the computer directorate (CDMC) of the Ministry
of Communication and Information Technology (MCIT), in his office overlooking one of
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Kabuls busiest traffic intersections. MCIT is among other things also responsible for
the countrywide fibre-optics infrastructure project and I asked him for an interview to
find out more about MCITs work and their involvement in the university connectivity
project.
As I had heard from several people before, Mr Sherzai also emphasised the MCIT as
one of the most productive and effective ministries, the only one indeed that man-
aged to spend around 75% of its core budget, while most ministries only managed to
spend 20 – 25%1 (E. S. :1:24:12). Meanwhile, the telecommunication sector under their
responsibility was one of the most (and one of the few) flourishing sectors in Afghanistan.
Ekram had returned to Kabul from Pakistan in 2002. He had no formal background
in computer science, but described himself as experienced. In 2009, as he said, he
had joined the CDMC at the behest of a close friend and he was now responsible for
information security and cyber defense issues, the assignment of the top-level domain .af
and a number of other projects. As at MoE, Ekram also explained that hiring technical
staff for a government salary was impossible and all technical staff salaries, including
his own, were paid by international organisations (E. S. :1:26:00). Ekram enumerated
all the projects he was involved in and I assumed from his remarks, that he took a
managing, rather than a technical, role. But he made sure to clarify the CDMC’s, and
his own, prominent role within them (E. S. :31:55).
The sheer number of international cooperations on extensive and complex projects he
mentioned being involved in, and often responsible for, whilst simultaneously attending
training abroad and pursuing an online degree in internet governance (E. S. :08:52),
was hard to believe. But later he described in more detailed how these cooperations
were organised. The projects were negotiated between MCIT and international donors
who provided the funding. Implementation was then contracted after a public call for
tenders.
“Installation is always done by the contractors and under our supervision.
Once the project is over, it’s established, the establishment, the entire
operation is run locally by us. We have not outsourced any project so far to
others to run it for us or to report it. We are doing it ourselves. And we are
really working hard on building capacity as well.”
1 These numbers are so low because spending procedures are closely monitored by the donors, even if
they are part of a ministry’s core budget. Spending has to be negotiated and if approved, often gets
delayed or implementation turns out much slower than planned. Most Afghan ministries have low
‘execution capacity’, meaning “even if money is available, it cannot be committed and used”(Jalali:
2008:43).
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(E. S. :34:09)
This suggests that MCIT was not strongly involved in technical decisions and config-
urations, rather they were recipients of systems designed by others but later run and
administrated within the MCIT’s in-house data centre, which Mr. Sherzai described as
the only reliable place to host such data (E. S. :33:04).
CDMC was also one of the main entities managing the country-wide digital infrastructure
project and Ekram Sherzai described it as having been challenging in the rural areas,
but after some initial delays even some of the insecure provinces like Helmand and
Kandahar had been included in the optical fiber ring (E. S. :1:37:57). When I asked
about restrictions or filtering mechanisms he did not delude himself about the possibility
of a watertight filtering process and even the present one had not yet been implemented
by all ISPs. There were several government entities involved in deciding on the content,
he said, when finally the technical implementation was transferred to him (ibid. [1:55:13]).
Hamidullah Qadir works for the Afghan Computer Science Association (ACSA) and
has strong ties with several ministries, in particular the MCIT. He is one of those people
that seem to know everyone, which was why I wanted to hear his perspective. I had
come across him at several ICT related events but only been formally introduced shortly
before and took the opportunity to ask him for an interview. Generally, Mr Quadir
acknowledged that the government decision making was transparent to some extent,
but the problem was that the different government bodies did not understand the laws
and policies around ICT and that everyone had their own interpretation leading to
conflicts between SMEs and the government, but also between different government
entities (H. Q. :2:11:48). Policies, therefore, were according to him, implemented in a
rather arbitrary manner, reinforced by the lack of understanding.
Mr Qadir described the development of the Information Society of Afghanistan as the
main objective of the MCIT and ICT as a major enabler for economic development (ibid.
[1:30:01]), while the biggest obstacles were seen by him in the lack of understanding, the
security situation and the generally high corruption (ibid. [01:25:52]). Though he at-
tested to MCIT’s achievements and altogether good work, he criticised the concentration
on infrastructure. Both the government’s and the internationals’ support was focused
on connectivity instead of developing service and utilisation strategies, he explained.
The provinces had been connected down to the village level, but the government had no
strategy for what should be done with this connectivity. The local staff was still mainly
using phones (H. Q. :2:04:25) (for the full quote see appendix A.5).
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8.2 Project initiation
The initial impulse for the university connectivity project had come from Frederic Tailler
and his team who work for a military public diplomacy (MPD) section of a military
alliance in Europe. There had been similar projects implemented in the region before
and, according to him, they saw it as an opportunity to use a tested approach and
technology for Afghan universities as well. It was uncommon that such a project would
be initiated by one of its donors, instead of being approached for funding, as Fred
explained.
“It was my initiative and that was a new approach, which took so much
internal persuasion work, leaving the botton-up approach and not waiting
until someone would come with an application. Instead we tried with a
top-down approach to cover all needs at a single blow.”
(F. T. :00:23:44)
Fred had been appointed as project coordinator and in 2006, but a first test satellite
dish had already been installed at Kabul University in 2004. Working at the Computer
Centre at Kabul University (CCKU) and the Computer Department of the Ministry of
Higher Education (CDMH) during the same time, I had met Fred repeatedly and could
observe how the project developed over the years and how the plans to expand beyond
Kabul had evolved. When the project was to be expanded, the CDMH was increasingly
involved in the planning and implementation, while the CCKU, which had initially
managed the campus network, withdrew from this task and the network administration
was handed over to the newly established Campus Network Centre (CNC). The necessary
hardware and its configuration had been contracted to companies outside Afghanistan.
According to the project requirements document the following actors are involved:
the Afghanistan Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE), and its network of university
sites across Afghanistan (plus other governmental sites of choice) who act as the End
User. The Military Public Diplomacy Section (MPD) is defined as the Customer, while
the companies contracted for the implementation are the Service Provider. It also states
that the End-User only interfaces with the Customer, who interfaces with the Service
Provider on behalf of the End User (MPD: 2008). Fred explained:
“We have a service contract, it’s all in their hands, once the project is over
they can take the satellite dishes down or leave them there as they prefer. We
have no ownership over the installed material. Pure service contract. And
my support comes from a team that emerged from the [previous] project.”
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(F. T. :30:33)
Mr Tailler was supported in his position by military IT and communications consul-
tants, he explained, who helped with technical tasks like the contract with the satellite
ISP in Europe, or the monitoring of the work of the technical contractors. As was
common for such projects, the international company that won the contract for the
technical implementation, worked with subcontractors in Afghanistan – often interna-
tional companies who specialise in post-conflict environments – that were responsible
for delivering and installing the dishes and the pre-configured hardware in the provinces
(F. T. :00:35:06).
In Afghanistan the MoHE and Kabul University were their primary partners (or
End-Users), later the cooperation was expanded to a selection of universities, appointed
by the MoHE. The choice of universities was controversial, in one case the university
had neither electricity nor any computer related department (or staff) at its disposal.
Mr Tailler made it clear that he was not happy with that choice, but could not easily
interfere with the Ministry’s requests. At the time the Ministry was already quite aware
of its position as a necessary entry point for donors and after a number of failed projects
it was no longer willing to accept any proposal as it had previously done.
The End-User responsibilities included local distribution of the bandwidth to different
facilities within and outwith the universities (Local Area Networks and Metropoli-
tan/Regional Area Networks), as well as user management (MPD: 2008). Typical
university network services like email, a user portal or online storage were not part of
the project.
To get the university chancellors on board for the infrastructure project, they estab-
lished a system where a ‘godfather ’, who was then formally responsible for the project,
needed to sign the application for the grant together with the university chancellor. The
‘godfathers’ Mr Tailler mentioned as examples, were two American women (sic) and one
Afghan American man who were, or had been, working in Afghanistan. Their role was
to supervise, as he explained, and advise the universities during the project execution
on a non-technical level.
“Project-management, project-supervision, making sure that reports are
written the way they should be written. When it comes to evaluating tenders
of course, we are looking for someone to be involved and to have a look when
it comes to determine the winner of such a tender.”
(F. T. :01:02:14)
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Fred visited the country regularly, he mentioned, and also tried to visit all the sites
where dishes were installed. He said he could move freely in many places like Kabul,
Herat or Mazaar but in other areas like Jalalabad or Kunduz the situation was more
tense, in places like Kandahar he even needed a military escort, with armed vehicles
and soldiers securing the area, a scene he described as “not exactly public diplomacy”(F.
T. :01:39:20).
Fred described himself as the central node of the project, as he was the only person who
worked with all involved parties directly. None of his consultants, his team members
in his department or the contracting companies responsible for the implementation
and services had ever been to Afghanistan, as he remarked. So he tried to establish
and keep contact with the partners in Afghanistan where necessary. Locally he was
planning to hold more regular meetings where at least the 14 CNC managers could meet
in person. Currently they tried to establish regular conference calls, he said, but these
often interfered with teaching and other obligations and the whole routine had to be
reorganised. These were small things they had to struggle with, he said (ibid. [01:03:14]).
He tried to encourage them to meet or exchange over the phone, but disappointedly
added he had the impression exchanging information was not something that was done
voluntarily in Afghanistan (ibid. [01:05:20]).
8.2.1 The Ministry of Higher Education Computer Department
The main cooperation partner for Mr Tailler was Fayeq Bezhan in the Ministry for
Higher Education (MoHE). He was a technical advisor to the minister and the head
of the Computer Department (CDMH) there. He belonged to the last generation who
started to study computer science in Kabul during the Taliban regime. There was no
electricity at the time, but the science department possessed one computer to show
to the students and explain the concepts in theory (F. B. :00:03:25). Mr Bezhan had
graduated shortly after the fall of the Taliban and started working as a lecturer in the
computer science department right away. In 2008 he started working for the MoHE as
the head of CDMH, while continuing to work at the neighbouring Kabul University as a
lecturer. We had known each other for several years at the time of the interview, as I
had already been working at the MoHE by the time he started. It had been certainly
partly due to his ambition that the CDMH soon after he got his position expanded
considerably by taking on a number of large projects.
The CDMH was established in 2004 and started to grow in size and importance within
a few years. Initially most universities worked directly with NGOs without the Ministry
being in the loop. Today all IT related projects in higher education need to be registered
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with CDMH.
“In IT now we do not have anything coming from outside [...]. Now we are
planning and proposing to others and then we collect the money.”
(F. B. :01:10:47)
Fayeq strongly believed in all the cooperation CDMH was involved in and presented it
as their accomplishment (for the full quote see appendix A.6). Some of the projects he
mentioned, like CISCO Academies and digital libraries had been running before CDMH
was established and were run by external organisations, though by now probably in
cooperation with CDMH. Others like MPHE and the university websites1 had been
developed and run within Bezhan’s department. Most of the projects CDMH was
involved in were funded externally with only very basic support by the government that
did not even cover all salaries. All the rest of it was covered by international donors
(ibid. [00:14:05])
8.2.2 The University IT staff
Darya Nazri is a graduate from Kabul University (KU) Computer Science and worked as
a network administrator for the Campus Network Centre (CNC) as part of the university
connectivity project. I had known him for several years since I had been working for
the CCKU, an entity famous among KU’s computer science students and for those who
had managed to acquire a membership card, a popular place to hang out after class.
We met for the interview in one of the rooms of the CCKU, but Darya was visibly not
comfortable when people came and left during the interview and we moved to the small
CNC office, a windowless room in the center of the university administration building.
He was one of the few who ask me what the interview will be used for and what exactly
I hope to find out.
Darya grew up in Kabul and, among those I interviewed, was one of the very few
whose family never left the country during the war, so unlike those who had lived in
exile, he first came in contact with ICTs after 2001. He taught himself some computer
science basics, as he explained, before he enrolled for a degree in science at KU. In the
second year of his studies he had started to work for the CCKU, at the time the main
institution that provided IT support and training to the university. There, he said,
1 When last tested (August 2014) most of the university websites were off-line again.
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for the first time, he came in contact with practical ICT work. In the early years the
CCKU was an exceptional facility with internet access, new hardware and advanced
computer training opportunities. It was connected to the first satellite dish that had
been installed in 2004, and was managing the campus network. But the network was
quite improvised, as Dariah described, and only a few offices and computer labs were
connected (D. N. : 2011:25:00). Computers and internet were still very new at the time
and those university members who used them needed lots of support. Currently, Darya
said, the situation was quite different and everyone was familiar with computers and
the internet and it had become an important part in the life of students and teachers
(ibid. [27:33]). Thanks to the fibre optics ring, he added, the internet connections that
were now also available at home were much cheaper than the satellite connections.
I interviewed Noorzad Emani and Khaled Nekzad at a Kabul restaurant where we met
for dinner. I had known and worked with both over several years. Both they and I were
familiar with their excellent reputations as computer scientists at Kabul University and
beyond. They had earned their masters’ degrees abroad and were now working at Kabul
University. They both worked as lecturers, as network administrators for the CCKU
and were involved in the planned IT directorate at Kabul University. In the early years,
they told me, the equipment had been scarce, there were few opportunities for training
and education, and none of their teachers had a master’s degree. The situation at the
university had changed after a few years when more scholarships and programs had
become available and several labs had been built (N. & K. :11:12). Now all faculties were
connected to the internet through the university connectivity project (ibid. [14:14]).
One of the biggest problems they saw was that the university did not have its own
budget. None of the people currently working in IT support were officially part of
the university structure and all depended on external support. The university, as they
described, was aware of the importance of IT and internet connectivity, but not yet to
an extent that it was seen as being important for research. People at university were
not aware what ICT could bring to education, Noorzad and Khaled were sure, not only
the management, but also the lecturers, because they were not research oriented (ibid.
[16:31]) and promotion was not based on research but on other things. For a long time,
they continued to explain, it did not matter what faculty you graduated from, you only
needed a certificate. But now with the increasing number of lecturers with masters’
degrees from other countries this was changing, in their view, and the attitude of the
students was changing as well (ibid. [19:04]). There was lots of money coming to the
university for support, they said, but the university did not do enough to strengthen the
IT directorate; investments were made in the wrong people and projects were duplicated.
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Now Khaled, Noorzad and a few others planned to build up a university network
infrastructure that was more research oriented, all faculties should have access to journals
and have stronger ties with other universities (N. & K. :20:30). So far only a few faculties
had PC labs for students and the internet was mainly for lecturers and administration
and the dormitories.
“Till now the university should have been able to have their own web-servers,
their own data centres, at least their own web platform.”
(N. & K. :23:40)
But instead, they regretted, it did not even have a running website and the electricity
was still regularly down for several hours. Kabul University was the most advanced
university in terms of ICT, they were sure, but there was still no long-term strategy
concerning what it could be used for, how to extend the structures, maintain the systems
and afford the costs in the future.
“ We have solved all the problems with the fiber project, we have centralized
servers, we have local servers at faculties, we have divided the bandwidth
according to needs of faculties – but what do they want to do with it? They
don’t know this. I think the solution is a strategic plan, first drafting it and
then implementing it.”
(ibid. [1:30:51])
They had little confidence in the current system. Noorzad said, he kept encouraging
his colleagues in IT to work on their own solutions and not rely on the government,
because nothing would come from them. But they were convinced everyone had an
interest in good solutions, including the donors, and if they saw a solid plan they would
support it and that would convince others to follow. From the government side they did
not expect much. Most people, they believed, were comfortable in their position and
would never give too much power or responsibility out of their hands. And these people,
Khaled added, did not even understand they could just let the correct bodies do the
work and still get the reward for it (ibid. [1:36:06]).
8.3 Project framework and implementation
8.3.1 MPD
When I met Fred Tailler for the interview in 2011, there were already several universities
and public institutions in Kabul connected, partly via VSAT (Very Small Aperture
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Terminal) dish, partly via the fibre optics ring, which was still under construction. When
the project first started in 2004 there had been no affordable fast internet available
and the goal was to provide some of the bigger universities access to information and
learning resources. The higher education connectivity project was in its second, heavily
delayed, phase. The delay was, according to Mr Tailler, due to ongoing problems with
power supply in some of the provinces, while in others the precarious security situation
had resulted in a reluctance of the contracted companies to go there. Yet no threats
or attempted attacks had been directed against the project itself, according to him,
though the satellite dishes were of considerable size and mostly in full view on one of
the roofs of the universities. At Kandahar University, he described, the 3,80m dish had
been on top of a three story building for more than a year already, causing no problems
so far (F. T. :01:14:01). In most provinces, he went on, the dishes were installed,
running and used during the day. At the time the total bandwidth was 43Mbit/s down
and 14Mbit/s up shared by all included universities and government entities1. The
connection was not split between the universities, as he said, so if all others shut down,
one entity could use the entire bandwidth (ibid. [51:03]) though this was described
slightly differently by the network administrator of KU. Fred explained that there was
no prioritising of any kind, as the usage seemed more effective if they just gave free
access to people. There also was, he continued, no monitoring or analysis system yet.
The only interference was the government ordered filtering system that all ISPs had to
follow since 2010 and that they would comply with as well, implemented at the hub
in Europe (ibid. [00:53:28]). As to which exact sites are blocked, Mr Tailler did not know.
The university connectivity project consisted of several components, as Fred described.
Providing bandwidth was one. Providing extra grants for the networking-infrastructure
on campus another. Each university could submit an application for funding of their
ICT infrastructure in the region of 150 – 250 000€ which was, as he added, usually
given sympathetic consideration. They had recently established the ‘Afghan first policy’
and now paid particular attention that the funds were given to local companies (F. T.
:00:12:47). However, experience had shown him that the universities often had difficulties
implementing their plans and actually spending the money (ibid. [00:35:53]), which
also contributed to the above mentioned delays. Another component of the university
connectivity project, Fred went on, was technical training for the network managers.
Some of it had been outsourced to a two to three week training in “how to manage an
academic network” as well as “cybersecurity” at universities in Europe (F. T. :00:41:34).
1 For comparison: at the same time the average connection speed in Ireland was 6.1Mbit/s (Akamai:
2011)
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Figure 8.1: The selected locations for the connectivity project (source: MPD (2008))
And part of the trainings were organised locally by the CDMH. Having an IT training
facility in Kabul, as the CDMH requested would, in Mr Tailler’s view, solve many
problems for them, like the trouble of getting visas for Afghans (F. T. :00:44:03).
“Its special appeal would lie in holding the training locally. Not having
to bring people out. Simply for logistic reasons. And beyond that maybe
offering not only training for the universities but for general administration.
[. . .] Computer usage, general skills, from basic to high-level.”
(F. T. :00:44:03)
What he failed to mention, or might not have been aware of, was that such facil-
ities existed at both the MoHE and the university. Considering the small number
of administrators involved it was not the premises or even the technical equipment
where the deficiencies lay, but the lack of qualified staff and funding for extensive training.
At the universities there was usually the chancellor or one of the vice-chancellors
involved, who had the leading position, although according to Fred, “to call it a ‘team’
might be a bit exaggerated”, and generally consisted of one or two IT people “if we are
lucky” (F. T. :01:06:23). Some universities like Kabul or Herat were better equipped
with well trained staff, but Fred admitted that to be more of an exception. Fred said he
knew that this could not be a sustainable solution to place the whole responsibility on
one person with little experience. Through further training they tried to recruit more
people, but he was also aware of the challenge to keep technical staff on a government
salary in a job that was not even official part of the government pay system, which would
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at least have offered some stability and career prospects1. The MoHE had promised to
equip all universities with sufficient IT positions, Fred explained, with decent salaries so
they could work with original university structures instead of ‘alien elements’. This was
currently causing him some problems. (F. T. :00:40:18).
Therefore finding competent cooperation partners at the universities was described as
one major issue. Most universities did not even have the technical expertise to write
the application for the campus wiring grant,Fred worried. They could not translate
their technical ‘needs’ into a plan that would be valid for funding. The weak points, as
he admitted, remained the payment and training of local staff at the universities, to
maintain and administrate the network in the future.
“Well Afghans, we’ll have to find some. We actually do not have funding
for salaries, you know, that is our big handicap, it is [military policy]. So
we depend on finding cooperation partners and make a deal with them. [...]
There are other projects that receive some bandwidth from us, 1 Mbit maybe,
and they pay the salaries in return for network management on the ground.”
(F. T. :00:38:08)
.
The administrators usually belonged to the young generation which often could
not assert itself sufficiently to implement their own ideas in conflict with established
structures, Fred explained. They had to compromise with superiors that had no
experience with ICT whatsoever and, in many cases, failed to understand the significance
of it (F. T. :00:57:15). The biggest problem apart from institutional integration,
however, remained the lack of experience. Decisions regarding technical details were
made beforehand by the implementing company in Europe, if something did not work
correctly, there was no one on the ground to fix it.
“When it comes to routing problems and someone who is sitting at UCL in
London [...] then that is pretty far away. At the same time, locally there is
no one capable to offer a solution for the routing problem either.” (for the
full quote see appendix A.7)
(F. T. :01:10:17)
1 “Pay policy is set centrally for all public employees in Afghanistan. [...] through years of service and
regular promotions (once every three years), staff in lower positions of authority can occupy a higher
grade and earn a higher salary than their managers” (AREU: 2012:93f)
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Though he had travelled to most of the universities, Fred Tailler admitted it was often
difficult to get a clear picture of the actual situation there and they soon realised they
could not rely on their government partners’ estimations. They felt misinformed about
the actual conditions at the universities which were much worse than they had expected
(F. T. :00:46:14). Fred gave an example where the lack of both technical experience and
institutional support led to conflicts. The equipment had been delivered to a particular
university in June the previous year and had not been connected a year later. They
had received the infrastructure grant but it took them too long to obtain offers and
spend the money. When, eventually, they had bought the generator, discussions had
started with the MoHE over who would provide petrol, which was an issue that several
universities still complained about and that had still not been settled. In his view the
government took it for granted that the project would cover all additional costs, when
in fact the Ministry had signed an agreement to reimburse expenses for generator fuel
(ibid. [00:48:23]). Therefore, the internet was at most sites only running during the day,
as soon as the generator was switched off the campus was oﬄine.
Mr Tailler clearly realised that the experience needed for planning and administrating
a campus network of the kind they envisaged for the universities could not be acquired
within the few weeks training they offered. Not even those with a master’s degree, who
were regarded as the best qualified IT professionals, could solve all the problems, as he
said. The instability of local conditions and the vulnerability of the network, due to a
lack of expertise, were just accepted as inconvenient factors.
8.3.2 CDMH
Fayeq Bezhan’s statements, regarding the university connectivity project, often contrast
with Frederique Tailler’s view. Fayeq clearly saw the university connectivity project as
part of CDMH’s responsibility and referred to it as our (CDMH’s) work.
“The concept of [the connectivity for] Afghanistan project is to provide
network and structure for universities, the electricity, support of electricity
and the internet connection. So this is the concept of the Afghanistan
[connectivity] project. We have completed four Kabul based universities,
now we complete Nangahar university, now we have Internet connection
for Mazaar, for Herat, for Bamiyan university and now we’re working to
provide for others as well. So 18 universities is under support of [university
connectivity] project.”
(F. B. :00:22:16)
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From his perspective, the CDMH was in charge of the project planning and imple-
mentation and the military alliance only provided the funding. The project extension
from neighbouring countries to Afghanistan was, according to him, initiated following a
request by the Afghan president in 2008. The CDMH had then, he explained, in cooper-
ation with the universities applied for money and facilities from the military alliance (for
the full quote see appendix A.8). When the applications were approved, Fayeq continued,
they started a public bidding process and the company who won the bid implemented
the project in cooperation with CDMH and the universities (ibid. [00:28:41]). The
initial server configuration had been done by a company from Uzbekistan, but apart
from the hardware and funding, he added, CDMH did everything (ibid. [00:29:33]).
This, however, had not always been the case. Before 2009, he felt, they had not been
involved sufficiently. They did not have qualified staff back then, he admitted, and the
coordination between ministries, universities and the military alliance was very bad, but
now CDMH had a team working with the universities for the connectivity project.
“Before that everything, it was at that time running by the foreign peoples
and we were not enough involved in the project so at that time we had a lot
of problems, but now it’s ok.”
(F. B. :00:30:31)
What sounded like a contradiction to me first, that both CDMH and the MPD felt
they were in charge of the project, also made sense when considering the different
perspectives and interaction they were involved in. From CDMH’s perspective, before
2009 they had not been involved in the project. Now they had received an important
role, they had to help the universities apply for money, organise the wiring, select
administrators and ‘only’ received money and ‘the technology’. The preceding deci-
sions and the details of the configuration and implementation remained invisible to them.
Like Mr Tailler, Fayeq explained the difficulty to find appropriate staff at the univer-
sities and that the short trainings in Europe were not sufficient for those who are not
computer scientists (F. B. :00:25:59). He suggested the planned video conference between
the CCMH and the universities would help to solve some of the network management
problems, because with video they could show the administrators how to configure the
network (ibid. [00:45:52]).
Apart from the difficulty in assigning sufficient bandwidth for such a video link -
45Mbits/s shared between several universities is still not a lot, it would probably depend
on the completion of the optical fibre ring - it can also be seen as rather uncommon to
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use video for network configuration issues, when a remote log-in over the network with
a shared desktop would seem to be much more useful. The video equipment had most
likely been suggested to him by one of the donors and he used the cooperation as an
argument to support this.
Like the MPD Fayeq also requested a stronger commitment by the government. In
his view there was still not enough understanding regarding ICT and digitisation, and
his biggest worry was how salaries and connectivity would be financed in the future.
“Still I’m worried about that, the universities, the stability of the universities,
internet connection and such things. Because still we bring everything from
the support of the foreign countries, the [military alliance] and other. If
we do not have support of them, how can the government of Afghanistan
provide such facility with the budget of Afghanistan?”
(F. B. :00:35:04)
Apart from that he was pleased with how things were going, he said, in particular with
his department, which he described as superior to any Computer Department at the
other ministries (ibid. [01:12:46]). Fayeq did not mention any further cooperation, like
the ‘godfathers’ Mr Tailler had talked about. He presented himself as the main person
in charge and demonstrates confidence that his department was capable taking over
full responsibility for the project and could address the current problems like capacity
building and institutional support. Mr Tailler is only indirectly addressed as a member
of the military alliance – the donor – never in his position as a project coordinator.
What Mr Tailler described as a future plan – the MPD’s withdrawal from the project –
seemed from Fayeq’s perspective, already very real.
8.3.3 CCKU and CNC
When Darya started working at the CCKU, with the first satellite dish connected,
he was able to gain some experience in network administration. When the university
connectivity project was expanded to connect all faculties via fibre optics, he was offered
a position in the newly established Campus Network Centre (CNC) (D. N. : 2011:30:42).
All issues concerning the internal campus network are the responsibility of the CNC
(ibid. [35:38]). With his experience with networking, Darya said he did not need much
training and quickly got used to the devices. He explained they had full control and
were planning some improvements in the future (ibid. [35:56]). At Kabul University, he
added, they had few problems and already seven years of experience running a network.
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They only needed some support at the very beginning but at other universities they
had very little experience and were struggling with very basic problems (ibid. [41:57])
According to Darya, the bandwidth was divided for all faculties according to their
needs, but the network was also closely monitored and when requirements shifted, they
could change the configuration. He explained there were also no filters installed and
access to internet was completely free (ibid. [50:50]). The government ordered filtering
was one of the issues that still needed to be implemented, but so far there were no
complaints from any side (ibid. [53:31]). His statements show that when working with
the system, some configurations are changed, like the the monitoring and the filtering,
that had been described by Mr Tailler quite differently.
Darya was careful about commenting on flaws and mentioned none of the problems
with the network I had heard of and even experienced myself during visits to CDKU.
Though he was an experienced administrator, which was acknowledged by his former
colleagues, the network was not as stable and uninterrupted as he described it (partly
for reasons beyond his influence, according to Noorzad and Khaled). Furthermore his
positive picture might result from firstly, his affiliation with and loyalty to CDMH,
where he served as the networking expert. And secondly, his discomfort with CCKU,
where he had worked previously and received most of his admin training. His transition
to a better paid job at the neighbouring CNC had raised some discussions. While his
personal reasons for accepting the offer were mostly seen as legitimate, the university
connectivity project was accused of poaching IT experts from CCKU after they had
been trained there for several years.
Noorzad and Khaled were among those who were much more sceptical about the
University connectivity project. They criticised that neither the network planning nor
the maintenance had been given enough consideration. According to them, the network
contained a so-called ‘single point of failure’ (see also figure 8.2), meaning if one switch
failed, the rest of the faculties were disconnected (N. & K. :00:25:24).
When the campus fibre network was planned, Noorzad and Khaled explained, no
one at the university, neither students nor lecturers, had experience in how to build a
campus network, so the military alliance did most of the work, but without sufficient
consideration of the situation on the ground.
“Just they come with one idea. You can bring a server here, that’s not a
problem, they have money, they can bring. But here in this side there was
nobody to maintain the server, to work with that, to administrate the system.
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Figure 8.2: The Kabul University campus network structure (source: Saay (2009))
There was nobody. And they did not include that in the plan. We have now,
they connected all faculties but we have very basic technical problems. They
put a firewall in and the firewall is a simple PC. For maybe 600 connections.
Of course it cannot work for 600 connections, if the connection number is
very high, just the PC goes down and disconnect the people. That’s very
basic problem, but they didn’t plan anything. They have just money, ok do
this do that.”
(ibid. [28:29])
The same mistakes were now being repeated at the other universities, they said. The
lack of a strategy and the short term thinking was seen by them as the main problem.
There were no long-term concepts, they just planned for the current year and current
project, spent the money and failed to think about what would happen after that (ibid.
[30:03]). The universities had no IT budget, they explained, no overall estimation of
costs, everything was dealt with just in time by separate entities, but no one knew what
the situation would be like in a couple of months (N. & K. :39:40). The problem, as
they saw it, was not necessarily the lack of technical expertise, but a consistent strategy.
“Now we have these people with experience and knowledge. So we make the
plan and when it’s ready in some weeks we will make a draft, share it with
faculty authorities, when we have all comments from ministries and foreign
partners, then we will finalise and they can choose any part they want based
on this plan.”
(N. & K. :26:09)
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Like Fayeq from the CDMH, they felt they had the necessary experience now and did
not need external entities making decisions for them anymore. They had developed a
plan that they hoped to be convincing enough to receive support. The money was not
the problem. They were, as they said, regularly approached by different donors asking
what they needed (ibid. [49:43]). The more challenging part would be to convince the
other stakeholders.
The unsolved issues of the maintenance, according to them, were already visible now,
even while the universities still received the external support. When I asked about
the network security Khaled laughed “there is no security” and Noorzad added “the
system is open” (ibid. [02:15:11]). It was configured for 100 users, they explained, but
10,000 were using it and the only person who knew a bit about security was Darya.
Like him, Noorzad and Khaled said, those few better qualified administrators at the
universities were additionally involved in many other responsibilities, be it teaching,
network administration or helping with any technical planning (N. & K. :51:29). Simply,
computer scientists were urgently needed at all universities and the numbers were still
low.
8.4 Project continuation
Providing connectivity by VSAT is much more expensive than fibre optic connection
would be. Fred explained the satellite dishes were only seen as a temporary solution
until coverage with fibre optics and WiMax was completed (F. T. :01:17:47) and would
replace the dishes with lower running costs. The project was planned to merge into a
regional academic network cooperation, he said, that was also expected to cover some of
the ongoing costs and the military alliance would withdraw entirely. The current phase
of the project had secured funding till summer 2013 and was expected to be extended
beyond that.
Whether the lack of institutional support and integration would change any time soon
was unclear. Currently most costs were covered by international organisations directly,
they were not in the ‘core budget’ and channelled through the Ministry of Finance. So
according to Fayeq Bezhan, the government was not even aware of most of the costs.
“Everybody think that the internet is free. So still I’m worried, if we give
this proposal to the government that we are using $100 000/ months for
the internet for example it will be a shock for the government. [...] we are
always sending the record of the finance and such things to the government
because they have to know that internet is not free. [. . .] they are thinking
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if such things are coming free, why we should be worried about that?
(F. B. :00:56:37)
With the increased interest in ICT and also an increasing dependency on digital
communication and administration within government entities like the MoHE, attention
to ICT, however, was according to several interviews, expected to grow.
Altogether Fayeq Bezhan was very optimistic about the achievements and current
developments in the ICT field, especially at the universities and among the younger
generation (F. B. :01:04:24). Only with the help of ICT, he was sure, problems like
corruption and the slow work pace in Afghanistan, could be solved (ibidd. [1:05:44]). At
the time of the interview most students owned a laptop and used the internet, hardware
prices had gone down and internet was, at least in the cities, widely available (D. N.
: 2011:56:20). Within a few short years most universities had been connected to the
internet, and Darya described the recent developments at the universities as entirely
positive. They had the latest technologies, he described, knew how to use CISCO
devices and Linux and had very well trained technical staff (ibid. [58:34]). However,
it is not clear if with he was mainly referring to Kabul University. Darya described
only positive changes in the field of technology, and in his view the situation had
improved on every level (ibid. [1:00:34]). Like Fayeq he was convinced that in the field
of technology it was only financially that Afghanistan depended on other countries, on a
professional level he felt people were ready (ibid. [01:05:05]) and he was together with the
CDMH working on several IT projects for the universities, to present to potential donors.
Though working at the same university, Darya was not involved in the plans Noorzad
and Khaled were working on, despite similar goals. Both approaches, it seemed, resulted
from the same frustration with inefficient donor led projects, as Darya explained.
“ We have experienced many funders coming and going back, so we have
experience of working with them and from that experience now we have
reached to the point that we have our own plans and if someone comes, a
funder comes to help, then we propose them the project we have and they
can help in implementing it.”
(D. N. : 2011:37:22)
There were too many donors at once, he complained, and each came with their own
interest and rules, sometimes leading to duplications. But the situation was changing,
now “they directly contact with us” (ibid. [38:47]).
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Khaled and Noorzad were much more sceptical regarding the current situation. They
did not see the awareness of the importance of ICT at the university and among the
deans of the faculties. One of the training courses the CCKU offered was for one
candidate from each faculty to support the faculty in administrating the network and
looking after the PCs. But in some cases, they described, the deans did not even grant
these faculty administrators access to the hardware room where the switch was located
or else favouritism played a bigger role in choosing a suitable candidate than computer
abilities. There was no awareness, not even among the lecturers, about what ICT could
contribute to academic life and to research.
“They don’t have a plan for doing research so if they have a plan for doing
the research, then they will have a plan for needing the supporting tools
[. . .]. If they know that the supporting tools are important, they will look
for the ways how to get it. And if someone is training free administrators
for them they will really appreciate this. And they will push this. But I
know that they don’t know the complexity behind it, but still they don’t
understand the importance of it.”
(N. & K. :42:33)
Fundamental problems at the university also influenced decisions concerning ICT,
Khaled and Noorzad explained. There was no academic competition among the lecturers,
faculties or with other universities and the faculties had no strategy or plan how to
improve their performance. If they did, the first thing they would encounter is IT (ibid.
[42:33]). They suggested that there needed to be more productive scientific competition.
At the moment the rivalry was more about the number of PCs or labs, not about what
they were actually doing with them.
The same thing happened, in their eyes, with projects that came to the university;
people came from abroad and started working on them. They offered short trainings,
but there was no strategy for their future usage, and the local partners did not know
how to continue. Bringing IT expertise in is one thing and very important and necessary,
in their view, but the local conditions also have to be taken into consideration. The
training, the work and conditions needed to be adapted (N. & K. :1:50:00). The money
was there, they were sure, but there was no path to follow. The projects hired someone
locally, made that person responsible for a while and when the project was finished, it
was over, they said (N. & K. :59:23). But they did not blame the internationals only:
The problem was also from their own side, they added, “we should have the capacity to
receive it.” (ibid. [1:51:29]).
The dependency on international money was something Khaled and Noorzad were also
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aware of. Though the CCKU was often seen as technology flagship project, an IT
capacity multiplier and independently maintained at the moment, if the funding stopped,
they were sure, it would disappear within a month.
“ It’s like taking some people who don’t know swimming by ship in the
middle of the sea and then throwing them in the sea and taking the ship
away (laughs). Everyone will die.”
(N. & K. :1:52:40)
The university should start preparing for times when the international money will
stop, they claimed, the CCKU could offer paid services, but they were not allowed to do
that. And with the universities having no budget of their own and all cash flows being
transferred through the Ministry of Finance, it would pass through too many hands
anyway, they added, to ever return (ibid. [1:54:19]).
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CHAPTER 9
ICT capacity building
A lot of the criticism to technology driven projects was directed to the lack of “context
awareness”. The provision of equipment is regularly mistaken with that of a running
system, in particular, in a context where technologies cannot simply be “connected”
into an existing infrastructure. One outcome is that of technology not even being
used – whether for technical or for social reasons. Another, probably more common
outcome, is the time-span during which a technology can be run without any maintenance
or intervention being needed. This provides an opportunity for a successful report,
displaying images of groups of happy users, but the real results show only months after
external support is cut. The lack of ICT literacy has been identified as one of the
main reasons for these failures and most ICT projects now include capacity building,
or even declare it as the main goal. ICT Capacity building and training as part of
the implementation activities are some 12% of the most common recommendations in
ICT4D literature (Gomez: 2013). Capacity building is focused on (re)building missing
capacities and predominantly places knowledge and expertise on one side, and the
necessity to learn on the other. It usually comes with a predefined concept of institutions
and management or in regard to ICT with a preconfigured system that needs to be
understood and adopted. Capacity building is a similarly blurry concept as participation.
Who decides which capacities need to be built, how they should be built, and for how
long training and support should last? As described in chapter 3.2, and seen in the two
previous chapters, the way ICT is perceived – as an independent tool, as an enabling
structure or as an end in itself – strongly influences how capacity building is discussed.
InfoDev (2010) suggests a three stage model of ICT integration in education, based on
the UNESCO (2008) ICT competency standards:
• the technology literacy approach, that enables technology integration
• the knowledge deepening approach, that enables one to apply knowledge to solving
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complex, real-world problems
• the knowledge creation approach, that enables to innovate and produce new
knowledge
There is a multitude of “capacities” one could link to ICT, but these three stages
offer suitable approaches to be linked to ICT capacity building in the education sec-
tor in Afghanistan. This chapter aims to take a closer look at these different forms
of ICT capacity building as they have been observed in the field, what these efforts
aim to achieve and what significance is given to them by project leaders and participants.
Apart from the demand for stronger institutional support (often linked with the
questions of long-term funding), issues surrounding questions of “ICT capacity” seem to
be most critical. In Afghanistan, due to the decades of war, most of the urban elite left
the country, and there remains a serious shortage of professionals skilled in ICT (United
Nations: 2009). Florian Peukert criticised the lack of sufficiently trained personnel
among the local partners (F. P. a :1:11:18). Similarly, the university connectivity project
struggled to find qualified personnel at the universities. Teachers felt they had not been
sufficiently prepared and trained for the new technology they were expected to work
with. The young ICT professionals, on the other hand, were well aware of their status as
experienced computer scientists who no longer wanted to follow poorly coordinated and
prepared international guidance. Their capacity included the potential to gain control.
9.1 Kabul University
In 2002 when the number of international organisations supporting Afghanistan went
up but power supply was still marginal, private IT and English training courses were
already in great demand. Christine Olson, who worked for the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) as a coordinator for several ICT projects in higher
education, had returned to work in Kabul shortly after the fall of the Taliban. She
had a particular interest in distance learning and ICT for education and was positively
surprised about the interest in technology.
“The public system wasn’t doing anything about IT and was doing very
badly anything in English but these courses, these private courses were trying
to teach IT and typically they had between two to five computers in a room,
but the demand was such that they were running - this is in Herat, Mazaar,
Nangahar and of course in Kabul [...] they were running from five am to
nine at night, that’s how much the demand was.”
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(C. O. :23:33)
The prices were as high as $30/month, which was a huge sum at the time when little
money could be made for the average Afghan family, but people were ready to pay these
amounts. The quality of this training was usually low and very basic, but the first of its
kind.
Figure 9.1: IT and English training centre on the outskirts of Kabul (source: the au-
thor)
The past decades of war had caused serious damage to Kabul University. Before
2001, the science department had no electricity, there was no digital infrastructure
and the internet was banned, the university possessed only one computer for hardware
demonstration purposes and other computer science classes like programming, were only
taught using pen and paper. When international aid money and attention entered the
country, the universities received significant attention.
Rabeha Karim and Uzma Rezai, two young computer science lecturers at Kabul Univer-
sity were among the first generation of students who started studying computer science
after the Taliban regime collapsed. Back then, computer science was part of the science
faculty, with most of the lecturers having no experience in computer science at all. Others
had just graduated from the same faculty themselves and had little more experience
than their students. Occasionally for those subjects international scholars were hired
for the short-term (R. K. :22:44) but the language barrier was often a problem in these
cases. There was no proper curriculum and, especially in subjects like programming, it
was hard to find suitable staff at all. Both Rabeha and Uzma started working at the
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Computer Centre (CCKU) early on, which was their only possibility for practical work
(R. K. :05:13). Other students went to additional computer classes outside university for
training or visited internet cafés, often in the evenings. Neither of these were an option
for girls, unless a relative would accompany them. With lower prices of devices and
the expansion of the digital infrastructure on campus, as well as in the bigger cities in
general, access and availability of ICT has improved considerably in subsequent years,
while the quality of ICT education remains contested.
Mr Fidai, an Afghan-European scholar who teaches at a European university and
works as a consultant for ICT and higher education in Afghanistan, judged the quality
of education in general as not at any level that could compare with higher education
internationally. He described computer science and IT as one of those areas that received
particular attention (T. F. :21:12). 12 years earlier there had been no (real) computer
science at Kabul University. In 2008 their computer science department was turned
into an independent faculty and by 2011 three more computer science faculties had
been established at public universities and various others at private institutes. But
in his opinion it was done too quickly. At some of these new faculties the lecturers
had just graduated themselves and were already expected to help develop a curriculum
(ibid. [21:08]). The government’s current answer to the rising number of students was
expanding universities, but the quality of the education could, in his view, not keep
pace and the number of jobs did not match the number of graduates, in particular, once
the international organisations started to leave (ibid. 38:21).
The increased interest in technology was not primarily due to the international aid
programmes, as Mr Fidai explained, but a development that came naturally through
neighbouring countries.
“Obviously the people of Afghanistan can not live in an isolation with the
rest of the world. So if some of them visit Pakistan, Iran, the neighbouring
countries, Dubai, etc. they will see the technology over there. The majority
of them now own their mobile telephone and the young generation is very
keen to learn computers and obviously every one is trying to have a car, a
vehicle so they cannot escape from the technology. [...] especially the young
generation, is very keen to learn technology. But sadly again the government
hasn’t got any proper plan.”
(T. F. :42:55)
With several million Afghans living in exile during the time of Taliban rule, the
demand for services and new technologies entered the country together with the returning
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population. The majority of the Afghan interview participants had lived abroad and
reported using digital tools before moving back and finding it initially difficult to do
without.
9.2 Computer literacy - enabling technology integration
Computer literacy training programms flooded Afghanistan after 2001, when prior
knowledge was literally non-existent and anyone with a PC and electricity could offer
such training. It was still the most common one, mostly concentrating on office software,
web search and digital communication. The high demand for English and computer
classes was also reflected in international aid programmes and induced countless ICT
training programmes and facilities at universities and other public institutions, including
“capacity building” in using digital tools. This computer literacy or learn how to use a
tool or a system approach is the most commonly observed type of ICT capacity building
in both the literature and also observed in the field.
One of these support programs was the Afghan Digital Learning Union (ADLU) that
started its capacity building effort at Kabul University and later expanded to nine more
universities as described in their final report:
“[The Afghan Digital Leaning Union (ADLU)] project was designed to build
the capacity of faculty members and higher education administrators to
enable them to support the provision of quality education and enlightened
public policy for the Afghan people.”
(USAID: 2011)
This included eLearning centres offering basic IT training, eLearning and web design
courses, and English language instruction for professors, university staff, and students
(USAID: 2011). The centre at Kabul University opened in 2007 and included a lab
with around 20 PCs and was open for all students to use. It had changing staff, usually
short-term trainers from the US or South Africa. Though the project’s goals were
generally seen as relevant and useful, it was confronted with a number of problems
during its implementation that were also observed in similar projects.
At the time I visited the centre, it had been handed over to a new coordinator,
Christine Olson, who was charged with preparing the project for its final phase – to
be handed over – and was not too happy with the results. The budget had been
underestimated, most of it had been spent on subcontractors and few of the initial
goals had been achieved or maintained, as Christine explained (C. O. :01:50). The
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Figure 9.2: Basic computer training classes at the MoHE (source: the author)
project’s declared focus group had been lecturers and faculty staff tasked to build a
lasting capacity in the faculties, but as they had been reluctant to attend the training,
they had trained students instead who were more willing to come. They had also focused
too much on IT and neglected the English component, in her view, which made most
of the computer and software classes inaccessible to those who spoke only Pashto or
Dari (ibid. [06:45]). For the basic computer classes they had local computer science
graduates, but most of them left the university for better jobs and they frequently had
to be replaced. When Christine took over, there was no standardised curriculum and
no consistent course content, as the courses depended entirely on the trainers they had
at the different universities. So she decided to introduce the international computers
drivers license (ICDL) and hire only certified teachers (C. O. :50:29) (for the full quote
see appendix A.9).
For the digital library component it was planned to digitise books and thus make them
available to more staff and students and set up a catalogue system. But the librarians
were trained by a team from the US and after they left no one followed up on them, so
the system was not in use. Only after they had hired local staff with a background in
library science could the project be continued. They established a mentoring system
where the librarians were treated as partners, with more responsibility, which also
motivated them to use the computerised system (ibid [55:21]).
Rabeha, then a computer science student, attended one of the training courses at the
centre and experienced it as confusing and badly prepared. Before starting the course,
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CCKU first had to help them install a new operating system on their PCs (R. K. :42:21).
The trainers had come from South Africa, she explained, and despite her experience
with IT she did not understand what they wanted and what the course was about.
“He was not able to clearly define what he wants, so we couldn’t understand
what he wanted. But I know there was a system and it had some modules,
he was asking us to develop some more modules.[...] And after it was finished
they gave some certificates to us (laughs) and it was very strange.”
(R. K. :42:21)
In Khaled’s view, the training centre was only a burden to CCKU. They were calling
CCKU every day to help them with technical issues and as the training centre was part
of the university, CCKU felt obliged to help. If they did not help, CCKU worried, the
chancellor might complain (N. & K. :00:31:03).
The project had started with the goal to build capacity with little consideration for
the local circumstances. Electricity and internet connection turned out to be major
problems, but also the interest and attendance of the focus group was low and the
technical course preparation insufficient. “Providing access” as a first step to capacity
building still predominantly concentrated on the hardware, with little attention to
the dependencies and – in a European/American context – invisible systems that this
hardware is embedded into. The local partners were given no active role in preparing the
provision of access and technologies, and could thus not contribute to its appropriation.
They are only asked for help, as Rabeha and Khaled described, to fix urgent problems
during the course of the project.
9.3 Institutional capacity building – solving real world problems
The second most common complaint regarding ICT implementation in the education
sector was the lack of understanding and support of ICT at institutional level, a
particular problem also mentioned by those working with or for government institutions.
Similar examples have been given from CDME and CDMH, the Computer Departments
of the relevant ministries, who mostly described themselves as being in a difficult
position to stand against this attitude. With little interest from the government and a
high demand for technical expertise, they depend entirely on international funds and
projects to maintain their status. And to fulfil the requirements to attract these funds,
and maintain the technical systems, considerable efforts were being made in terms of
institutional capacity building. Hameed Daoud from the MoE also addressed this issue
repeatedly during the interview;
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“We [should] provide first the human capacity, to maintain whatever we
develop. If we don’t have the manpower, to provide the future coming
support, then it’s better not to build. Because, I’ll give you an example of
ministry of communication. Yes they do have the fibre optic now, they do
have the data centre. But what is the usability? We have the fibre optic ring
almost completed, but when I say lets connect these locations, there is no
technical expertise, or it is damn slow. They have spend, I don’t know, 800
million or something? But we’re not taking full advantage. It’s because we
don’t have the capacity. [...] Because technical expertise can not be found in
a day. Or in a year.”
(H. D. :57:29)
The most common procedure for public sector ICT projects was also illustrated by
the laptop and the infrastructure projects. Digital tools or systems are developed and
implemented by external contractors; operation and maintenance are expected to be
organised by the governmental project partners, in these cases the technology sections
of the ministries. With little trust in (and also experience with) other entities, such
tasks are not outsourced but instead “capacity” is hired or build in-house.
9.3.1 The Management Platform for Higher Education (MPHE)
In 2008, the MoHE hired Baseer Mohammad Omar, who had previously worked as a
system developer for the MoE, but came with no clear assignment to MoHE. I remember
when we started at the CDMH and no one knew what he was doing and when I
interviewed him he explained that his mission was also not clear to him at the start
and the task he was given was changed on a daily basis (B. M. O. :01:00:40). For the
development of a student management system there was, at the time, an Indian company
and an Afghan developer already hired by two other donors and Baseer was asked to
evaluate these systems and he started a system analyses for the Ministry.
It took him several months to scrutinise the current paper-based system the universities
and the ministry were working with and to translate that into a digital version. Someone
from outside would not have brought the necessary understanding for such a system,
since it was fundamental to know it from within. I remember him spending days
interviewing and visiting different ministry administration sections and drawing sketches
from the routines. And he also needed to find the right way to present his results to the
ministry people, he described, who did not have the technical understanding about how
such a system would work. It took him six hours, he explained, to present the system
requirements because he needed to make it simple and visual enough to understand. He
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finally recommended the use of one of the currently developed systems to the Deputy
Minister, and to customise the system according to their needs. But the Deputy Minister
told him to develop a new system from what he had presented. So he had to start from
scratch, he explained, and with no guidance from anyone because no one in the MoHE
understood the technical requirements (B. M. O. :01:15:35).
He completed the work in 2011 after about two years. During the whole time he had
no supervision, but received many complaints, as he said, because it took him so long
and no one was able to understand why and what exactly he was doing. In 2011 Fayeq
Bezhan told him to finish the database, Baseer mentioned, and they got into a fight.
“ When I show him he told me: ok you finished. I told him: this is finished,
ja? I asked him: how do you understand it’s finished? He told me ja, when
I saw. [I told him:] you don’t know by yourself, how you can tell me that I
finished? He became angry.”
(B. M. O. :01:25:19)
The system was at the time of the interviews running in test-mode, but not ready
for web-based services. When Norzai and Khaled, in their position as university IT
support, met with Baseer to get an idea of the system, he could not answer most of
their questions, as Khaled described, but also did not feel responsible for these parts.
He only took care of the database aspect, but “it has database part, it has programming
part, it has network part, it has IT part, there is hosting and these things” (N. & K.
:01:18:18) (for the full quote see appendix A.10).
In 2011 Abdul, a young computer scientist who had just returned from completing
his master’s in Europe, joined the project and after Baseer left the ministry shortly
after, he took over. They had started testing in 2011 at four Kabul based universities,
as Fayeq told me, including training for 140 university employees (F. B. :20:53) and
Fayeq was very optimistic about its implications.
“For example if we implement a [MPHE], I’m sure we will decrease the load
of the work for MoHE and the universities to at least around 50%. And we
will make at least 50% faster the working process. So nobody can do any
corruption if we implement this.”
(F. B. :01:15:11)
The introduction of such a student and teacher administration system would need
secure country-wide power and internet supplies, security and back-up solutions for the
server. Staff would have to be trained how to administer the system at all universities and
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it would, apart from the technical challenges, also mean a complete about-turn in how
the universities were currently run and organised. It would reorganise responsibilities
and duties and make certain positions in the current manual process redundant. Its
above mentioned limiting effect on corruption also meant cutting privileges and filling
loopholes, which might not be seen as a welcome change at all universities.
Since 2011 the project has been supported by a number of other donors, but by 2012
it was still not completed. The universities did not fully support and implement the
system, and the incomplete state of the system itself also prevented its adoption (ZiiK:
2012).
9.3.2 Private sector ICT capacity
Iqbal Muhammad is a young Afghan computer scientist who worked for an international
NGO in IT for several years before starting a software development company with some
friends and now mainly works for international organisations and government entities. He
emphasised that all their employees hold international degrees and certificates, as Afghan
degrees count for very little. Similar to most international consultants, his judgement
of the quality of public sector ICT staff was critical. Those with an international
education looked for better paid jobs or jobs where they had better career and training
opportunities. So the government ended up either with short-term contractors paid
by international donor money or inexperienced staff. To secure these positions, the
Computer Departments tried to secure money for capacity building and insisted on
implementing technical projects in-house, to hire new employees and pay the existing
staff, as described by both Hameed, from the MoE, and Fayeq, from the MoHE. Iqbal
suggested IT companies should be taking this supportive role. The private sector was
growing and maturing quickly and invested a lot of money in its staff capacity building;
if international companies did the implementation, they should in his opinion take only
an advisory role with a local company which could later continue the customer services
(I. M. :10:48). But currently the donor money was invested in solutions that appeared
to support governmental institutions’ capacity building.
“They are giving these salaries, hiring people, lots of experts, bringing
internationals – they have budgets available for this. [...] if 10 people are
being paid from the World Bank side to MoE lets suppose, and after two
years the World Bank project gets closed. And you just count, a system
is even not developed and not completed over there and everything gets
multiplied by zero and then USAID comes and then they start another
project and then they bring new people and then they are not aware of what
was done before and what was done now.”
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(I. M. :26:27)
The government should, in his view, focus on policies and procedures and outsource IT
tasks. A lot of ministries developed their own systems, he explained, – like the MPHE –
and then, on the one hand, struggled to keep them running after the developers left and,
on the other, they had no clear vision for implanting the systems into the environment
they were supposed to run in. There was no awareness, he said, of the difference between
developing a solution, applying and maintaining a system and managing the whole
process. He assumed the ministries’ IT people were afraid the private companies would
replace them (I. M. :22:16) (for the full quote see appendix A.11). They wanted to
secure their jobs, he added, by expanding the number of projects they were running.
“The technical people they start opposing and saying “well if you spend
some amount of money on this and you train us then we will implement this
for you, why should somebody else do this” and in this sense like trying and
trying and trying. And nothing is done.”
(I. M. :27:28)
If projects failed that were only funded for a few years and paid by international
money, there was much less accountability, Iqbal explained. But he was sure that this
situation would not last forever and once the international aid money was withdrawn
from the country and no one was paying the bloated salaries any more, he was sure it
would be easier for both public and private sectors to hire qualified people (ibid. [57:44]).
Chief Information Officer
ICT capacities at public institutions need to reach a certain level so that requirements
can be understood and estimated, and support within the institution can be established.
These competencies were also being increasingly discussed among international con-
sultants, who advise the Afghan government and the international donors involved in
the telecommunication strategy and spending. David Kemp, a member of the Telecom-
munications Advisory Team (TAT) suggested that the ministries had, regarding the
dependence on ICT, developed considerably, so what they needed to be doing in the near
future, was to start to differentiate between technical staff responsible for maintenance
and trouble shooting, and a Chief Information Officer (CIO) (D. K. :01:01:11) (for
the full quote see appendix A.12). His colleague Paul, who worked as a researcher for
the same team, discussed a meeting with all ministries’ IT people he attended that
had revealed similar issues. When they were asked what they were planning, once the
ministries were connected to the fibre ring, most had no idea, Paul described, “it’s just
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they are all given some equipment, hook it up and turn it on and now figure out how to
use it.” (P. R. :55:54).
Figure 9.3: The printing machine used for university announcements and official corre-
spondence (source: the author)
Like the universities, most ministries still had manual procedures in place that could
not simply be replaced by providing hardware and infrastructure. Paul described a
situation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) that had similarities with the
restructuring issues Kabul University had faced with the introduction of the MPHE.
When he visited their facilities and was shown around, he saw that despite their new
digital equipment, they were still working mostly manually. Instead of retraining their
staff, Paul explained, they just kept the current procedures even if it made the work
much more complicated (P. R. :01:16:04) (for the full quote see appendix A.13). Both
situations described by Paul show what can happen if new technologies are introduced,
but the process is not supervised and supported along the way.
9.3.3 ICT as change makers
The resistance or inability to use to new technologies was not always met by under-
standing or a call for capacity building. Technology, some assumed, could also play
the role in overcoming outdated, non-transparent or unreliable manual processes and
enforce a change of attitude, as Hameed Daoud hoped the laptops would discipline the
teachers by indicating their mistakes. In that regard, the technology would contribute to
institutional capacity building by eliminating those who would not follow the system, or
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as Peter O’Neill put it, “if you want the next project then you just use this tool and you
do these things” (P. O. :38:57). Peter was a retired military officer from North America
– a background not unusual for international contractors in Afghanistan – who worked
for a locally registered NGO that mostly provided technical consultancy and software
development services to the government. He described the mandatory introduction of
project management systems as an important factor for the government’s development
and said that the ministries had to implement it, whether they wanted to or not.
“ The acceptance of the system will come when they realise that’s where the
money comes from. No acceptance no money.[...] So it’s really a question of
conditionality and the condition is: here is the system through which the
money flows. If you don’t like it, then you don’t get the money.” (for the
full quote see appendix A.14)
(P. O. :13:34)
The system was to monitor money flows and aid effects and offer a complete set of
planning and implementation tools, it would provide the necessary transparency, in his
view, the donors could expect to see where their money went and that it didn’t end up
in someone’s pocked.
“So, where I’m getting at is this system deals with effects. It’s effects based
management. [...] It’s deciding what’s needed, planning it properly, executing
it properly and then figuring out if you got the result you wanted [...]” (for
the full quote see appendix A.15)
(P. O. :18:32)
Peter said he experienced the same problems in software development during the
training of his staff but also in the private sector in general. It was important and
necessary to adapt to Western systems and standards, he was convinced, and Afghan
programmers were not up to these standards yet. His NGO, however, worked differently,
as he said, and could deal with big Western contractors because he had disciplined his
staff to take a ‘Western attitude’ (P. O. :57:08). If the ICT industry in Afghanistan did
not change, he predicted, the market would be overtaken by the neighbouring countries.
With regard to the private sector, he described the international aid money as an aid
virus, leading to high prices for low quality. And the Afghan first policy could do little
to change the fact that a profit based industry would buy IT services from neighbouring
countries for a lower price and better quality (P. O. :01:00:02) (for the full quote see
appendix A.16).
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He attested to the country is a “tremendous talent base” but the quality of education
at the universities in Afghanistan was, in his eyes, insufficient, while minor ICT skills
already sufficed to get a well paid job with one of the NGOs. The aid money created an
insulated bubble, in his view, and there was no real competition yet (P. O. :01:10:43).
He could, he explained, run the NGO much more effectively with less people, or by
outsourcing some of the work, but “the idea is for them to learn” (ibid. [01:09:17]).
Peter said he did not see a bright future in terms of the ICT industry for Afghanistan,
“probably something buggy and unacceptable like Pakistan but - that’s it. That’s what
it will be.”. The best experiences he had were with his female IT staff, because, as he
said, “they don’t have the egos”(ibid. [01:15:12]).
Peter’s attitude was certainly one of the more extreme ones, but it was far from being
an exception. I had come across similarly patronising statements during many informal
conversations. He was an exception insofar as he did not mind making such remarks
during the interview and seemed to feel comfortable with it.
9.4 ICT capacity as a goal – innovation and knowledge production
By many of the IT professionals, the public institutions for ICT education were not seen
as capable of meeting the demand, while most of the private ones were rated even lower.
And though the quality of the graduates remained contested, the number of institutions
offering computer science degrees has gone up considerably. In addition to the 30 public
higher education institutes, there are now 81 private institutions of higher education in
Afghanistan, of which 17 of the 38 in Kabul alone offer computer science as a field of
study1.
The situation at Kabul University in the first years after the Taliban regime has been
briefly described in section 9.1. Much has changed since then, regarding infrastructure,
premises, equipment and curriculum. Yet most interviewees, like Mr Fidai, complained
about the insufficient developments, considering the time and money invested. In his
view, the Afghan government has not yet realised the importance of IT education (T. F.
:27:12) (for the full quote see appendix A.17).
The university did not provide enough attention and support to computer science as a
subject and ICT facilities in general, he added, but he also accused the international com-
munity of not having done their part in addressing problems and were just implementing
1 Details are on the Website of the MoHE last checked August 2014
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projects that mostly benefited themselves. In his view many of the internationals took
advantage of the money that was easily available, and benefited financially themselves
while achieving very little with their projects (T. F. :44:38).
Rabeha also acknowledged improvements but attributed them mostly to what they
learned at the CCKU rather than to the computer science department (R. K. :05:13)
(for the full quote see appendix A.18). Uzma saw few positive developments since the
time she was a student several years before “I don’t see much improvement in our faculty.
Even it’s degraded.” (U. R. :26:41). The lecturers were better trained now, but the
lectures were still too theoretical because there were no practical applications and only
those with access to the CCKU could apply their knowledge (U. R. :28:15).
Khaled observed that the students’ preparation for university and their expectations for
the subject had changed and were much higher now than they had been when Khaled
and Norzad were students.
”[T]he students [...] that are coming are a little bit familiar with English, they
know the importance of computer science and come of their own interest.
But those times some people just wanted to have a certificate from any
faculty and they were sitting with us in computer science 1. [...] the students
understand importance of computers and internet [...]. In 2003 people would
have said that they want to learn Office.”
(N. & K. :17:59)
The job opportunities for computer scientists are considered much better than in
other disciplines, as several interview partners confirmed. A lot of them started teaching
computer courses or worked for one of the telecommunication companies, often before
they had even graduated, as Rabeha mentioned “with a basic knowledge in IT they
can get a job” (R. K. :28:09). But nonetheless changes at the university are going very
slowly and it was described as difficult by the younger, better educated, generation with
international master’s degrees to get positions higher up in the hierarchy or the chance
to influence developments at the computer science faculty (for more details see appendix
A.19) .
The tensions between the different generations and the new influences from other
educational systems entering Kabul University with the donor programs made it more
1 In the first few years computer science was little known and mostly attracted those that had not
been accepted in their first choice. Today it is one of the most popular subjects.
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difficult to offer training and lectures directly channelled through the public university
system. Additionally, this higher level training needs to be done in small groups, often
requires well equipped, reliable facilities and professional trainers. Therefore most
specialised ICT training for the public sector is outsourced to international training
institutions abroad and only lasts for a few weeks, as in the case of the university
connectivity project. This often results in what Gevaert (2011) calls “too-many-donors-
syndrome” with staff attending multiple training courses, dealing with hardware they do
not have at their home-institutions and finally never learning to practically implement
anything. Advanced training is not, typically, organised locally, but as in other higher
education disciplines, mostly covered by scholarships for postgraduate-degrees or summer
schools. A different approach was taken at the Computer Centre at Kabul University
(CCKU), which developed local ICT capacity and organisational structures over a course
of several years.
9.4.1 The Computer Centre at Kabul University (CCKU)
The Computer Centre at Kabul University (CCKU) was built in 2003 by a Technical
University in Germany (TUG) in cooperation with Kabul University and financed by
the German Academic Assistance (GAA). Its major goal was to develop “ a sustainable
IT concept for the academic structures of Afghanistan and especially for the University
of Kabul” (ITCK: 2014). Like the ADLU, this included basic IT training for university
staff and students, but also network administration training on different levels and
preparing staff for providing IT services for the entire university. The centre established
a structure that ensured continued training by the most senior and experienced members
for new staff who replace those who graduate and leave for jobs outside the university.
There are different positions with different responsibilities: junior administrators, senior
administrators and management. The centre is offering IT help-desk services to the
university and has a PC workshop for repairing broken hardware on campus (U. R. :17:52)
The centre closely cooperates with the TUG. In particular, in the first years, this
meant frequent visits by a German team to develop technical solution based on the
local conditions, build up the centre, select and import the hardware and train the local
staff that had been recruited from among the computer science students. After the first
generation graduated the staff became a mix of university lecturers working part-time
and providing training there and students. Until 2008 the centre was also responsible
for managing the internet connection provided by the first satellite dish of the university
connectivity project.
Today the centre runs mostly independently, with less frequent training in Kabul but
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with ongoing financial support by the GAA. The concept had also been exported to
four more universities in Afghanistan where centres were opened between 2010 and
2014, with members of the CCKU like Khaled and Norzad, taking a leading role in their
preparation and implementation (N. & K. :03:39).
“[A]t first [. . .] we were busy before learning how to manage [CCKU] itself,
because before that it was our German friends [...] these people came and
they implemented the servers, they made some changes in the servers and
then sometimes they had to teach us also and at that time we learned it by
ourselves. Then we trained the new generation of [CCKU] and now they are
working more independently. So not much trainings are needed for them by
the German friends.”
(U. R. :26:41)
There had also been plans, according to Khaled and Noorzad, for the CCKU on how
to become financially independent: developing software, act as an ISP to ensure ongoing
free internet services or offering web development and design services. But also two
years after the interviews none of this had been realised1. This almost certainly was
to do with the fact that all university finances are managed centrally by the MoHE,
making adaptations and individual solutions difficult. But it might also result from the
ongoing difficulty to amalgamate efforts from different sides: technical, administrative
and academic and the different donors involved in each of these areas.
Donors are in competition for the best results and contractors are in competition for
project money. More than once I was warned before entering a meeting that participants
from other projects might “steal ideas” or even worse “claim results”. Most projects
are only funded for few years and to apply for continued funding the projects need
to produce short-term results to prove the money was well spent. Training several
thousand students in basic IT skills or equipping computer labs seems to be a more
desirable outcome than training a dozen computer scientists in open source network
security. Noorzad had the same experience with several donors asking what the faculty
needs were and looking for quick solutions.
“They have money, 2 million, 10 million, 20 million they say we have some
million, we want to spend it in two years, three years, how can we do that?
1 This had been confirmed by several members of CCKU I either met in person at later visits or via
Skype conversations
172
9.5 Capacity, authority and local conflicts 173
They are happy if you say we need equipment, then you can get a lot of
money. For training they only like if it is short, two weeks, maybe three
weeks.”
(N. & K. :56:04)
What the universities more urgently needed, in his view, was to send IT professionals
to help develop local solutions. The CCKU is, in their view, a good example of how
localised training and planning together with experts can lead to sustainable solutions
(ibid. [53:58]). But the approach to send IT experts to the universities for longer
periods is still being neglected by most donors. Khaled and Noorzad were convinced
that bringing experts to Afghanistan helped localise the training and work and allow
more people to participate (N. & K. :01:50:00). The lack of cooperation also concerned
Rabeha Karim. Kabul University was in her view now well equipped with technical
staff, but in other provinces there were very few technical staff and the universities still
have very basic problems.
“ [W]e are in contact with some colleagues in other provinces because we
were classmates, we went together to study, we know each other. But there
is no other unified network of IT professionals who can talk with each other
and we can solve problems. Who can somehow promote the IT situation. So
we need to have something like that also.”
(R. K. :01:02:43)
The demand for IT experts in different areas continues and the public sector faces
increasingly strong competition, not only with NGOs and donors, but also with a
fast growing Afghan IT industry. For many computer scientists, advanced training
opportunities and job security with steady promotion were the greatest incentives for
the public service, making a low salary more acceptable. If neither can be provided, as
is still the case for many IT positions, it is likely to become hard for the universities to
find appropriate people.
9.5 Capacity, authority and local conflicts
9.5.1 Change and context
Similar to what Fayeq described regarding the CDMH, Khaled and Norzad suggested the
MoHE as the highest entity, together with the universities, needed to develop a strategy
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on what role IT could play in enhancing the higher education system. They believed
they should channel all efforts to one course of action that was closely monitored (ibid.
[1:00:16]). Right now, they said, the MoHE did not know whether projects failed or
were successful. The projects were islands. As described in the previous chapter, there
were tensions between the CDMH and the government concerning institutional support.
Simultaneously, there are tensions concerning decision making and responsibility between
CDMH and the donors resulting from insufficient integration in previous years. And
finally there is the hidden conflict between CDMH, as the leading entity in IT in higher
education, and the younger generation of computer scientists now working as lecturers
at the universities. Norzad and Khaled did not agree that the CDMH had the necessary
capacity to fulfil its role as guiding body for technological planning. All the CDMH
wanted in their view, was to have everything under their own control (ibid. [1:13:26]).
They would need the support of those students that earned their master’s degrees abroad.
But the CDMH showed no interest in cooperating.
“ If you ask MoHE: did you ask any of them? Because we had some session,
two, three times all the people [. . .] with them, with Deputy Minister. Ok
there are masters here, you can ask them anything. For the servers, for the
data center, ask them for the website, ask them for the concours system -
anything. But till now I’m talking with you, they didn’t talk with even one
of these guys please come to the Ministry, help us with the planning, help us
with anything nothing.”
(N. & K. :1:03:41)
There has been an IT board for higher education planned by the MoHE for years,
but it was never put into action, partly because it could not be solved who should be on
such a board. And the reasons for that, they were sure, again lay in the conflict between
different generations, qualifications and authorities (D. N. : 2011:1:06:13).
At the university, the generations are divided into before and after the Taliban. Some
of the older lecturers taught at the faculty at times when no computers or even electricity
were available. And even those who graduated during the first years after the Taliban
and then became lecturers are often considered as part of the ‘older generation’, as
compared to the ‘younger generation’ lecturers who had much better resources and study
conditions. The older generation was during several interviews accused of deliberately
trying to slow down any progress.
The only thing Norzad and Khaled could do in their current position, they said, was
wait for someone high enough up who understands the importance of IT and suggests
a cooperation. Then the CDMH and the older generation would be afraid to be left
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out and agree to cooperate (ibid. [2:03:45]). If they kept up the good work and made
strong suggestions the others would have no choice, they were sure, but to follow (ibid.
[2:07:45]).
“ Because I told you they cannot block the sun with two fingers (laughter)”
(ibid. [2:08:21])
At the CDMH this disinterest in cooperation was never openly addressed. Fayeq
would instead emphasise their own plans, the competence of his team and the general
good relations with the universities. Norzad and Khaled received broad approval among
many individuals at the university, the ministry and most of all, among donors. But
their criticism and call for changes also touched a lot of sensitive areas like the Afghan
scholarly system and the higher education ICT policies. They were (at the time) among
a very small group of dedicated and experienced computer scientists in the public sector,
calling for change to a system that consisted of many more unresolved issues than simply
technological ones. Therefore the CCKU was not only highly respected in the university
and the MoHE but also seen and described as a parallel world and isolated in some
respects. Again to some extent because it was not an official part of the university
structure and lacked institutional backing, rumours about salaries and certain privileges
easily spread and raised scepticism and envy.
9.5.2 Cooperation and competition
Distinct from most internationally funded projects, the CCKU’s salaries were only
slightly above public service salaries. This was meant to assure its integration into
university structures would not mean losing all its staff. Instead the slight correction to
their salaries would be balanced by official government status that would last beyond
project funding dependencies. Other projects like ADLU and the university connectivity
project were known to pay significantly more, putting them in a much more difficult
situation in terms of government integration and the coverage of costs. As mentioned
above, the CCKU’s attraction for students was the advanced practical training possibili-
ties while for graduates it was often the summer/winter-schools in Germany.
The occasional job change from the CCKU to another donor funded IT project at
the university, the ministry or, at times, even the active attempts of other projects
to recruit from the CCKU, increased distrust and competition. CCKU would invest
years of training and would build future projects on the increased expertise, but then
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“lose” some of their staff to projects that made no such educational efforts, but offered
better salaries. CCKU’s frustration with this behaviour and their attempts to avoid
it reinforced CCKU’s image of being isolated and uncooperative. When asked about
CCKU, a young Afghan woman who used to work for ADLU and now worked for one
of the biggest higher education support programs in the ministry, described them as
arrogant and difficult to work with (HES :28:41).
These tensions were often transfered from the project level to a personal level with a
strong awareness where one “belonged”, intensified by the above mentioned competitive
environment of the projects regarding best results and continued funding. Mr Fidai
worried that with the high salaries the NGOs were offering and the limited career
possibilities, together with the low expectations at the universities, most people had
a second occupation and did not take their government jobs seriously enough (T. F.
:25:11) (for the full quote see appendix A.20).
Some additional comments on general conflicts based on ethnic affiliation are summarised
in appendix B.
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CHAPTER 10
Modernization, Manipulation, Determinism - long overcome?
50 years of scholarship in Communication for Development and development studies has
not gone unnoticed by the international aid sector. More than once, radical changes
have been demanded and announced, from top-down to bottom-up, from market-led to
poverty-reduction, from structural adjustment to community-participation. Similarly,
social constructivist views have influenced how science, technology and, also, develop-
ment are viewed and discussed. In this chapter I will first look at how these old and new
concepts have become part of argumentation and action, how “context” and “participa-
tion” are discussed within the three areas described in the previous chapters, and I will
explore the roles New ICTs are given and how they are conceptualised by different actors.
As briefly explained in chapter 6.7, the broader institutional settings of international
aid programs, in cooperation with government institutions, predefine certain goals and
priorities. The concrete situations resulting from these arrangements were also visible
in the projects in this study. Including local knowledge and requests was on occasion
incompatible and, sometimes even in direct conflict, with the broader project structures.
All local actors at School Four complained about what seemed to them arbitrary teacher
arrests by the international forces, one of whom was the head of the now closed teacher
training centre. Simultaneously, the international forces’ civil-military cooperation
section funded the laptops, whose intention it was to “minimise the role of teachers to
some extent” (H. D. :09:39) and fill in for the current lack of well trained teachers.
Another obstacle to local participation is seen in the demand for more transparency
and accountability of aid spending, which means less flexibility and stricter calculations.
Most project funding requires strict book-keeping, regular detailed reporting and a clear
definition of project deliverables. Unexpected costs are not easily covered and delays
equal spending more time for the same amount of money and require yet another report
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explaining the delay. “Project managers still face other pressures to get things done, and
other measures of efficiency than those provided by measures of participation” (Mosse:
2001:24). Including local expertise is, therefore, rarely expected to bring any important
additional input to the project but is rather treated as an act of goodwill and confirmation
of what has already been decided. These limitations regarding flexibility and changes
were sometimes criticised, but on most occasions, taken for granted. Frederic Tailler
describes the fact that they have no funding for the salaries of network administrators
at the universities as “our big handicap” (F. T. :00:38:08); he adds that this is part of
official policy, so they will have to find a way around it locally. The policy itself it not
questioned. These circumstances have led in many projects to a kind of game, where
regulations and deadlines are guiding action, but there were always small workarounds
for dealing with predictive planning in an unpredictable environment. This was used
for personal benefit as much as for project benefit reasons. These strategies to gain
some flexibility were, however, mostly used to comply with project regulations despite
‘irregularities’ where the local context did not ‘function according to the plan’. They
were used to maintain conformity instead of undermining the rules. That said, I want
to explore how, within and beyond such project framing, involvement, interaction and
participation among local and international actors takes place.
10.1 I don’t mean to be patronizing, but
“I’m sure we will decrease the load of the work for MoHE and the universities
to at least around 50%. And we will make at least 50% faster the working
process. So nobody can do any corruption if we implement this.”
(F. B. :01:15:11)
The view that Afghanistan needs to get rid of its “traditional” routines and catch
up on values and technologies that are the basis of efficiency, accountability and trans-
parency in the developed world widely persists among international and local actors
and is strongly reflected in technology-centred project design. Where Lerner (1958) saw
the transformational power in media use, it is now New ICT that bears the promise of
modernizing Afghanistan. Especially it is those (mostly younger) Afghans who studied
abroad, experienced the advantages of a technologised society and are now part of the
international aid structures, who are the strongest supporters of ICT-based solutions.
Like the “native intellectuals” described by Fanon (1959), the ministry employees Fayeq
Bezhan, Ekram Sherzai and Hameed Daoud play a crucial role in introducing tech-
nologies and new structures to their ministries, embracing new technologies widely and
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uncritically and are therefore welcome local partners for international organisations.
When Hameed Daoud quotes the laptop producer on how technology is like food, it
becomes most obvious how a 1:1 transfer of the positive image of the importance of new
technologies collides with the local problems of missing school buildings and teachers
that he is also very much aware of. Nonetheless, Hameed remains in his role as the
defender of the project against the technology-hostile environment he sees at the MoE
(H. D. :0:11:10). Their positions put Fayeq and Hameed in conflict with both sides, the
‘older generation’ of Afghans who in their view did not understand the importance of
these new technologies, but also the international partners who have long overlooked
them, and, do not treat them as equal partners but depend on their cooperation.
The relationship between Internationals and Afghans was often similarly unacceptable
and, at the same time, commonplace to me, and similar to everyday sexism. Only when
imagining the roles being reversed do I realise the absurdity this could cause. The
natural superiority many internationals internalised was rarely challenged. The fact that
“we” (the international community) are here to support “them” (the Afghans) seemed
for many to imply a teacher-student relationship, or even a mother-child relationship
in which the mother has to repeat her request thousands of times before the child
internalises it, as the IDB consultant suggested, “it works exactly the same way in
the developing world” (S.G. :18:47). Afghanistan’s history, the country’s continued
resistance to the invasion of competing empires and its changing allies, reinforces the
image of Afghans as unpredictable and gave rise to the frequently quoted saying “you
can rent Afghanistan, but you can’t buy it” (Burke: 2001). Fluri (2009) describes the
tendency of “imperialist nations” to see Afghans as “uncivilised or traditional” and
an unwillingness to work with them as equals (p. 987). This reinforces the above
mentioned tendency to treat Afghans like children who need to be disciplined rather
than as equal partners (for the full quote see appendix A.14), who are in charge of their
own ‘development’. Resistance against imported concepts and technological solutions
is by their proponents on most occasions met by one of two reactions: a regret for
the lack of understanding ascribed to age or limited knowledge, or anger about the
narrow-mindedness, unwillingness to understand or egoistic reasons of those profiting
from the “old system”.
Local involvement in projects was described as functioning at best, but more often as
causing problems, complications and slowing the whole process down. Teachers need to
be motivated, network administrators need to be educated, university administration
staff trained and ministries convinced to make the technology work the way it was
intended. This often meant the technology functioning as a driver for change. As Florian
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described it, “[Sonatec] happens to be the entity that can actually do it and the ministry
happens to be the government body in control of that subject.” (F. P. a :1:22:59). He
knew the ministry’s involvement was unavoidable to secure funding, even though he
saw the MoE as sometimes “more of an obstacle to education” (ibid. [1:30:03]). Within
project paperwork, official meetings or donor reports, cooperation took a prominent role,
local partners were equals and could secure “sustainability”. Like the ‘workarounds’ to
comply with project schedules and rules that can be found in any project, this shows
another unwritten rule of the game called development aid. Rottenburg (2002) describes
this as official script (o-script) versus unofficial script (u-script): the o-script attests
to the project partners’ autonomy and responsibility, while the u-script talks of their
incompetence and inability and makes them passive receivers. The laptop project gives
a good example of the conflicts that arise from switching between these scripts. Sonatec
depended on the MoE’s cooperation and had to communicate that they could hand over
project responsibility to the MoE while, at the same time, Florian was quite frank that
he didn’t think they were capable of it at all.
10.2 Adapting the user
“The acceptance of the system will come when they realise that’s where the
money comes from.”
(P. O. :13:34)
All interviewed stakeholders were aware that New ICTs depend on certain conditions
to work, certain resources, knowledge and institutional support. As a result, the domi-
nant view was that an environment needed to be established that would make sure the
technology of choice could fulfil its mission. The school laptops’ mission was to relieve
pressure on schools arising from the lack of teachers by promoting ‘self-empowered
learning’. According to its manufacturer, it is designed and constructed to meet the
educational needs of developing countries. These needs, however, are predefined and
not expected to be voiced by the schools or the children themselves. The educational
concept utilised for the laptop is centred on the pupil, whose potential is to be “unlocked”
by the device. Afghan schools, however, are presented as the opposite: as the teacher
centred, creativity-hostile environment that the laptop is to break open. The laptop
encourages certain behaviour and use, and allows very little flexibility, regarding the
requests by the teachers. No other operating system is meant to be installed and no use
other than the individual one-to-one is intended. The laptop tries to configure its users
into a certain style of learning, which is also exactly its purpose in the Afghan laptop for
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schools project. It will not only fill the teacher-gap, but compensate for “bad teaching”,
reorganise lectures and introduce new learning methodologies. Hameed Daoud suggests
the laptop would therefore function not only as a learning tool for children, but also
discipline the teachers and confront them with their mistakes. Again, this example shows
how the instructional perception of technology is not only evident in the “Western-view”,
but even stronger or at least more openly communicated among “native intellectuals”.
Unlike most international development workers whose “professional empathy” requires
them to demonstrate understanding for different needs and conditions, technophile
young Afghans often request much faster and more radical changes.
The fundamental conflict within the laptop project is that the device excludes the
teachers. It brings individualised learning to a teacher-centred learning environment.
The measures taken to make it robust and stable, also make it inflexible for adaptations.
The laptop seeks to define its use and instruct its users, but its deterministic concept can
still be dismissed by the users who refuse to accept the role proposed for them (Akrich:
1992). This can mean, as at School One, a complete rejection by the teachers, or, like
School Two and Three, a welcome and accepted existence of the machine that has no
part in classes or teaching, but, by simply being a computer, holds a high symbolic value.
The laptop may have been designed to be less dependent on the physical infrastructure
and environment of the developed world – though whether this was achieved is also
debatable – but it was certainly not designed to be less dependent on a specific use-culture.
The technology – and therefore the technology designer and producer – tries to dictate
which adaptations it expects from the users, with very little flexibility regarding different
use practices. The laptop’s flexibility focuses instead entirely on spatial and material
aspects: it is robust, small, portable and children can even work “together under a
tree” (SLAP: 2014b). A blackboxed system, that needs as little human interference as
possible, is under these conditions, seen as ideal. If the solution is “foolproof” (Akrich:
1992) and no alterations are possible, no “mistakes” can be made by the user. The
users then need to be trained how to make use of it. It is upon their understanding
and using the technology “correctly” that the success of the projects depends. From
Sonatec’s perspective, the MoE’s role within the laptop project was to facilitate this
process of adapting to the technology. Sonatec initially acted as the direct extension of
the producer, making the necessary physical preparations and localising the software.
In the second phase, after the expected behaviour did not appear, Sonatec tried to react
and incorporate different needs into the device within the limited adaptability the device
would allow, but the goal remained successfully supporting and training the teachers in
how to include the new functions in their lectures. The MoE remained excluded from
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technical tasks, it was not seen as capable and technical training for the ministry was
not part of the project as it was not seen as necessary. “It is not my job – they will not
learn for five years to do this stuff” (F. P. a :1:14:38) as Florian explained. This again
emphasises how the laptops were communicated as something that would just work,
while the MoE was better not trusted with complex technical work. The laptop project
shows the perception of adapting the users on different levels: both the schools and the
MoE were not included in the planning and design, but instead expected to accept their
roles within the setting to make the project work.
Frederic Tailler was not involved in decisions about technical requirements. His task
was to prepare the local partners for the “top-down approach to cover all needs at
a single blow” (F. T. :00:23:44). He is the only one who is in regular contact and
directly interacts with the partners in Afghanistan. Again it is not the technology that
is discussed for adaptation. The success of the project relies on local partners and
conditions that are ready to receive the project, following the project design – supported
by godfathers “making sure that reports are written the way they should be written”
(F. T. :01:02:14) – and finding and training network administrators.
In the university connectivity project it is not so much the user being configured,
but a setting is attempted to be reconstructed at the universities, based on similar
projects in neighbouring countries. Each of the human and non-human elements is
required to function according to their role to make the complex system work. The
introduction of the campus network to the universities is further aggravated by the lack
of a concept as to what exactly the technology is aimed to be used for. Reconfigurable
technologies, as Orlikowski (2000) observed, provide a wide range of possibilities of how
their practice is shaped by different conditions and intentions. The use-concept for the
universities is an artificial one with no real attachment to the context of the universities.
Neither the number of users, nor the prioritised or blocked traffic, security measures,
experience of the administrators and many other factors sufficiently shape the current
network-configurations. This seems to change in Kabul, where Darya has increasingly
gained control and understanding of the possibilities the technology provides, while the
other universities are struggling with very basic problems (D. N. : 2011:41:57).
Similarly, the provincial communication networks run by the MCIT were only guided by
connectivity, as Mr Qadir observed, “they were just concerned about connecting the
two rooms. Now what these two rooms are doing with this connection was never in the
plan.” (H. Q. :2:04:25). Access remains the goal; access is equated with information,
and information with knowing about the world, leading to empowerment and freedom.
Showing the children the world out there over the internet, in order to bring a new
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mindset to the provinces, was also a suggestion made by Ms Chaudhary of the IDB (IDB).
This focus on structure and devices instead of use-concepts has caused the technology
to remain a foreign body within the local context.
Fayeq Bezhan from the MoHE supports this technology-centred approach. They
initially did not have enough staff, he admits, to run the project. But now he sees his
department as being well prepared to take over, or, indeed, he sees them as already
in charge. Similar to Mr Tailler’s responsibilities, it is not technical planning and
decisions that need to be made by the CDMH but the delegation of tasks to different
nodes, following the pre-defined top-down procedures. “The concept of [the connectiv-
ity for] Afghanistan project is to provide network and structure for universities, the
electricity, support of electricity and the internet connection. So this is the concept of
the Afghanistan [connectivity] project.” (F. B. :00:22:16). Fayeq never mentions any
adaptations or changes to the original plan and does not seem to see them as required.
His department wilfully supports suggestions like IP telephones and video conferencing
systems and requested no changes in network planning, server configurations or training
and support, as Khaled and Noorzad did. The only thing he is worried about, as he
repeatedly mentions, is the continued funding to pay for staff, electricity and bandwidth.
10.2.1 Alignment and Empowerment
“[The Afghan Digital Leaning Union (ADLU)] project was designed to build
the capacity of faculty members and higher education administrators to enable
them to support the provision of quality education and enlightened public
policy for the Afghan people.”
(USAID: 2011)
Paolo Freire (1970) emphasises the need for humans to be ‘beings for themselves’,
suggesting that when people are alienated from their their own decision-making they
are made into objects (p. 84f). Development means to free people of oppression and
dehumanising circumstances, the ‘struggle to be more fully human’ (ibid. p. 47). What
he described in his book Pedagogy of the Oppressed is that the poor and marginalized
can, and should, be enabled to conduct their own analysis of their own reality. But
participation needs practice and positive experience with getting involved and expressing
one’s view of things. This is especially so in countries with strong hierarchical structures
and the often unquestioned acceptance of ‘higher rank’ decisions. This conception
of facilitating empowerment seems hard to grasp when dealing with interconnected
technological systems whose inner workings and configurations are, even in developed
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countries, only understood by a few. The possibility of participation in ICT related
decisions is often conceptualised to be entirely dependent on “experts” who are to decide
for those in need of IT access and literacy. As described above, the focus is on making
the technology work instead of making the technology work for the users.
Most of the technical capacity building efforts target training people in ready-made
imported systems to reproduce a certain way of organising, researching and working
that is seen as exemplary. This technology literacy approach, also described in Chapter
9, trains technology use, introduces new forms of learning and working and adapts the
user’s previously analogue routines to new digital ones. The computer’s role as a tool
for learning is in the computer literacy approach entirely separate from the necessary
support system which the devices depend on. In a context with stable infrastructure
and an IT help-desk that can be called if the device doesn’t work as expected, and
functions that are developed for use in such a context, users can concentrate on the
content. In fact one might be an expert in programming, routinely use an integrated
development environment (IDE), and still ignore any issues concerning the operating
system or hardware. The actor-network has stabilised and does not show its individual
parts that contribute to its stability. The attempt to reproduce this stability at the
Kabul University learning centres, however, depended on too many unstable elements
and regularly broke down. And as they were the ones responsible for the campus network
at the time, CCKU were asked for help “every day we were receiving calls that it’s
down.[...] And if someone is not helping, then the chancellor is complaining.” (N. & K.
:00:31:03).
There is an increasing awareness of the crucial role and importance of the maintenance
structures that these systems depend on and both international and local partners
agree on the importance of capacity building for being less dependent on international
support. However, the process of developing and configuring the systems, and even
their installation, remains separate from the training endeavours as the university con-
nectivity example and a number of projects at the MCIT show. The technical side
is “outsourced” to contractors who in most cases know the local circumstances only
marginally and who again subcontract the installation of the equipment to another entity.
They only become visible to the local partners as configurations — like bandwidth
and server settings – and are treated like an inherent part of the hardware. For the
training an entirely different contractor is booked, as Fred explains: “this year for the
second time we bought a whole course as it were to send a group of 14 Afghans for
three weeks to this training” (F. T. :00:41:34). To make sense of this division of tasks,
there must be an agreement beforehand about the state and function of the technical
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system, that is in the centre of all these efforts. If each group could make suggestions for
adaptations they would need to interact directly, but this is not part of the project design.
ICT capacity building can, consequently, have the opposite effect of empowerment,
by preparing the local partners for the introduction of external, pre-defined solutions,
instead of enabling them to conduct their own analyses of needs. Or as Dichter (1989)
observed “when asked what it is they need, they will feed back what they have in
effect been taught to need” (cited in Bailur: 2007). Ratan & Bailur (2007) criticise how
‘welfare-based’ initiatives undermine local agency. There is surprisingly little attention
drawn to the question of whether part of the lack of sustainability of many these
‘welfare-based’ ICT initiatives is indeed the absence of adapting technologies to local
technical capabilities. Technological training that empowers the users to continuously
change and adapt the systems according to changing capabilities and requirements could
provide the flexibility needed in an unstable and quickly changing environment, instead
of confronting the learner with a perfect but vulnerable reality that is not prepared for
any variations. Good technologies, de Laet and Mol (2000) suggest, incorporate the
possibility of their own break-down.
10.3 Locally owned dependencies
“ It’s like taking some people who don’t know swimming by ship in the
middle of the sea and then throwing them in the sea and taking the ship away
(laughs). Everyone will die.”
(N. & K. :1:52:40)
The lack of adaptation becomes obvious when one element the system depends upon
fails and cannot be compensated for or new elements interrupt and change the settings.
A charger is an essential accessory for a laptop, but can easily be replaced. However, if
this information, that a replacement can be purchased at the bazaar, is missing, the
broken charger disables the entire setting. Unless it is compensated by another child’s
charger becoming a – less reliable – actor, allowing a limited functionality. A broken
mobile-phone screen may be a minor nuisance in Europe, followed by costs for its repair
and the absence of the phone for some days. Repairs of the school laptop depended
entirely on service, or at least knowledge, that could only be reached through the MoE,
who proved unwilling or unable to help. In most cases, the supportive structure that
helped stabilise the network for some time, disappears with the end of a project and
successfully imitating the same conditions as in other contexts, where the system might
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have worked, is the exception. Besides, making one’s own position redundant is not
always in the interest of the international project partners, who in many cases would
favour continued involvement to keep themselves funded (Harr: 2009).
Both Hameed Daoud from the MoE and Fayeq Bezhan from MoHE are active, sup-
portive and welcome local partners for international technology projects. They represent
their institutions and function as intermediaries with the schools and universities, respec-
tively. They ensure official institutional embedding and, therefore, continued and clearly
assigned responsibility. Both adopted the concepts handed to them and accepted taking
responsibility during the implementation. The self-confidence regarding the management
and implementation of highly complex technical projects, is the result, I suggest, of a
lack of actual involvement in technological aspects of the projects. Hameed had been
deliberately excluded from technical aspects, Sonatec saw the CCME as incompetent and
their own role within the project was justified by their technical expertise. The university
connectivity project had by design separated interaction between the ‘End-User’ (the
ministries and universities) and the ‘Customer’ (the MPD, represented by Mr Tailler)
from interaction between the ‘Service Provider’ (the technical implementation and
support) and the Customer (MPD: 2008). Mr Tailler, who has himself no background or
experience in the computer science field, was the only one Fayeq interacted with directly.
The ministry computer directorates are surrounded by consultants: hiring contractors,
installing pre-selected hardware, preconfigured systems and following clear implementa-
tion schedules. The conception of technologies as mechanical rule-following devices that
simply needed to be embedded and used “correctly” was adopted by Hameed and Fayeq
from the external project designs. Their limited involvement in the technical aspects did
not confront them with the need for appropriation as directly as experienced, for instance,
by Rabeha, Noorzad and Khaled, who had been providing technical support for the
university for several years. As a result both projects depend highly on external support
– if they are expected to continue according to their initial design. The connectivity
project offers some flexibility and could follow a different path through people like Darya,
Uzma, Rabeha, Noorzad or Khaled. Yet tensions arising for the same reasons – technical
expertise and influence – have shown to make this cooperation unlikely.
10.4 Hard-earned partnerships
“ We have experienced many funders coming and going back, so we have
experience of working with them, and from that experience now we have
reached to the point that we have our own plans, and if someone comes, a
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funder comes to help, then we propose them the project we have and they
can help in implementing it.”
(D. N. : 2011:37:22)
The strong intention to take responsibility and implement plans independent of
external decision-making was obvious, though not uniform, in many interviews with
Afghan stakeholders. The initial trust in complying with the propositions of the modern
and educated West was often followed by a disappointment regarding the poor results
and a confrontation with the complaints of the ‘end-users’, in whose eyes the public
institutions as official partners were responsible for ongoing support. Thus, the ques-
tion emerged, why highly paid external contractors, who abandoned the projects after
their contracts ended, would be necessary in the first place if the result was a loss of
control by the local government partners and unsatisfactory results on site (H. D. :43:18)?
The previously docile local partners became stubborn, requested changes and caused
increasing headaches to the international actors. Those at the essential intersections
between ministries and international projects, like Fayeq and Hameed, now insist on
implementing their own suggestions and taking over the lead for major projects. They
have gained increasing confidence in their positions and describe these developments as
a process of learning the rules of international project procedures, like proposal writing
and building the necessary (technical) capacity.
The university connectivity project can be run with deviations from its original
conception – though it comes at the cost of delays, outages and security risks. To keep
the network running in a different environment than the one it was conceptualised for
requires some understanding of the supporting structure, the dependencies and the hard-
and software. But once the network administrators have familiarised themselves to some
extent, like Darya has, they are able to reset configurations, work around problems or
make adaptations. The project also receives ongoing attention and support as its role in
providing access to the internet is deemed important enough to tolerate high costs and
ongoing external support.
The laptop project, on the other hand, could neither be appropriated sufficiently to
run independently, nor did it receive ongoing further investment to continue efforts to
accustom and adapt the users. It benefited only a small group and promised neither
political stability nor economic advantages quickly enough to keep up the intensive
supervision Florian had mentioned it would need. Hameed Daoud would continue on the
same course and sees his department in good shape to do so, but also sees it as unlikely
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that the project will be funded in the future. The MoE clearly stated that technology is
not among their highest priorities, but the only option for him and his department is
currently to attract similar projects with a prominent role and sufficient resources for
the CDME. If he cannot acquire any technical projects with externally paid salaries, he
will lose his staff because no one works in IT for a public service salary “nobody, even
someone who knows bits and pieces related to IT” (H. D. :36:23).
Several of the CCKU members, who also belong to the first generation of international
master’s graduates, are prominent figures in ICT related projects and working groups
for several universities, and now have plans of their own regarding how to best develop
the universities’ technical infrastructure, “at the moment no university has any plan
for the next year [...] for anything.” (N. & K. :39:40). Most of them blame both the
international partners, who should know better about requirements and what works
and what does not, and those local partners, who blindly accept anything. They are
also critical towards the university connectivity project, and despite being described
as the best qualified IT professionals at the universities by Mr Tailler, they are not
directly involved. Fayeq Bezhan, though only a few years their senior, belongs to the
“old generation” who received the main part of their education during the troubled post-
Taliban years and are now struggling to compete with much better prepared generations
– indeed every other year there seems to be a “new” generation starting their studies
under better condition than the previous one. CCKU blamed the CDMH for ignoring
their offer to help with the connectivity project, but the tension between the two entities
made this unsurprising. Despite – or because of – the CCKU’s often praised excellence,
the centre has the reputation of being reluctant and difficult in cooperating with others
and always insisting on getting control over everything. “[CCKU] always fights with all
the other projects” (HES :28:41) as one ministry employee observed. There was a fear
of being exploited, having one’s ideas stolen and staff enticed away. Though this might
have been for good reason, as in the case of Darya, it also isolated the CCKU from
partnerships other than the long lasting one with the Technical University in Germany.
10.5 Relevant groups, opinion leaders and champions
“ [W]e are in contact with some colleagues in other provinces because we
were classmates, we went together to study, we know each other. But there
is no other unified network of IT professionals who can talk with each other
and we can solve problems.”
(R. K. :01:02:43)
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The literature makes various suggestions concerning which actors might be most
influential in promoting and shaping new technologies. Quarry and Ramirez talk about
a champion who is well acquainted with the local context, promotes the project idea in a
Freirean sense and stays for a long time. These can be “individuals or organisations with
a sincere respect for the views of the people with whom they work and with people’s
ability to solve many of their own problems.” (2009:62).
Pinch and Bijker (1984) talk about relevant social groups with different expectations and
interpretations of a new innovation, which influence, during the technology development
process, the direction in which the artefact evolves until it reaches “closure” and remains
relatively unambiguous. Among these competing relevant groups are most prominently
the designers and users, but they could also be institutions or civil society groups.
Carroll (2004) describes the mutual adaptation of the technology’s features and the
user’s practices as completing the design process, or “Technology in Use”. Like Pinch and
Bijker, Carroll emphasises the choices that are involved in technology use. “Closure”,
however, is not negotiated between designer and users, but instead the users appro-
priate the technology within their current use-context to achieve temporary stability.
‘Technology as Designed’ only provides a theory as to how it should be used, while the
technology remains malleable to some extent, to be shaped and appropriated by and
within the relevant groups.
Most influential in the adoption of innovations are, according to Rogers (1995), mem-
bers of a society that function as opinion leaders, those who are able to influence
other individuals’ attitudes. This leadership is in most cases not an individual’s formal
position or status. Opinion leadership is earned and maintained by individuals’ technical
competence, social accessibility and conformity to the systems’ norms. Other than
change agents who are usually professionals who represent external change agencies,
opinion leaders are members of the social system.
Although each of these analytical concepts has its shortcomings (for which they have
been criticised, see Klein & Kleinman (2002), Beltrán (1976)) I also find each of the
approaches useful when focusing on local agency within ICT4D project preparation,
implementation and aftermath. Though not as the sole determinant, I argue, these
champions, relevant groups and opinion leaders can each – singularly or combined – play
a vital role in technology appropriation, shaping and mediation of the overall project
course. I will return to these concepts when discussing different forms of participation
in chapter 11.1.
The idea of a technology that ‘just works’ and has only one correct way to do so
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is still much more persistent in ICT4D than alternative views which suggest that a
technology ‘in action’ cannot be seen separately from the context where it is used,
like Orlikowski’s notion of ‘technologies-in-practice’ or similarly Carroll’s notion of
‘Technology in Use’. Their examples concentrate on technologies that are introduced
into stable structures that provide guidelines for, or against, the adaptation of certain
functionalities, with managers, mentors and a technical support playing crucial roles
during the appropriation process. I would argue, in the Afghan education sector context,
a similar supportive environment could not only encourage and support appropriation
depending on capabilities, social practice and institutional context but could also play a
crucial role in ‘completing the design in use’ by helping to adapt a technical system to
the unstable physical and technical conditions. The school laptop project has shown
how the blackbox-view affects both the users and the supportive system of the device. A
more open operating system and a video port might have given the teachers and parents
increased accessibility, but repairs and software updates would still have remained
blackboxed issues if the MoE – or an engineer like at School Three – are not enabled
to gain better control over the device. To view technology in ICT4D projects as
something that is defined by the users’ understanding of the properties and functionality
of the technology (Orlikowski: 2000), draws the attention to how these properties and
functionalities are communicated to the users.
10.6 Conclusion
The examples in chapters 7 - 9 show how a technology that lacks the ability to be
adapted, appropriated or reconfigured to the context and the users’ needs, most likely
will not or cannot be taken up. This certainly depends on the efforts taken to introduce
a new technology, as the university connectivity project’s ongoing operation shows, and
the adaptations the users are willing, or can be convinced, to make. Local participation
has been shown to be necessary not only to understand and include expectations and
needs, but also to enable the local partners to take control over the new technical
systems. Yet, the question as to who participates in representing the users, the technical
managers and the government adequately has shown to be a challenging one. Norzad
and Khaled might be opinion leaders but are lacking the social power to influence
decisions on the ministry level. The provincial education director Dr. Sangin Zadran is
certainly a champion, but is far removed from decisions on technical configuration. And
the relevant social groups in ICT project in Afghanistan are far too divided, spatially as
well as by different levels of influence and power, to negotiate the necessary adaptations.
If technology is not seen as a firm product, but as a fluid, constantly changing process,
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that is defined by its use rather than design, we must turn our attention to two issues:
the question of how decisions are formed regarding the technology and project design
(and how malleable both are), as well as the question of who is involved in the ‘getting-
used’ process (and who might have been mostly invisible). We must dissociate from a
production – consumption and practitioner – beneficiaries dichotomy and take a closer
look at the “relevant groups” within ICT4D projects to open the participation arena. In
the following chapter I want to explore how participation is interpreted with regard to
technology and how this influences project dynamics. I will scrutinise the discredited
concepts of “participation” and “empowerment” and see how they are linked to context
and technology appropriation.
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CHAPTER 11
Participation in ICT projects
Upon a closer examination of what ‘participation’ means within the different projects, it
turns out to be a complex issue with varying interpretations and different implications
deriving from each project. The intention or necessity of including different stakeholders
in certain areas of projects was repeatedly stated by virtually all interviewees and could
in most cases be observed taking place. “Cooperation” turned out to be a term no one
wanted to miss mentioning, whether the person wanted to emphasise his/her own active
role or the fact that others were also included in the process. Talking with different
stakeholders involved in the same project, however, helped reveal the many faces of
‘participation’, and the thin line between empowerment and paternalism, between socio-
cultural sensitivity and reinforcing unequal power structures, between supporting local
agency and overestimating local capacities.
Participation in the design and implementation of ICT4D projects can occur at
various levels. As Pretty’s typology (see also chapter 2.2.4) suggests, participation
can range from information sharing, to information gathering, participation in selected
decision-making up to participation in project design, systems design, and project im-
plementation. Equally, in most cases, various roles can be assigned to the pre-defined
stakeholders, from being a source of information, to an active contributor or one of the
decision makers. On the basis of the empirical examples I will discuss various aspects of
participation that are of particular relevance in the ICT field and, moreover, address
some less common perspectives on participation that are characteristic of dealing with
complex technological systems in a developing country context.
As described in chapter 3.2.2, Heeks (2009) differentiates between three levels that the
target group – he refers to them as “the poor” – can be involved in during the innovation
process in ICT4D. These levels also describe to some extent the level of participation:
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1. Pro-poor projects are designed for the target group, but geographically outside
the target area and without direct participation of the target group. Participation
only takes places in what Arnstein calls Tokenism: consultation and information
sharing at a stage when most project details have been decided by the implementing
organisation and been approved by a funding body.
2. Para-poor projects engage the target groups in the design process in the same way
as has been done with clients in the software industry for decades; by conducting
interviews and collaboratively describing the problem and the proposed solution.
This approach is usually the most difficult and costly one as it combines often
conflicting expectations and preferences. It is also harder to estimate the costs
and submit a proposal with a clearly defined agenda for funding, as outcomes are
ideally not determined in advance but are developed in a collaborative process.
3. Per-poor projects are driven and steered directly by the target group. External
IT experts are consulted whenever they are seen as needed by the target group.
This ‘self-mobilised’ approach usually starts with small scale local projects that
can help mobilise similar initiatives by passing on innovative ideas with a low
barrier for participation.
As for participation, these approaches are not mutually exclusive. Depending on the
project, each of the above can make sense to a certain degree on the various project
levels; one can be generated by another or reinvented by different groups of stakeholders.
Using ICTs to reach a certain development goal often involves the participation of
users other than the target group or makes additional training necessary for main-
tenance and support. Failing to consider the necessary supporting environment for
a technological system, as in the case of the laptop project, still seems a common mistake.
How to minimise or ideally eliminate long-term dependence from external support?
How to adapt technical systems to local conditions, when local technical capabilities
are (still) low? And how to configure systems to remain malleable for the users yet still
deliver stable services? Accepting that without the support of the ‘local elite’ ICT4D
projects risk a very short life-span, is as important as the fact that participation is
necessary on more than simply a technical and institutional level to ensure there is
demand and acceptance of the service.
Additionally, target-group participation in ICT project design includes critical attention
to the ‘who participates’ – the invisibility of women and girls at School Four did not
mean they are excluded from education but, instead, meant they could not be reached
as directly. Participation needs to bridge multiple divides here: techie versus non-techie;
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rich versus poor; often a Western versus non-Western mindset; urban versus rural and
men versus women, all need to be considered (Heeks: 2008).
11.1 Dimensions of participation in the three cases
Participation is still almost exclusively defined from a donor perspective. How can those
offering their help and resources enable participation by those receiving the support?
Although I have shown how inadequate these dichotomies are with regard to ICT4D, I
have chosen to take the “project management” perspective, which mostly represents the
donor, to describe different forms of participation.
From a project management point of view, participation can be seen within two main
dimensions (following Uphoff (1985) and Cornwall (2008)), see figure 11.1:
• The degree of participation, meaning the number of project-related areas an actor
is involved in, as well as the number of relevant groups an actor interacts with
directly
• The stage at which the participation is happening, from its design, to its imple-
mentation up until the handover to the local partners.
Within these dimensions, local partners (in light blue) and technology design and
configuration (hatched) are often kept entirely separate. Projects are often designed in
such a way that they take one dimension of participation to the extreme while neglecting
the other, leading to unwanted but, as will be shown, not necessarily unexpected results.
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Figure 11.1: Dimensions of Participation in ICT projects in developing countries
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11.2 Token Participation
"We will literally take tablets and drop them out of helicopters (. . .) and go
back a year later and see if the kids can read"
(Negroponte: 2011)
What is described by Arnstein as Tokenism, by Pretty as consultation or functional
participation and by White as Nominal will here be called ‘token participation’. This
approach is probably the most common one in development aid, especially within
technology centred initiatives, and could also be observed with regard to the schools
during the laptop project. Participation is facilitated only in the implementation stage
to display inclusion, while all decisions are made elsewhere. Taking Heeks’ definition,
this would be a clear pro-poor approach where a project is being designed in a top-down
manner and then imposed upon the target group. ICT4D projects that would fall into
the category of token participation are at no stage up for discussion on the target-group
level. Participation is interpreted as showing how a given IT tool is used, not if it is
the right tool in the first place. Cooperation with the parents and teachers started in a
mostly campaigning way, an instrumental use of participation to gain consensus.
Formal approval by parents and teachers was obtained before the technology was
introduced, but in such a way that no resistance or criticism was to be expected. Stronger
involvement would have been necessary, as Florian later admitted, to make sure people
actually understand what it is they are getting and what can or cannot be done with it.
To actually involve people in the project design level, however, would have required an
entirely different approach. The implementation was scheduled, contracts were signed
and schools selected before any interaction with the pupils, parents and teachers could
take place.
Another example of token participation is drawn from the interview with Peter, who
described the introduction of a new government administration system as an important
corrective to current procedures. His case shows a manner of self-perception as an
international expert that I encountered frequently. Participation is less something that
needs to be facilitated, but rather seen as an act of persuasion. The international
community has the role of a parent that needs to lead the way for the child – in this case
Afghanistan – and it has the means to enforce its conditions in the inexperienced child’s
best interest, with a technology supporting the introduction of “specific organisational
features” (Avgerou: 2001). And those who are supposedly the centre of attention become
195
11.3 Proxy Participation 196
the weak point in an otherwise smoothly running operation.
One justification for this manner of proceeding in the area of ICTs, which was given
during several of the interviews, was the technical complexity of the projects and the
lack of local expertise. Several stakeholders expressed the need to educate and convince
the local population in terms of ICTs. The belief that people needed to be taught about
the benefits that ICTs could bring to their lives, education and work seemed considerably
stronger than the willingness to listen to what might be reasonable doubts or concerns.
Another often cited reason for limited participation was unreliable partners and a
lack of trust. According to international stakeholders, it was corrupt or biased local
partners, particularly in the government, that were responsible for many failures. This
was an aspect that would not be mentioned during official meetings (o-script) with
donor agencies – as a strong partnership with local institutions has become the first
precondition for funding – but was widely discussed among international aid workers
(u-script).
Local stakeholders mentioned both a lack of trust of other Afghans, often for one
of the reasons described in chapter 9.5 (see also appendix B), and also a growing
frustration with the broken promises of international partners and unaccomplished
expectations regarding project outcomes. Distrust was one of the strongest obstacles for
collaboration in most projects. The reasons were, as mentioned, sometimes obvious and
sometimes hidden in personal or cultural conflicts. The disappointment with this lack
of participation is one of the reasons for self-exclusion and what Cornwall (2008) calls
‘participation fatigue’: a complete refusal to take part in external project suggestions.
11.3 Proxy Participation
“One mistake we made with the original plan is there was not a single carrot
in it for the ministry1 ”
Proxy participation is another common form in ICT4D projects that is mostly com-
bined with token participation but can also be a means for alibi participation (see below).
It often includes ‘functional participation’ (Pretty: 1995) where local government or
community representatives are included in some minor aspects of the project, while
major goals are pre-defined by external agents. These proxy participants may be chosen
1 Comment made at the IDB meeting regarding how to secure support by the MoE
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for different reasons: they might be the most accessible ones, they might function as
gate keepers to the necessary official approval or they might just be chosen out of an
insufficient understanding of local procedures or the technical complexities that are
involved.
This low level participation usually starts with a government/official entity being
approached for a joint application for project-funding. An institution appears as original
project-partner, though design and application are mostly pre-defined. The official local
partner has generally little or no experience with ICT and claims no say in technical
matters. Young, well educated computer scientists at public institutions often encounter
the frustrating experience that ICTs are either given a very low priority or that crucial
decisions are made by superiors who lack the understanding and experience to judge
what is necessary and appropriate. Almost identical projects are implemented twice
at one university while fundamental requirements are ignored. But not only divergent
priorities or personal benefits explain why the young professionals are excluded from
project planning and negotiations between the institutions, donors and IT consultants,
they also seem to represent a threat to some in higher positions, as described in chapter
9.5.
In most cases proxy participation is the result of a technology-deterministic project
planning, with local participation seen as the agreement by the local partner to fulfil
his/her part of the job. The school laptop project shows how, with a concentration on
the device, local expertise is only marginally included or not at all in the planning and
implementation of the project. The MoE was perceived more as a potential disturbance
than as an active participant. It had been assigned a clear role: to select the schools and
prepare them for the delivery. Any additional involvement was unwanted. Hardware
is treated in a ‘ready to use’ manner with those on the ground being confronted with
unfamiliar use concepts and ‘unexpected failures’. The technology is expected to dictate
its best use and adapt the user to a new and improved behaviour.
Mr. Daoud initially accepted his role as local partner of this invited participation. When
the problems at the schools ithbecame apparent, however, and proved his colleagues
scepticism right, he refused any future cooperation with Sonatec and started looking
for new partners w his own conditions. The limited influence he had on the project’s
outcomes contributed to the tendency mentioned in chapter 10.4 to develop his own
solutions and an increasing unwillingness to agree to any cooperation outside his own
control.
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11.4 Alibi Participation
“[They] made it themselves most of the work. Just they come with one idea.
You can bring a server here, that’s not a problem, they have money, they
can bring. But here in this side there was nobody to maintain the server, to
work with that, to administrate the system.”
(N. & K. :28:29)
The opposite extreme of assigning minor tasks to local stakeholders to demonstrate
their role as ‘project partners’ as described above, is to use the participatory approach
as an exit strategy to escape unresolved issues. This is a rarely criticised approach
as it looks very ‘participatory’ from the outside and has a lot of similarities with a
partnership on equal terms. The local project partners tend to be approached at a
time when the ‘what’ has been decided by the implementing organisation and approved
(or set on the agenda) by the donor while the ‘how’ is open to some discussion. ICT
projects with alibi participation usually depend on long-term qualified personnel on
the ground or ongoing costs that can only be covered for a limited period of time.
ICT4D projects in general seem to attract this kind of exit strategy, as sufficient
adaptation and financial and professional support remain unresolved issues for many
cases and passing the buck to the local partners ensures a “successful project completion”.
Furthermore, ICT projects are not necessarily managed by technologically experienced
personnel. As described in the previous chapter, technologies are often treated as neutral,
reliable, rule-following tools, technical decisions and implementations are outsourced to
external ‘experts’ and project management and coordination mainly consists of com-
municating the project planning to the local partners. Alibi participation offers strong
involvement to the local partners and can even to lead to self-mobilisation. Decisions are
discussed, applications for further funding filed by partnering institutions on-site and
responsibility gradually shifts to the local partner. But, especially when dealing with
complex technical systems, room for manoeuvre is usually limited and the consequences
of technical and financial dependencies only become fully evident after external support
ends. The ‘self-mobilisation’ of the CDMH within the university-connectivity project is
based on simplified assumptions about how the project can be continued and maintained
and by the unquestioned acceptance of the ready-made project design.
The introduction of a campus network into the Afghan university context is not trivialized
by the international partners. However, the challenges are mainly seen in establishing
the structures the technology needs for its smooth operation, including power supply,
campus wiring, getting the hardware shipped and installed, and booking training courses
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for the university administrators, which are held in Europe but which Mr Tailler would
“for logistic reasons” prefer to take place in Kabul. Mr Tailler admitted the top-down
character of their approach, even mentioning it explicitly as a positive aspect during
the interview. The alternative, and thus main difference, is described as “waiting until
someone would come with an application” from within Afghanistan, which might have
taken too much time, instead they decided to “cover all needs at a single blow.” (F. T.
:00:23:44).
Fayeq Bezhan, the project’s main local cooperation partner, revealed during the
interviews his marginal involvement in the technical implications of the project. But
emphasising his role as a relevant partner in this prestigious, extensive undertaking
seemed also to be an act of self-affirmation. He had fully accepted his role as ‘head of
the responsible entity’ and also presented the project to the interviewer as both planned
and managed by his department. At the same time, Mr Tailler willingly accepted claims
that everything could be handled locally, as well as other requests by ministry officials
like the choice of universities, despite revealing his awareness of the various problems.
The responsibility for network planning and system administration was handed over
to the universities, while none of the local partners could show sufficient experience in
any of these areas. Everyone is aware of the lack of experienced computer scientists in
Afghanistan, an informed participation with sustainable planning can hardly take place,
yet thinking beyond the official end of funding of the project in 2013 and beyond clearly
defined areas of responsibility that do not include long-term maintenance, seems to be
ignored. Everything that is running for now is presented as success, while neither the
salaries, nor the urgently needed extended training are secured. Kabul University, with
by far the best trained ICT staff, is struggling to keep the network up and running. It
is hard to imagine how less privileged universities in other provinces will cope with it.
So when asking on-site staff about the project the answers were, as one would expect,
less optimistic.
This is another example that shows participation only applied – and in this case
‘over-applied’ – at the implementation stage without giving enough thought at the design
stage as to “who defines what the initial community needs are” (Bailur: 2007). The rea-
sons for such an approach derive, again, from technology-centred planning. One strong
element is certainly an optimistic determinism regarding the power of a technology that
just works. Another one is overestimating the ability of the target community to comply
with the roles and tasks assigned to them as part of the project structure. Thirdly
involves a lack of technical understanding within the project management, who divide
technology design, configuration, implementation and training into separate entities.
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This view is closely linked with the above mentioned technological determinism and
the notion of the technological sublime. And finally alibi participation can also result
from the awareness that an extensive participation, adaptation and preparation cannot
be justified within the given project framework and similar constraints associated with
international development policies.
11.5 Participation and Technology Appropriation
“They didn’t spend a lot on gathering the requirements. Somebody is just
seeing the surface ‘ok this is the problem, I have this solution for it. Just
let’s implement it’ ”
(N. & K. :58:12)
As shown in Chapter 10, the target-groups are still widely treated as passive receivers
that need to understand, learn and adapt to new technologies. Champions like school
principals or young IT professionals seemed present in all projects, but were often not
included as such. Relevant groups were mostly ignored during the initial technology
configuration process and opinion leaders, like village elders or the CCKU staff, were
supportive of technology in general, but did not necessarily represent an opinion that
corresponded with the project framework. Participatory elements, as shown above, were
readily taken up by local partners and often led to a demand for a stronger involvement,
but mostly at a stage when decisions about the technology itself had widely been closed,
and adaptation and appropriation needed a much higher level of understanding of the
functionalities or it resulted in a break-down.
There are several examples suggesting how looking at ICT4D projects as actor-networks
and considering their individual pieces could help in appropriating the technology instead
of the user and collaboratively develop a local solution that remains fluid and “may well
prove to be stronger than one which is firm” (de Laet & Mol: 2000). This participatory
appropriation cannot be seen as a strategy to reach an anticipated solution but to
develop a setting that stabilises and might even be treated as a blackbox temporarily
but remains in constant motion in as quickly a changing context as Afghanistan.
The interviews at the schools revealed the central role of the teachers in the Afghan
education system. Testing and self-assessment are barely known by the pupils, resulting
in little direct competition among them. Instead respect towards Islam, the teachers
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and elders define their positions in class and society. The failure to identify the teachers
as important actors, involving them in the laptop project and allowing them to benefit
and influence the project also blocked the access to the pupils. In the case of the laptop
project an early teacher-participation might have brought the unwelcome finding that
the laptop in its current version was unsuitable for Afghan classrooms. A demographic
worth assessing for self-learning, however, is the situation of girls and women in the
insecure provinces, who were reported not to be kept away from learning per se but
simply kept away from appearing in (the potentially dangerous) public.
Other systems, like computer networks or software development are not only more
open to adaptations, but actually require manipulating their “inner workings”. In this
regard the Management Platform for Higher Education (MPHE) might seem like a
perfect local solution. It was conceptualised and programmed based on an in-depth
analysis of higher education administration. Yet the software itself was developed in a
different environment than the one it was intended for and by leaving the safe IDE it
was developed in, it encountered the instability, vulnerabilities and dependencies of the
server it was installed to run on. This, however, was not understood by those who had
only seen a local demonstration of the software in the office PC. Norzad explains: “he
talks only from the database perspective. He knows the processes of the MoHE very
well, he is very strong in this. He is a good requirements engineer. But it’s not only
programming if you want to deploy [MPHE]. It has database part, it has programming
part, it has network part, it has IT part, there is hosting and these things.” (N. &
K. :01:18:18). Translating a technological system into a certain context depends as
much on knowing the local structures as on knowing the technology’s requirements and
adaptability. This example shows how the participation of different technical mediators,
that can be both local or external, can be as essential as cultural mediators as relevant
groups that take part in shaping and appropriating a technology and its use.
Applying Carroll’s notion of ‘completing design in use’ to ICT4D projects, suggests
a new and extended role for trainers and technicians as supportive element in the
development and introduction of a new technology and by accompanying the gradual
extension of functionalities while the users explore and gain control over the system.
The MPHE was modelled after the current university administration, to make sure it
covered all areas and the ‘old system’ could be integrated into the new, digital one.
What it was lacking was the necessary technical support to help integrate the system
into a secure and reliable webserver and equip it with an easy to use interface. As in the
laptop project, there are two levels of appropriation: reaching a point where the MPHE
becomes integrated into a the local (server-) context, runs stably and securely and can
201
11.5 Participation and Technology Appropriation 202
be maintained locally; and introducing it to university staff, who will also need time
and support to understand and explore the system step by step, might request changes,
or ignore certain functions or ask for extensions after some time.
Similarly, the connectivity project would, from a material perspective, have offered
some flexibility, but that seems not to have been open for discussion. As its value was
not questioned, and access to the internet was in itself seen as crucial, it received general
support and acceptance. The network planning was done without the direct involvement
of the universities or assessing their requirements, and the systems were not built based
on local capacities and needs. Concerns concentrated on operational aspects and how
power, internet and network administration could be secured. Yet even with a running
system there was no conception of how the universities could make use of it or expand
its digital services, as Khaled remarked: “we have solved all the problems with the fibre
project, we have centralised servers, we have local servers at faculties, we have divided
the bandwidth according to needs of faculties – but what do they want to do with it?
They don’t know this.” (N. & K. :1:30:51). The whole project was led by the idea that
access in itself would bring the Information Society. This example shows again the
dominance of techno-centric ideas and how an interaction between those configuring the
systems and the universities’ IT personnel later adapting and maintaining them would
have helped appropriate the technology to the different contexts where it runs, with
regard to the considerably different circumstances at the various universities. Secondly,
the participation of lecturers and educators could have led towards the conceptualization
of a more needs based system.
When Kabul University’s Computer Centre (CCKU) was built, the project took a
high risk in its long-term approach, relying on yearly funding cycles to be renewed and
initially were only able to offer short-term contracts for tasks that were planned as
a continuous efforts. While the systems were installed and configured by the staff of
the TUG, regular trainings over the course of several years were held both in Kabul
and Germany to train the configuration and adaptation of open source software, to
expand the services to KU and to hand over responsibility for the system step by
step, as Uzma described “at first [. . .] we were busy before learning how to manage
[CCKU] itself, [...]. Then we trained the new generation of [CCKU] and now they are
working more independently” (U. R. :26:41). Today CCKU is the IT service provider at
Kabul University and its employees, together with TUG, help build computer centres at
other universities. The capacity building was not only based on learning how to use a
ready-made system, but rather how to empower the local IT professionals to make their
own decisions on configurations and adaptations within the network, to conduct their
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Figure 11.2: Participatory Technology Appropriation in ICT projects in developing
countries
own analysis of the situation and suggest new functionalities for the systems that could
then, if required, be developed with external support. Many of these young computer
scientists can be described as champions in negotiating cooperations and attracting new
projects at their universities, they are among the relevant groups, shaping the digital
services the universities offer through the computer centres and they are opinion leaders
as trainers and lecturers, promoting adaptable technologies and open source solutions
instead of closed proprietary systems.
11.6 Conclusion
Participatory technology appropriation (see figure 11.2) adapts the ‘Technology in Use’
view, and advocates an early involvement of champions, opinion leaders and the relevant
groups – including technical consultants and trainers – into the project planning. Not
all stakeholders can be expected to – or need to – understand technical details and
implications, nor is it necessary for the developers and technologists to be aware of details
about the social and cultural context in certain provinces. Not all actors need to be
present and active elements at all times, but all bring relevant and necessary experiences
and information into the process that shapes the project design and evolution and
contributes to a project’s success or failure. Participatory technology appropriation is
neither an easy fix, nor can it offer a technological shortcut to international development
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dilemmas. Project policies and local conflicts might not always make it a valid option,
as some of the examples described in this thesis also suggest. Nor does the ability of
local partners to conduct their own analysis mean they also possess their own decision-
making power. Nonetheless, as argued here, an STS view on ICT4D projects, treating
technology as malleable, open and defined by its users, can reveal fundamental insights
for participatory approaches with a special consideration for champions, opinion leaders
and relevant social groups.
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CHAPTER 12
Conclusion and Outlook
12.1 Main findings
I have looked at different approaches from different fields regarding technology and
development and have concluded only an inter-disciplinary approach can in my view,
cover all the important issues involved. Development studies show the overall framework
that influences development politics and project regulations. How development was,
and is, defined, what areas are prioritised for investments and how the ‘development
aid architecture’ functions frame which projects are implemented on the ground. I have
shown how these settings promote technology-driven approaches in Afghanistan, where
goals and costs are pre-defined by the international stakeholders and participation is
just treated as one small aspect during implementation.
The Communication for Development field offered a good starting-point for look-
ing at where and how communication technologies have been used for international
development since the late 1950s and it continues, as I have shown, to influence how
New ICTs are utilised for development today. While C4D as a field has moved towards
more participatory approaches, the dominant paradigm seems far from “passed”. My
research reveals how ICT continues to be treated as a symbol for (access to) knowledge,
modernity and development. The diffusion of innovations framework has shown to be
useful with regard to the role of local actors, like the early adopters and opinion leaders.
At Kabul University, the first generation of computer science students that started
working in the Computer Centre and were confronted with Open Source technologies,
became influential multipliers not only for their later students, but also by providing
support to universities and colleagues all over the country. The framework has, however,
also clear limitations for this study. For one, it doesn’t explain the role the international
organisations play during the diffusion process. The campus network is perceived as
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beneficial by the universities, but its complexity and questions of compatibility are
mostly hidden and solved externally. The laptop project failed for a number of reasons,
but as the device is not freely available its success never depended on its diffusion. The
involvement of international organisations therefore can be said to have a distorting
effect on the diffusion of innovations and can make their actual diffusion difficult to judge.
The other limit of the diffusion framework is its view on ‘an innovation’ as something
(initially) stable that can be transferred and diffused. The possibility of re-invention is
briefly mentioned by Rogers, but only at later stages of the diffusion. Whereas I argue
in this study that flexibility and the possibility of appropriation of technical innovations,
can be an important prerequisite for their diffusion.
While the participatory communication approaches and the inclusion of local capacity
are a fundamental aspect of my research, I was also interested in technical implications.
What role did the choice of hard- and software for a laptop project play? What technical
problems occurred in the university connectivity project? What different system config-
uration or additional training might have changed or influenced these outcomes? I was
interested in whether technical training was part of the project and what that meant
for sustainability – questions that are of a more technical and practical nature. These
technical details and specifications were mostly absent in C4D publications, technology
was hardly ever detailed beyond a general description of the media category or the
device being used.
The field of ICT4D with its stronger consideration of the technical aspects was there-
fore an important supplement for the development of my theoretical approach. Its
concentration on how technologies are designed, configured and implemented to best
function in a certain context raises awareness for technical implications that are an
important prerequisite for a technological system to work in an unstable environment.
The approach also shows, however, as in the case of the laptop project, how a strong
focus on the technical is often linked with a deterministic view of a technology that just
‘needs to work’, ignoring the fact that how a technology is used is not universal.
Historic, social and cultural circumstances form and influence the actors involved in
ICT projects in Afghanistan and shape their perceptions of technology and development.
With insufficient local participation and concepts for applications, as could be observed,
ICTs provide few advantages and opportunities for the users. Technology is part of a
setting that depends on infrastructure and services, but also implies certain use-concepts
that need to be translated (and adapted) for their use in a different context.
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Science and Technology studies ‘open up the blackbox’, and the story and context
behind a device come into focus. STS looks at how a technology is intended to be used –
and therefore what limitations this might bring – but also how it can be (re)interpreted,
adapted and appropriated for a particular praxis. Technology is shaped by the social,
in its design but also in its use, and it can play a role in shaping behaviour in return.
These mutual influences have also shown to be crucial in understanding and explaining
technology-use in a the Afghan context.
A social constructivist view, as proposed by the SCOT framework, was crucial to set
the social in context with what is often attributed to mere technical aspects. In the
setting described here, neither the laptop nor the campus network reached (temporary)
closure because (the most) relevant groups (the users) were not involved in negotiating
changes. The problems identified by those groups were not addressed sufficiently, or,
as in the case of the laptop, often not addressed at all. As described in the study, the
campus network allows some interpretative flexibility and it can be expected that the
problems experienced by the users will over time lead to changes in the system. The
laptop, however, was already mostly “closed to alternative interpretations”.
The ‘anti-social constructivist’ view of Actor-Network Theory turned out to be crucial for
shifting the focus away from the social to some of the non-social background conditions
and often invisible elements, such as configurations and technical dependencies, that are
also part of the network. With regard to unstable actor-networks as the ones presented
here, however, embedded in unstable societal and physical structures, ANT offers less
means to explore why a network fails to reach stability.
Therefore, while my approach has been inter-disciplinary and I have considered a
number of theoretical perspectives for both the methodological approach as well as the
analysis, I have also shown where the limitations of each of these approaches lie with
regard to this study. I have highlighted the shortcomings of the diffusion of innovations
paradigm, the neglect of technical implications I see in most participatory communica-
tion approaches and I critique the difficulty to extract ‘constructive criticism’ out of
(anti-)social constructivist approaches like SCOT and ANT. Though new to the area
of ICT4D, I suggest the Technology-in-Use and Technology-in-Practice perspectives by
Carroll (2004) and Orlikowski (2000) are the most promising frameworks to analyse
current procedures in education-technology projects in developing countries and to make
suggestions based on elements of participation and empowerment as well as capacity
building and technology appropriation.
With regard to the empirical data, the theoretical approach led to a focus on the
adaption, appropriation and re-configuration of technology. The latter two, making
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a technology relevant for the users and enabling them to gain control over it, have
been shown to be rarely the case in ICT projects in Afghanistan. Digital technologies
have only in the past decade disseminated in Afghanistan and computer scientists
with profound knowledge about their workings are still rare. For a re-configuration
of complex digital technology, as I argue, this profound knowledge is a pre-requisite
but with ‘black-boxed technologies’ often ignored. Efforts are made by the users to
make a technology work and the limits are in most cases not set by satisfaction or
rejection, but by a limited flexibility and resilience of the technology that impedes
further appropriation and re-configuration or by lack of (access to) information how to
overcome these barriers.
Currently, as also demonstrated by Eglash (2004) (see figure 4.1), technological
products are transferred to Afghanistan primarily by international producers and or-
ganisations. Other than Eglash and Pisani et al. (2007), however, I argue that the
‘high social power’ is not exclusively represented by the producers, but in the case
of ICT projects in international development also by those designing the project and
deciding about the technology and its configuration. Similarly to Odumosu (2009) I
have shown that production and consumption can in this context not be seen as two
opposing poles, but must be seen as a continuum. Or as as Orlikowski (2000) and
Carroll (2004) describe it, that a technology in use must be treated differently from
the technology as artefact. Technology appropriation in ICT projects, as has been
shown, is a combined effort of all stakeholders where multiple elements influence the
outcome. This participatory appropriation, as observed in the field, not only depends
on the participation of local stakeholders, but also on those in control of designing and
configuring the devices. Technology introduction, therefore, is a process that is less
about the technological system and more about the ensemble of users and technology
that remains, sometimes more, sometimes less, in constant motion and development.
And even if currently adaptation describes best how the context and technologies are
modified in ICT projects in the Afghan education sector, while appropriation and
‘re-configuration’ of technologies are still rare, once a growing number of users have
gained control, a growing number of re-configurations and new technological inventions,
that fill gaps in Afghan user demands, will follow.
The biggest challenges for participatory appropriation are the aforementioned poli-
cies and regulations of the development aid architecture; the persistent deterministic
view on technology and the belief in its transformative power to change a ‘traditional
society’ into an ‘Information Society’; and a dominant attitude among those working
with technology in the development aid sector, that the technology experienced ‘West’
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needs to teach those in need of development how to follow their example. This attitude
of superiority many international consultants demonstrate in relation to the Afghans
and the persisting binary opposition of ‘us’ and ‘them’ that was observed in many
interviews, reflect some of the central criticisms first addressed by postcolonial theorists
almost 40 years ago. The uncontested promotion of Western concepts, knowledge and
technologies as representations for development and progress simultaneously suppress
any efforts of true empowerment in a Freirean sense that would shift the emphasis to
local abilities, perspectives and solutions. In the examples given in this study, control
over the technical systems remained with the international actors and local initiative
was more often described as problematic than welcome.
ICT projects in international development continue to be driven by this deterministic
view on how technologies are used, localisation mostly concerns only the language and
adaptations by the users are seen as a side-effect at best.
I suggest in this thesis that the awareness that technological capabilities are often
marginal in developing countries should lead to a setting where technical expertise
and local expertise are combined in participatory technology appropriation to make
a technological system work in its use-context. The goal, therefore, needs to shift
from “making a technology work” to “making a technology work for the users” with
empowerment of the local partners to gain control over the system to be able make their
own choices as a central element. The perspective that the design of a technological
system is completed by its users Carroll (2004) offers a useful concept to analyse the
project framework and its dependencies and to help developing a participatory solution
for technology appropriation.
12.2 Looking back...
I heard from several friends and colleagues that ‘if I had known how hard it was going
to be, I’m not sure I would have started this PhD’ – and I agree that there were things I
would have liked to avoid and issues I did not expect to be so hard. But I was, and still
am, grateful for the opportunity to look in-depth into things that I could previously,
while working as a technology consultant in Afghanistan, only observe on the surface.
This research certainly changed the way I will continue to work in this area and I hope
it can also contribute to how others see it and plan ICT4D projects.
Knowing the field, I was prepared for data collection to pose a challenge. What I had
not sufficiently taken into consideration when I started my research were the challenges
posed by my interdisciplinary approach. Reading and understanding approaches to
my central themes – technology, development, context and participation – from very
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different disciplines took considerable time and caused many doubts. I felt unable to
understand the history and evolution of each field as thoroughly as I would have liked,
read all relevant authors and keep an eye on recent developments. Most conferences I
attended belonged to one of the above mentioned fields of research and I repeatedly felt
I did not ‘fit in’ properly or was not, as one colleague described it jokingly, part of their
religion.
In addition to the theoretical triangle, my data is based on action research and practical
work and in several cases on me being part of the scenario I researched. I was surprised
to find few other scholars with ongoing practical experience and involvement in how to
use media and communication technologies for social development beyond occasional
research projects. I am aware that it is not without risk to venture the balancing
act of being academically neutral whilst personally involved, but it also offered many
advantages. I would certainly have found it useful to discuss and share the pros and
cons with more people who find themselves in a similar position.
One of the limiting aspects of my research was the fact that I could not freely decide
when and where I would conduct my research but first of all I depended on applying for
a job in the field that would allow me access to all important sites, but also provide the
safe environment that is needed when doing research in a conflict zone. The period I
spent in Afghanistan to conduct my research was at an earlier time than I would have
chosen and the preparation was difficult and time consuming. The research itself was
at a time when attacks were more frequent and I was regularly confronted with the
choice to follow the official ‘white city’ security status (that in fact imposed a strict
curfew for those working for the UN and other international organisations) or attend
an appointment that I was never sure could be rescheduled. I took risks during data
collection, like the unaccompanied trip back from School Three, where I also put the
driver in an uncomfortable situation; and I had to cancel a visit to Mazar-e- Sharif, where
I had intended to visit the university and talk to university network administrators,
because of a riot where several UN employees had been killed. I knew I had those three
months and I could not easily interrupt my stay or return a year later and I had to
make the best use of it.
12.3 Scholars and practitioners
Development Communication and ICT for Development have always had a strong practi-
cal focus and an applied side to them. Working in both areas, however, I have repeatedly
wondered why there is no stronger link between research and project implementation.
“We have no real evidence of a specific impact” was a statement I have heard repeatedly
together with the claim for more impact analyses. If millions are spent on technology
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pilots, I keep wondering, why is more money not invested in independent research on
technology in development aid programs? This would allow us to build future projects
based on more than the ‘anecdotal evidence’ mentioned in the introduction. I have
experienced myself how tricky it can be to gain access to the sensitive issues of a project
and how difficult it can be for project initiators, on the other hand, to apply for funding
of impact analyses – beyond the obligatory M&E report. If governments and big donor
organisations would invest more in research cooperation with universities and research
institutions (also those in the ‘developing world’), practitioners and scholars could benefit
from the results and research would become a more natural aspect of international
development.
As an academic, as well as a practitioner, I would also like to see more conferences,
workshops or other forms of gatherings where practitioners and researchers exchange
ideas. I have experienced both sides accusing the other of their limitations. Practitioners
often feel new approaches coming from academia are not applicable to the field, while
academia finds it hard to communicate research findings to a crowd outside the journal-
reading scholars. This may, however, be an issue that most disciplines see themselves
confronted with.
12.4 Outlook
As already indicated above, I call for more and stronger cooperation between those
working and researching in the same area but approaching it from different disciplines.
In particular in the area of communication technologies and development I see very
little cooperation and exchange between computer scientists, communication scholars
and the social scientists. Not despite, but because of, fundamental differences in
approaching the field, am I convinced interdisciplinary research-teams could make
important contributions, for theory as well as for development practice.
Future research that could build on this thesis might also look at different strategies
regarding how a stronger participation in all stages of ICT projects in developing countries
could be enabled and organised. The field of user-centred-design could provide some
promising approaches together with the already mentioned field of Information Systems.
The introduction of a technological system into an organisation and its adaptation and
appropriation by the users as described by Orlikowski (2000) and Carroll (2004) provide
an interesting perspective that could be explored and tested further for research in
developing countries; including the question of how the local partners could be involved
more strongly in project evaluation to communicate their views regarding results and
project continuation.
And finally I would welcome seeing empirical research on the ‘institutional settings’
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that I have criticised and made responsible for some of the limitations described in this
study. In my research I looked at concrete examples in a particular context. Several
anthropologists have suggested to ‘study up’ and to look at those in power in international
development instead of researching only those at the ‘receiving end’ (Nader (1972),
Mosse (2013)). Though my research focus included technology designers, international
development aid professionals and representatives of some of the donor organisations,
looking at the broader institutional settings of international development and decisions
regarding technology could, in my opinion, add considerable value to this area of research.
Some of the questions might include: what dominant views on technology and their role
for international development prevail in big donor organisations, what roles are given
to ‘experts’ with regard to complex technological systems, as well as, if, and how, a
participatory technology appropriation approach might be feasible for large development
programs.
12.5 Concluding statement
I was repeatedly asked during my research if I would also add some positive examples
that could function as role models. I had two different replies for that question, the short
one was “yes, but...”, the long one was “no, because...”. There are positive examples, as
also described in this study, but they are confronted with the same structural problems as
other projects, only they tend to take the risk of deviating from the standard procedures.
And secondly, the idea of ICT4D role models that can be followed, is one of the central
problems of technology in international development, as I hope to have clearly illustrated
here.
There are some fundamental problems with how technology projects in international
development are conceptualised and expected to be organised and, as a consequence,
continue to be managed and implemented. The fact that technologies become ever more
complex and remain a mystery to the vast majority of users while, at the same time,
an increasing number of people depend on them, gives those in control of the technical
systems a lot of power and responsibility. This imbalance between the ‘experts’ and the
‘users’ has, as I have shown, also a reinforcing effect on the existing power-imbalance
that divides the ‘technology experienced West’ from the ‘technology inexperienced
Developing Country’. The findings of this study suggest that the perception of technology
and development, as well as the perception of technology in development need to be
reconsidered in order to address this imbalance in the long run.
I hope the findings presented in this study encourage those working and researching
in the area of ICT and social development to think out of the blackbox, leave the
‘standard procedures’ and reconsider empowerment and participation with regard to
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ICT. And I hope it can contribute to a rethinking of the role and meaning of technology
in international development, not as a fixed product that can be imported, but as a
structure that needs to be built in collaboration with, and between those, who are
currently predominantly only involved as distant contractors and ‘invited participants’:
the technical experts as well as the local users.
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translated by Samie.
U. R. . Uzma Rezai, Interview on April 25th 2011 in Kabul, Afghanistan. Uzma Rezai is
a lecturer at the Computer Science Department at Kabul University and also teaches
basic IT training at other faculties.
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APPENDIX A
Quotes
A.1 .
At a time when I was researching technology use among young Afghans, I had an
informal conversation with Mahmood, one of my colleagues at Kabul University. He had
at the time just graduated, a young Afghan man who was excited about the Internet
and its possibilities and loved chatting with strangers from all over the world. I could
sometimes catch sight of his Yahoo-messenger, which I knew included more than 200
contacts, and was regularly flashing with hearts and hugging teddy bears. He kept asking
me for some Romanian phrases as he, he then explained, had a Romanian girlfriend now
and was chatting with her. He then told me how the Internet made it possible to get in
contact even with young Afghan women without their families finding out and causing
them trouble. Some girls, he went on, had become reluctant to give out their phone
numbers as they were afraid of threats or obscene calls, but chatting was by most seen as
safe. Months later, when I interviewed him and specifically asked about the benefits he
saw in the Internet and new technologies he could not think of any other than education,
information and news. He had never seemed embarrassed telling me about his latest
chat girlfriends, or being seen by me spending hours chatting to strangers, but it just
did not occur to him that this might be of any interest to me during the interview.
A.2 .
“A couple of years ago it happened, when Taliban come to the school and
they saw the books and they said no, this is wrong book, stop, close all the
schools. [. . .] because the books are not good, the way it was written, the
way it has pictures on them, it’s not good, we are against it. So they say
close! So there were all those teachers, all the men in districts, the education
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director, they were confused ‘why should we close the school?’ So they went
to all the elders and they said you are the elders of this province or village or
district so go to the Taliban and tell them why should we close the school?
For what reason? So they went to the Taliban and they said why? They said
we are against the books, the books are not in a proper way. So the teachers,
all the teachers agreed and said ok, we are going to throw these books away,
so we need you guys to bring us the book. So they tell the elders, they went
back to the Taliban, they say like ’ok, they stopped teaching them on the
same book, so they are going to throw away the books. So they need you
guys to bring them the books’. So the Taliban said ’no no, it’s ok. Let them
just study on the same books’. (laughter)”
(S. Z. :01:03:17)
A.3 .
“Then I started googleing around [‘time on task’], then I started googleing
around ‘what does an effective education mean’ anyway? And I found these
UNESCO reports and the education for equality imperative report and you
know the importance of feedback, instruction, blabla. So then I thought
ok well, if this is what is accepted as an effective education, that should
have these ingredients – which makes sense, you have to have some sort of
defined curriculum, you have to have the time to learn that curriculum, you
have to have feedback on learning outcomes, if you are missing any of these -
it’s not effective education. This doesn’t seem like rocket science. And so I
thought ok well, lets look at where is it right now and where could we use
this laptop to fill the gaps? [...] and that’s how we got to the problem. This
is a huge problem. And the more we asked, everybody would say yes this is
the problem.”
(ibid. [57:24])
A.4 .
“I don’t blame politicians and the minister and so on. Because 50% of the
schools doesn’t have a building. And it’s really really hard to push this
message. They will say that, come on, we don’t have a building, we don’t
have chairs to sit, and you are coming with this luxurious computers? But,
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I totally disagree with them. Because as [...] the founder of these laptop,
he said something very good and it really touched me. He said that these
computers are like someone who needs food, you can not just say that no,
food is not important for you. These computers are something like food. It’s
not something luxurious. If you cannot provide these laptops to every kid,
but to the amount that you can provide, let them provide. It’s like, food,
you can not just stop someone from eating.”
(H. D. :11:10)
A.5 .
“They had a project called government communication network. And then
they started another one called district communication network, and another
one, village communication network, DCN, GCN and VCN, right? The GCN
was connecting the government ministries and institutions together. It was
successful because there were some activities in ministries, just like still they
did not have some really good projects on what sort of services they should
be doing. Or what sort of communications they would be doing and what
are the standards and all these, right? But still it was effective. And GCN
was connecting the provincial governor offices, headquarters, but all it was
used for was the telephone. You know, you take your telephone, call me in
Kabul or your relevant line ministry, oral communication that was all they
did. [...] when it came to the DCN it was completely a failure and VCN
was the same. Not sure what sort of a plan they had for the services, what
sort of data...[...] the reason was the lack of expertise and then not having
a holistic approach, right? They were just concerned about connecting the
two rooms. Now what these two rooms are doing with this connection was
never in the plan. The service side of it.”
(H. Q. :2:04:25)
A.6 .
“Now we have four official sub-departments: education, technical, online
support and websites and database. We are working in four section. For
the networking structure we work for 24 universities to provide networking
structure for them. We computerize the work of MoHE and the university
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as well and now we have a database with a higher education management
information system (MPHE). We completed this project and implemented it.
At four Kabul based universities it’s now running. Now we work to extend
it to other universities of provinces as well. Another project that we have,
some capacity building projects. We have CISCO academies here, we have
eight CISCO academy running by this department now. So we have the
ICDL (International Computer Driving License) program as well. Also we
have 24 website for our university and website of ministry, that is also run by
this department now. We have some digital libraries, we have some portals.
Such things going on here.”
(F. B. :00:12: 07)
A.7 .
“When it comes to routing problems and someone who is sitting at UCL in
London and has never been there is concerned with the routing in Nangahar
where we have three different internet sources, then that is pretty far away.
At the same time, locally there is no one capable to offer a solution for the
routing problem either. That’s something we really have to struggle with and
try to find local companies like [X] to rely on their technical know-how and
include them. Because the universities have nothing useful to offer. Despite
the people from Berlin1 a lot of questions remain unanswered. Despite the
master.”
(F. T. :01:10:17)
A.8 .
“Actually in 2008, the first time it was a request from president Karzai to
provide internet connection and IT facility for Afghanistan’s universities.
It was the first starting. After that we requested from them. Now we are
requesting - they have money, we are requesting from the [military] and
they are providing the facility of that. [...] the projects are running by this
department, so we are working closely with the universities. We have in
every year, an inventory from the universities, we know the requirements of
1 There is a computer science master program in Berlin especially for Afghans coming from Afghan
universities across the country. He is referring to the graduates that returned to their universities
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the universities, then in coordination with universities, we propose to the
[military alliance] and [the military alliance] is providing the IT facilities.”
(F. B. :00:27:37)
A.9 .
“Because it was troubling to me A that there was no consistency as a dean
you think about consistency and stuff. No consistency in the course content,
the qualifications of the teachers or the amount of instructional time or the
outcomes. Nothing. I mean it was just like they finished - ok fine. What
do they know? We had no competency based outcomes. So I was really
in ICDL and that’s what we are using now. That takes care of all of it,
because the teachers have to be certified so I know they had to go through
ICDL themselves, they have to pass the test for a trainer, they can’t be
trainers if they aren’t. So they all have the same credentials at least the
same base-credentials, the stuff that we are teaching is consistent and that
it’s internationally recognized which is a service to those who finish and they
want to get a job they know what they’ve got.”
(C. O. :50:29)
A.10 .
“We were there with him in a meeting. He started to say he bought a
license for $60000 or something for a windows server. First question was who
told you to use Microsoft platform? Ok, it’s done. He said ‘I will give the
super user to the dean of university’. All the data will be, he has to enable,
disable the lecturer accounts, the dean accounts, the data entry. If someone
compromises his account - what will happen? If there is simple key logger
on his system. Or if he doesn’t know, he might give it to his assistant. He
is playing with the whole university data. He can modify anything. And
the other thing is, what supporting IT infrastructure you have for that in
the MoHE? All the universities are accessing thing at the same time, cause
registration and everything is at the same time. It will be overloaded. You
need system planning there, system will go down. He said no. He has no
reason, but he didn’t listen. I calculated it for them. But he said no, because
he talks only from the database perspective. He knows the processes of
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the MoHE very well, he is very strong in this. He is a good requirements
engineer. But it’s not only programming if you want to deploy [MPHE]. It
has database part, it has programming part, it has network part, it has IT
part, there is hosting and these things. And you should estimate the load.”
(N. & K. :01:18:18)
A.11 .
“ And that is because their staff, the staff working over there they feel that
“if a private firm is doing our job then why should we be here?”. Rather the
ministry needs to convey this message to them that ok, the private firm will
do their job for you but you are going to maintain it. Because we can’t allow
any private firm to come here and have access to the information. This is a
message that needs to be conveyed to them that these private companies are
not replacing you. They will give you a solution and get the burden from
your shoulders. And then you just need to maintain the system. If there
is any problem in the system, you will not be accountable, the company is
accountable for it. They will come here and fix it for you. Only thing is you
just give your services.”
(I. M. :22:16)
A.12 .
The key distinction in my view to make, an IT manager, basically is just
you could say an installer and maintainer. Right. Making a system, putting
a system in place, making sure the electricity and the backup and you know
the wiring and they help-desk, because frequently things break down. Versus
a CIO. The CIO is more about how does the ICT infrastructure that one
might have support the mission and enhance the mission, make it more
effective and efficient and so forth. It’s the role of that person to know what
is the responsibility. [. . .] I’m sure there’s technical definitions for CIO but I
mean the key emphasis, the thing I’m trying to emphasize is information as
opposed to IT
(D. K. :01:01:11)
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A.13 .
“I went down to visit [the IT guy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] when
he was still in that job and he took me around, showed me all the servers
and all the computers and everything, and as we were walking around I kept
seeing all these manual processes going on, xeroxing something, put in a
three-ring binder, putting the binder together, putting it in a cabinet. So at
the end of the day I said “I’m following that this is all kind of interesting
but what do you do here?”. And he goes, “well we get all these reports from
our embassies around the world, we xerox all the copies of the report, we
package them up and send them back to the embassy”. I say why don’t you
do that electronically, why do you? Cause I say you have the information
network here. “Oh no we can’t do that because then these people will be out
of their job”. [...] so there is nothing like how do you retrain people, how do
you train them to fill in some of the IT jobs. It’ just not part of the culture.”
(P. R. :01:16:04)
A.14 .
“I had to write an implementation plan, for the entire country. Which again
I just completed about three weeks ago. And it went through [U.S. aid
policy]. And it’s going as a package to the president Karzai [...]. It’s a three
year plan, it involves all ministries,[...] So it’s about a 70 million enterprise
for three years to create a program management system in the country, so
that all the investments can be followed through and people can see, when
they’re investing money in the central treasury, they can see the money
flowing through the projects that they are interested in.[...] if we consider
ourselves as children and we consider the constraints that our parents put
on us, we did not wake up in the morning and say: I want to be told when I
have to go to bed. Did we? We didn’t jump up in the morning and say: I
want to be told when to do my homework. And I want the constraints that
my parents put on my life. We didn’t do that. We thought we do best, in
fact, frankly we couldn’t understand how come our parents were still alive
they were so stupid. Right? Point is, that we’re old enough to be parents we
recognize that the child has its own agenda, which is not always, in fact most
of the time not at its best interest, (laugh) especially in terms of survival.
So there is, like it or not, a degree of parochialism required in this situation.
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Secretary Rice used to say there was a dark side to the Afghanistan compact.
And that it was time we started to realize that and to impose it. So this
goes down to those nasty words like conditionality. The acceptance of the
system will come when they realize that’s where the money comes from. No
acceptance no money. And that way, our tax payers in our home countries
have some degree of assurance that this does not become a great gaping moor
in which we continue to pour money so that the poor people can become
poorer and others can become rich on their backs. So it’s really a question,
it is a question of conditionality and the condition is: here is the system
through which the money flows. If you don’t like it, then you don’t get the
money.”
(P. O. :13:34)
A.15 .
“So, where I’m getting at is this system deals with effects. It’s effects based
management. Why are you going to built a school is the first question. So it
creates an information environment which can fee to the deciders to decide
whether a school is needed to begin with. If a school is the intervention
that’s needed then it has the complete set of planning tools for developing
the school and then it has all the controls where we get into the traditional
sense of quality control and financial control for a project. So you can seize
it, you know, the $100 000 is actually going to built a school not going off to
Ahmed’s back pocket. And then it has a measurement tool in the end of it,
set of measurement tools in the end of it, which allow you to assess at the
appropriate amount, the appropriate distance from the project did you get
the effect you wanted. So the money is tertiary to this. It’s deciding what’s
needed, planning it properly, executing it properly and then figuring out if
you got the result you wanted and the money is simply a tool, that comes in
in a third or forth instance.”
(P. O. :18:32)
A.16 .
“India and Pakistan have gone through 20, 30 years of this [...] so they
haven’t got to the end of the path yet but they’re on the path. And also their
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economies have never really been infected by the aid bug and the aid virus.
So they don’t have the USAIDs and the GTZs and the other hiring people
for lets say massive salaries for mediocre capabilities. And consequently they
can come here and deliver a better looking product for a much lower price.
And they will do that. So a confusing factor in the market place is the Indian
and Pakistani influence. [...] Now there is the Afghan first policy here which
is, if you want the thing to grow you got to support it, so you’re required to
go Afghan first. But I’ll tell you the people most guilty of not doing that
are the Westerners who wrote the policy. (laugh) So I understand why they
wouldn’t, cause why would you pay, if you are a profit based development
industry player and you can buy it for 10 Rs outside the country, you can
buy it for 100 Rs inside the country, you’re gonna buy the 10 Rs export,
right? Same product. You know, either it works or it doesn’t.”
(P. O. :01:00:02)
A.17 .
“The Afghan government has not realized, so far has not realized the im-
portance of science and engineering and technology education. I have been
telling in every meeting, informing, telling them that the rest of the world,
especially the developed world, have been developed because of the devel-
opments in science and technologies. And we have to follow that. So I had
a meeting with the chancellor of Kabul Polytechnic University yesterday
morning and I mentioned this to him. And he agreed with me, and he
mentioned to me that sadly there are people in the country that they do
not agree with this, they can not realize the importance of this. [...] The
government is not very professional. The people, for instance the people
at the top of the ministry at higher education, [. . .] he’s graduated from
a madrassa in Iran. How he would realize the importance of science and
engineering education?”
(T. F. :27:12)
A.18 .
“ [A]t the beginning [we] did not have any laboratory for all students and
our class was quite a big class, we were 120 students in the same class. But
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because I was working in [CCKU] so I had more chances to do some practical
work and learn more. At that time we were building a PC lab for the faculty,
so I was also working there and building the network there and installing
PCs, servers and so. I was more in the practical also, I could learn more, but
the people who did not have this chance, were not learning so much because
of the practical work. Now also this year we will have a PC lab but for the
past two or three years there were also no PC labs, so I think students had
a difficult time learning practical.”
(R. K. :05:13)
A.19 .
Positions are not primarily based on merit or qualification. The dean of the computer
science faculty is a mathematician with no academic background in IT and little
experience with it. He had served at the science faculty for several decades, and when
the computer science department became an independent faculty in 2009 the main reason
for his nomination was “he was older than every one” (U. R. :23:25). There are six levels,
every three years the lecturers can apply to step up one level, from Pohyalai, Phanyar,
Pohanmal, Pohandoi, Pohanwal and finally Pohand, which is the full professorship (ibid.
[25:09]). When the faculty and its departments were established the younger lecturers
were not involved.
A.20 .
“And one of the sad things that I have experienced is that unfortunately the
academics at most institutions, these institutions that I have been visiting,
KU, KPU and ICTI1 - they are not committed to their jobs. Their jobs at
the universities are primarily a secondary job. The main job is somewhere
at an NGO or an international organization and this is one of the major
reasons that why there has been a lack of say major progress. And I hope the
Afghan government will realize this and will rectify this. Because they just
come and do their bare minimum and then run away and work in another
organization for the rest of the day. This is sad.”
(T. F. :25:11)
1 Kabul University, Kabul Polytechnic University and Information and Communication Technology
Institute
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Conflicts
B.1 Ethnic and political conflicts
In Afghan everyday life I have experienced many conflicts and discussions regarding
ethnicity, political affiliations and discrimination, and tried to address the issue during
the interviews in different ways. However, the topic was avoided by most if asked
directly, leading to answers like “we are all Afghans” or “we have no such problems
here”. Only some of the younger generation interviewees openly gave their opinion on
policies based on politics or ethnicity, while at the same time telling me it was not
an issue they would discuss with their parents. One member of the CCKU’s parents
worked for the communist government during the 1980s and he often, half jokingly,
half seriously, defended how everything was better during the Soviet occupation. His
colleagues were teasing him and I asked if they ever discussed these issues with their
parents, which they denied. There seemed to be no critical reflection of personal family
history – or at least no desire to talk about it – but an urge to look ahead and not
become part of these conflicts. Another reason might be that they were not part of any
government or project structure. They neither had to defend themselves nor the sys-
tem they were part of. Possibly this position also made it easier to criticise the status quo.
When I asked how one of the ministry employees, who was often described as incom-
petent, got his position, Norzad explained,
“you know there are different ethnics here, they said from this ethnic we need
one guy from this faculty [...]. It doesn’t matter who. Because unfortunately
the ministers, and the big positions are divided by these ethnics, Pashtun,
Hazara and Tajik. [...] Each ministry, one deputy should be from the other
one. So if the Hazara is the minister, Pashtun should come for one Deputy
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and Tajik the other. [...] This is the politics part. So the situation is difficult,
they also have fights with each other and different groups supporting them.”
(N. & K. :1:37:00)
But at university these ethnic differences played much less of a role and in particular
at the CCKU, they emphasised, people were not chosen according to ethnic affiliation.
“If they are all Pashtun it’s fine. If they are all Hazara it’s fine. If they are
mixed it’s fine. Fortunately we have most of them anyway. But we focus
only on the work. And all want to give their best.”
(N. & K. :1:38:57)
Though I remember conversations when new students were hired at the CCKU, it
was taken into consideration to have a balance between different ethnic groups. In most
governmental institutions there is at least a strong awareness of ethnic identity, often
closely monitored by outsiders as well. Even if there were currently no disagreements,
as Baseer Omar described his situation at the MoHE, issues of authority and unfair
behaviour regularly come up.
“[M]aybe you know we have also this ethnic group problem as well, because
he belong from another group I’m belonging. Right now we don’t have
misunderstandings between the ethnic group and he believes me on my work.
At that time he didn’t believe me. All the time he told me ok, they pay
you a lot of money and I know there will be no result from your work [...].
However he wasn’t my supervisor, my supervisor is [the vice minister], but I
have to coordinate with him, you know.”
(B. M. O. :01:03:11)
Ethnic affiliation is still something people are very much aware of, in particular for
Pashtuns belonging to certain families or clans. Marriages outside one’s own ethnic
group are still the exception, as are marriages between Sunni and Shia Muslims. Political
positions also seem to be something people are aware of, which department or university
was pro-Iran or pro-communist, or supported which presidential candidate, and this was
often linked to ethnicity and origin. However these were – at least in conversations I
was involved in – much less discussed in public, particularly anything after the Soviet
invasion in 1979, if linked to personal or family history. One interview participant asked
me at the end of our interview to turn off the recording, since then he could tell me some
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of the positive aspects of his life during the Taliban time. He said he was sure I could
not understand, but he would tell me nonetheless. In his memory women were safe back
then, because they stayed at home and since they were not allowed to learn, they also
did not aspire to becoming anything but a wife and mother. The presence of a young,
European woman doing research for her Ph.D. might thus also have avoided the topic,
expecting I would neither understand anything about the Soviet era, or about traditional
Islam. What many others liked to recollect were the peaceful and prosperous 1960s
and 70s, “back then the female students at Kabul University were wearing mini-skirts”
seemed to be one of the favourite memories, at least to tell a Western visitor.
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History
C.1 Afghan history 1919 - 1978
1919 - 1929
Afghanistan entered the twentieth century with little difference as to how it entered 1800
in terms of transportation, communication, industry or education (Barfield: 2010:165).
Political power was, until 1978, monopolized by the Durrani, a Pashtun tribal dynasty,
and concentrated on Kabul, which led to an ever widening gap between the political and
intellectual elite in Kabul and the vast majority of widely illiterate regionally organised
tribes. Afghanistan became independent in 1919, after the third Anglo-Afghan war
initiated by king Amanullah. He established, in the following years, diplomatic relations
with first the Soviet Union and then Europe which raised the status of Afghanistan
across the Muslim world (Barfield: 2010:182). He tried to quickly implement a number
of democratization and industrialization measures, the most significant one being the
constitution of 1923, including the promotion of equal rights and the expansion of the
educational system, including formal education for woman. His attempt to extend
government power, the newly established taxation laws and the perceived interference
with family life, however, led tribal elders, farmers and religious leaders to join a rebellion
against these changes and finally forced Amanullah into exile in 1929 (Jäkel: 1972:124).
1929 - 1978
His successor Habibullah, one of the leaders of the revolt and also the first non-Pashtun
to rule the country, abolished all reforms, but his reign remained short and only nine
months later he was killed by allies of the former king. He was followed by Nadir Shah, a
member of the ruling dynasty and distant cousin of Amanullah, who called himself “not
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the king but the servant of the tribes and the country” (Gregorian, 1969 in (Barfield:
2010:195)). Though related, Nadir Shah did not belong to a line of family that had
ever before been considered for amirship. His regime was recognized and financially
supported by the British but faced persistent opposition in Afghanistan by Amanullah’s
supporters. Shortly after he had assembled a loya jirga1 who approved his request
of formally suspending the royal rights of Amanullah and his heirs, he was killed in
a revenge attack in 1933. Based on the loya jirga’s declaration, his son Zahir Shah
immediately followed his reign, and would remain king for the following 40 years in
relative peace and internal stability.
Under Zahir Shahs reign, which was dominated by his uncle’s premiership until the
1960s, Afghanistan underwent cautious social and economic changes, first implemented in
Kabul and then slowly moving into the provinces. Internal stability became the highest
priority, taxes on rural production were gradually eliminated in return for political
subservience (Barfield: 2010:198) and the tension between Kabul and the countryside
subsided. From the 1950s onwards, under the increasing attention of the rivals Soviet
Union and the United States, a modern army and police force was built up, education
was expanded and a basic infrastructure of roads, bridges, dams, and power lines was
built (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: 2006:30), mainly through foreign aid and loans.
The retreat of the British and Pakistan’s independence in 1947 led to ongoing (and
still not fully resolved) conflicts between the two countries about the affiliation of the
border region. Pakistan repeatedly blocked off border traffic, which had serious economic
consequences for Afghanistan’s already limited export market. By 1973 two-thirds of
its annual revenue was derived from foreign grants and loans (Fry, 1974 in (Barfield:
2010:205)). Zahir Shah finally took the reins of power in 1964 and established a limited
parliamentary system, however no political parties were permitted, and power remained
largely within the existing extended family. He was replaced in 1973 by his cousin Daud,
who had also been prime-minister during the 1960s, in a largely bloodless coup, while
Zahir Shah was abroad. Daud declared the end of the monarchy and made himself the
president of the republic of Afghanistan. The changes in government structures and the
expansion of the educational system had by then led to an increasing number of educated
young people in the bigger cities, with rising expectations in terms of public service,
infrastructure and the standard of living (Barfield: 2010:212), which the government
widely failed to meet. Simultaneously the rural areas received little attention from the
1 A “grand assembly”, gathering elders and community leaders from across the country to discuss
matters of major national importance
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central government officials, 95% of the population were still illiterate and concerned
with feeding their families, rather than political ideologies (Brechna: 2005:261). This
caused a strong mutual mistrust on both sides. Radical political views gained popularity,
communist and Islamist groups fought on the streets of Kabul. A communist coup by
the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and the Afghan Army in 1978
ended Daud’s life and his republic, and terminated 230 years of Durrani rule.
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APPENDIX D
Master Thesis
Summary of main findings of Stilz (2009)
I could make out three groups of actors within the local actors that I described as ‘Young
Experts’, ‘Exile Afghans’ and ‘Senior Officials’ who took prominent roles in donor-funded
public sector ICT projects. The first group was mainly the younger generation Afghans
who had been living, and had often gone to school, abroad and had access to ICT
before returning to Afghanistan. For them computers and the internet offered many
possibilities, on a personal level as well as career-wise, and helped them to stay in touch
with the world outside Afghanistan, with family and friends, but also with information
and entertainment.
The group I called “Exile Afghans” are Afghans who had lived abroad for several decades,
often studied in Europe or the US and who now held key positions in government insti-
tutions. They had lived and worked in recent years in environments where the technical
infrastructure and high-speed internet were taken for granted, and also belonged to the
large group within the Afghan government that is regularly referred to as “technocrats”.
What I summarised as “Senior Officials” comprises members of university or ministerial
staff, who had not lived abroad and whose first personal experiences with communica-
tion technologies usually took place in recent years. Among this group are university
professors, government officials and advisers.
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